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Between 1946 and 1950, the U.S. State Department repeatedly expressed its de-
termination to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized and offered pledges regarding 
the extended presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe. At the same time, and initially 
unbeknownst to the State Department, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were making plans to 
arm Germany in response to the growing Soviet threat to Western Europe. In September 
1950, in reaction to the communist invasion of South Korea that had prompted fears the 
same would happen in Germany, the United States decided to arm the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Although coupled with a pledge to increase the number of U.S. troops in 
Europe, the U.S. decision resulted in a number of unintended consequences including a 
Congressional challenge to Presidential power, opposition by and discord among U.S. 
Allies, loss of control over the rearmament process, and the establishment of a new set of 
relations with its erstwhile enemy. While the actual outcome of that 1950 decision was 
positive, i.e., the arming of the Federal Republic of Germany was approved, the creation 
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On 9 May 1955, exactly ten years after the armed forces of Germany’s Third 
Reich surrendered unconditionally ending the war in Europe, the black, red and gold col-
ors of the flag of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was raised at the Supreme 
Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Rocquencourt, France, alongside those 
of the other fourteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), most 
of whom had been Germany’s enemies just ten years earlier.
1
 A resurrected West Germa-
ny had been granted full sovereignty and authorized to create an armed force after years 
of debate within the United States Government and between it and the governments of its 
West European allies. This Cold War event occurred because of the reversal of a major 
U.S. policy decision made before World War II ended to keep Germany disarmed and 
demilitarized for generations. This dissertation is a history of that reversal and the com-
plications that attended it. 
In revisiting this rearmament debate, this dissertation will cover ground well trod 
by others, as the scholarly historical literature of this first decade of the Cold War is vast. 
It also reflects what Marc Trachtenberg has identified as a real “gap between the disci-
plines,” i.e., that among diplomatic historians there has been a neglect of the military as-
pects of the period before 1950 whereas military historians have equally neglected this 
period’s politics.
2
 This dissertation examines both military and political dimensions of the 
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German rearmament process and with respect to the evidence goes where others have not, 
i.e., with the exception of Chapter 6, my dissertation has been developed primarily from 
either unseen, neglected, or underexamined files of the Department of State and its Office 
of European Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Policy Planning Staff, Supreme Head-
quarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) found in the National Archives as well as 
previously classified histories, some unpublished, of the U.S. Army, Europe 




These documents go beyond the existing literature on German rearmament by 
providing insights to the underlying discussions and rationale that led to the decisions 
made within the Departments of both State and Defense. Bringing these documents into 
the light of day and adding their contents to the existing scholarship adds context and 
depth to previously addressed but understudied issues such as the lack of U.S. prepared-
ness to defend Western Europe in the face of possible Soviet aggression both before and 
after the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb, and U.S. military plans to arm West 
Germany that began as early as 1948.
4
 They also document and provide additional mean-
ing to the debates within the Department of State over the question of rearming Germany 
and those that took place between officials of the Departments of State and Defense prior 
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to the formal presentation of the U.S. decision of September 1950 to arm the Germans. 
Using formerly classified USAREUR and USAFE documents, this dissertation will show 
the efforts of and the obstacles faced by the U.S. military services in planning for the cre-
ation of a new German armed force. Last, the archival documentation will show that 
while the United States had no intention of incurring a long-term defense commitment in 
Europe, American officials believed that they had no choice but to make repeated assur-
ances that U.S. forces would remain in Europe as long as needed both to deter the Soviets 
and to protect its European allies against an imagined German revanchism. 
The evidence I present supports several conclusions that call for a revision of cer-
tain conventional views about West German rearmament and the beginnings of the Cold 
War. These conclusions include the following. First, once the decision was made to 
change standing U.S. national policy and arm the Germans, the United States government 
lost effective control of the process when it ceded direction of the implementation of 
German rearmament to France. Second, despite the efforts by two U.S. administrations, 
neither their pleas nor their threats could save the European Defense Community (EDC) - 
the entity under which Germany was to be rearmed - from defeat. Third, the U.S.’s total 
commitment to German rearmament within the EDC precluded consideration of an alter-
native. When a solution to the German rearmament problem was found following the de-
feat of the EDC, the U.S. found itself pledging an open-ended troop commitment on the 
European continent, a pledge that remains in force today.     
Conventional wisdom attributes the arming of the FRG to the Korean War. In his 
introduction to The German Rearmament Question, Robert McGeehan writes that “The 




American diplomacy during the postwar period,” and that rearmament was the result of a 
unilateral U.S. decision in the summer of 1950 following the outbreak of the Korean 
War.
5
 This statement is echoed by a vast majority of the literature in one form or another. 
In reality, however, the documentation found in the National Archives shows that the is-




The decision to rearm Germany was a result of what American political and mili-
tary leaders perceived to be a growing Soviet threat that took on greater urgency follow-
ing both the 1948 Czech Coup and the Berlin Blockade, and the Soviet detonation of an 
atomic bomb in the late summer of 1949.
7
 Rearmament represented a reversal of U.S. 
policy to disarm and demilitarize Germany completely and keep it so for decades to 
come. Within five years of the war’s end, however, U.S. policy changed directions. Both 
President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson were strongly dis-
posed to keeping Germany disarmed but succumbed to Cold War realities, to the fear in 
Europe resulting from the Korean War, and to the urgings of the Joint Staff to strengthen 
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 JSPC 876, 21 April 1948, Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United States Military Alliance with 
Nations of Western Europe, RG 218, Geographic Files, 092 Western Europe, Sect. 2. While the documents 
I reviewed for this dissertation say nothing about the impact of the Soviet nuclear explosion on the rearm-
ing of Germany, it represented the loss of the U.S. nuclear monopoly. This, in turn, would require a major 
reappraisal of Western defense strategy. Also, these weapons were not seen as a “pivotal weapon of war”  
and, given the city-busting nature of the nuclear weapons of the period, made the need for a strong ground-
based defense imperative. See, for example, Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, Princeton: Princeton 
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the defense of Western Europe. As a consequence, they reversed course and began to fa-
vor a German contribution to that defense.  
The desire to arm the Federal Republic of Germany before 1950 was deeply im-
bedded in an international, politico-military conundrum that followed two separate but 
related paths from 1948 until the late summer of 1950.
8
 The differences, as Melvyn P. 
Leffler indicated in his study of the Truman Administration’s national security policies, 
were not fundamental but tactical.
9
 The State Department saw the threat and took a path 
that sought to strengthen Western Europe by unifying it politically and economically, 
thereby creating a mechanism by which a rehabilitated Germany could be reintegrated 
into Western Europe without posing a threat to the peace and stability of its neighbors. 
Only then, so State Department officials thought, could one raise the question of arming 
the Germans. It was not that the leading officials of the State Department did not want the 
Germans armed, but they wanted to decouple this issue from other issues they deemed 
more important and less risky than the policy goals they were trying to achieve, such as 
strengthening the economies of the West European nations and integrating Germany eco-
nomically and politically into the West. They believed that in this manner, the Soviet 
threat could be held at bay. 
The Department of Defense, however, needing to devise rapidly a strategy to de-
fend Western Europe, chose a path advocated by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 
Outnumbered in manpower, limited by a budget ceiling, and associated with relatively 
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weak powers, themselves still recovering from the ravages of the war, the Pentagon 
sought a solution that would utilize the manpower and highly regarded fighting experi-
ence that the recently defeated Germany could provide, i.e., to place German “boots on 
the ground” as quickly as possible.
10
  
The existing scholarship shows us that in addressing these issues, the U.S. poli-
cymakers and the administration were confronted with several difficult problems. One 
required reversing American attitudes about the Soviet Union and Germany - erstwhile 
ally and enemy, respectively - held throughout the war years. A second required finding a 
way to rearm Germany in a manner that would “deter the Russians but not scare the Bel-
gians” while, at the same time, ensuring that the new Germany would not be able to act 
independently and threaten the peace of Europe again.
11
 A third required convincing the 
European allies to strengthen their own defensive capabilities. And, lastly, convincing the 
American public that the preservation of democracy and the “American way of life” re-
quired the long-term presence of U.S. military forces on the European continent. 
As the situation vis-à-vis the USSR worsened, the United States Departments of 
Defense and State saw a need to bind Western Germany to the West: the Pentagon want-
ed to do so by arming German troops, the State Department by integrating West Germany 
into a united European edifice. In 1949, the United States decided to join an "entangling 
alliance," NATO, and in 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War, it formally de-
cided to arm West Germany but ran up against strong French opposition. This opposition 
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succeeded in wresting the initiative for German rearmament from the United States by 
initially introducing the French-devised “Pleven Plan, which metamorphosed into the ill-
fated European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC, based on the principle of suprana-
tionality, was subsequently strongly supported by the Eisenhower administration to the 
exclusion of all other alternatives and U.S. foreign policy became predicated on the suc-
cessful outcome of that European endeavor.
12
 
Although military strategy is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it had an im-
pact on the decisions that were made during this period. In part, as a result of the loss of 
its nuclear monopoly, the U.S. government shifted its military strategy from one of con-
taining Soviet military power at all costs to one of deterring it at the least cost. Within a 
few years, the Pentagon had devised a nuclear strategy to defend Europe - the "New 
Look" – which would allow a reduction in the size of the U.S. military establishment. 
The advent of newer tactical nuclear weapons after 1952 also made a reduction in 
defense expenditures possible but created dissent within the American military services 
over roles and missions. The Army, on the one hand, favored a “forward defense” role 
and sought an increase in its portion of the defense budget. On the other hand, the low 
numbers and physical size of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. inventory favored the Air 
Force and supported advocates of a “peripheral” strategy. This strategy involved remov-
ing U.S. forces from the European mainland, thus ending the “forward defense” strategy, 
and depended upon the primarily nuclear deterrent abilities of airpower and sea power 
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based in England, North Africa and in the Mediterranean to defend Western Europe
13
. 
The Europeans welcomed the inclusion of nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union but 
at the same time, the ever-present fear that these weapons would allow the United States 
to revert to a peripheral defense became synonymous with the abandonment of Europe by 
the United States and a return to a “fortress” America.  
Thus, in the first decade of the Cold War, 1946-1955, the changing international 
environment, particularly as it applied to Soviet-American relations, caused the United 
States to make several decisions that, as Secretary of State Acheson said, “took a step 
never before taken in [U.S.] history.”
14
 The first was to end an almost two-hundred year-
old isolationist tradition and become part of an ‘entangling’ foreign alliance; the second 
was to reverse a key World War II policy by rearming its recently defeated foe, Germany. 
Confronting the policy makers, however, was the problem of how to implement this new 
course.  
Chapter 1 presents a review of the existing literature on these matters. In order to 
discuss the rearmament of West Germany, there had to have been disarmament. Thus, it 
is only fitting that Chapter 2 tells the story of the disarmament of Germany through Op-
eration ECLIPSE. Using archival material, Chapter 3 describes and analyzes the State 
Departments approach to the rearmament of Germany, including a detailed explanation of 
Acheson’s demand to arm the Germans. Chapter 4 will parallel Chapter 3, also using ar-
chival documents, to highlight the planning and efforts of the U.S. Department of De-
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fense to convince the government the Germans needed to be armed. Chapter 5 continues 
the narration from the time immediately following Acheson’s demand to arm West Ger-
many to include the efforts of the Eisenhower Administration to save the European De-
fense Community from rejection by France. Chapter 6 lays out the activities taken and 
obstacles faced by the three U.S. military services during the “EDC phase” as they pre-
pared to train what would become the new West German Bundeswehr, and Chapter 7 
concludes this narrative. 
This dissertation seeks to answer five major questions: When did thinking about 
the rearming of Germany become serious? Who facilitated the fundamental change to 
U.S. policy and why? Why was the United Kingdom able to solve the crisis that followed 
French rejection of the EDC? Why would President Eisenhower, so set on reducing the 
number of U.S. forces in Europe, commit to an open-ended continuation of their presence 
on the continent? And what role did the U.S. military services play in this process? 
In addressing these questions, this dissertation will also highlight certain unin-
tended consequences that resulted from this turnaround in U.S. national policy. Addition-
ally, it will extend the existing and significant scholarship on the Cold War and German 
rearmament that underscores the previously ignored role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) and the military services, as well as certain State Department officers, thereby 
helping to explain the policy reversal. The examination of these issues as described pro-
vides a basis for new and important insights into such matters as the dedicated adherence 
of the JCS to the primacy of civilian leadership.  
The disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, which is the starting point of 




The first period covers the immediate post-hostilities planning period from mid-1943 un-
til mid-1946, looking specifically at the development of Operation ECLIPSE, the plan to 
disarm Germany and its aftermath. The second period took place from mid-1947 to Sep-
tember 12, 1950 when Acheson presented the “Single Package” demand for German re-
armament to the Allies. The third was from September 13, 1950 until May 1955, when 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was admitted first to the Western European Un-
ion (WEU) - the expanded Brussels Treaty Organization - and then to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) as a fully sovereign nation.   
One finds a plethora of books and articles covering this latter period but again, 
with a few exceptions, the coverage is sporadic and overly general. The literature does 
not, for the most part, provide details of what lay behind the policies and actions taken 
and, in the case of some of the foreign literature, U.S. motives and decisions have been 
misrepresented because U.S. archival sources have not been examined carefully. By 
providing these details through archival and primary source research, a more accurate 
picture of the U.S. decision to arm the FRG and the unanticipated policy consequences 
that followed can be seen. 
Post-Hostilities Historiography May 1943- September 1950 
The concept of disarming and demilitarizing a nation was formed during the war 
without any serious thought being given to whether it could, in fact, be done, or what the 
consequences might be. Nonetheless, the idea began to take concrete form in the spring 
of 1943 when the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (desig-
nate) (COSSAC), under Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan was charged by the 




many in the event of a sudden German collapse.
15
 This plan, originally called Operation 
RANKIN, was initiated in May 1943. Following the establishment of Supreme Head-
quarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) under General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
and the successful Allied landing at Normandy, a new plan - Operation TALISMAN - 
subsequently changed after its code name was compromised to Operation ECLIPSE - was 
begun. 
My research for this dissertation adds a new element to the existing scholarship - 
a detailed account of Operation ECLIPSE, the plan to disarm Germany. With the excep-
tion of Kenneth O. McCreedy’s article on Operation ECLIPSE, this post-hostilities plan 
for Germany is not mentioned anywhere in the scholarly literature and even the official 
histories of the WWII period only mention it briefly, if at all.
16
 Additionally, it is clear 
from the literature, whether it be American, British, or German, that the decision to total-
ly disarm and demilitarize Germany stemmed from the failure of the World War I allies 
to impose restrictions on Germany that proved to be inadequate.
17
 Ironically, however, 
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despite the emphasis given to the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany by the 




One reason there is so little detail in the literature on the disarmament and demili-
tarization of Germany is that most of it addresses occupation policy as defined in JCS 
1067, which was enacted approximately six months after the war ended. Many of the pol-
icies credited to JCS 1067 were, however, developed and in place before its promulga-
tion. The lack of coverage regarding Operation ECLIPSE may be attributed to the fact 
that in the timeframe when most of the history covering that period was written, docu-
mentation on Operation ECLIPSE and many other military papers regarding the rearming 
of West Germany had not been declassified and were simply not available to researchers. 
While most of the State Department’s policy documents were declassified in the mid-
1970s and early 1980s, much of the military documentation was not declassified until the 
late 1980s and mid-to-late 1990s. Since their declassification, however, time has passed 
and interest has faded and thus a number of documents essential to a sound understanding 
of major policy remained largely unexamined. The initial narrative in this dissertation is 
thus devoted to the development of the disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization 
plan that became Operation ECLIPSE.  
Lastly, the literature that exists on post-hostilities planning for what would be a 
defeated Germany highlights the bureaucratic infighting and turf battles that took place 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
18





between the various departments of the U.S. Government.
19
 Its primary focus is on the 
development and establishment of civil government policy and procedures for the occu-
pation that would follow, such as JCS 1067.
20
 Neither the background to the disarmament 
plans nor the lack of guidance afforded first to the staff of the Chief of Staff, Supreme 
Allied Commander (COSSAC) and later to General Eisenhower and his staff at the Su-
preme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) have been adequately ad-
dressed in the Post-hostilities literature. 
There is a great void in the scholarly literature regarding anything that relates to 
the issue of rearming of Germany in the period 1947-1950, although there are some 
works that briefly describe the inadequate plans to defend, or better said, evacuate the 
European continent.
21
 Similarly, when discussing the 1948 formation of the Brussels 
Treaty Organization (Western Union) or even NATO in 1949, the literature often refers 
to “secret” military discussions without providing details of those discussions. While the 
scholarly literature speaks of the weakness of the Allied military capability vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union in the early period and clearly states Allied fears that a Soviet invasion 
would overrun the continent, little has been written that acknowledges the reason for 
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those fears, namely the lack of effective U.S. and Allied plans and forces to defend West-
ern Europe.
 
Existing defense plans left U.S. officials believing a Soviet invasion could 
not be resisted.
22
 Until late 1948 there is no scholarly mention of arming West Germany, 
and what mention there is drawn primarily from newspaper articles that are based on ru-
mor and speculation. Thus the archival research undertaken for this dissertation extends 
the history of this subject backward and illuminates the initial rationale for rearming the 
Germans. 
For example, according to a RAND Research Paper written by Eric Willenz, ru-
mors about German rearmament were plentiful as early as the summer of 1948. He cites 
the Hannoverschen Neuesten Nachrichten of August 28 and Die Weltwoche of September 
24 as early examples.
23
 Norbert Tönnies writes that the first rumors of rearmament in 
Germany began during a November 1948 press conference in which Eugen Kogon, a 
journalist from Frankfurt, claimed there was an army in development in Germany al-
ready. Also in November 1948, the French newspaper Le Monde claimed that a Franco-
German alliance with a common army had been suggested, and in December, 1948, Carlo 
Schmid, a leading member of West Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), wrote in 
Die Welt that it was possible to create an international army of which Germany could be 
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part. Tönnies writes further that throughout 1949, staff officers from various NATO 
countries, including France, discussed the addition of as many as five German divisions 
to help offset the Soviet’s numerical superiority over NATO and to help defend against a 
Soviet attack. Discussion over a German contribution was, according to Tönnies, an open 
secret in NATO.
24
   
Also in November 1949, the New York Times reported that a congressional com-
mittee would recommend including Germany in the Western European Union and articles 
in both the New York Times and the Washington Post in late November speculated on the 
meaning of a statement by Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson that arming Germany 
was not being considered “at the present time.”
25
 However, West German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer gave an interview on 3 December 1949 to the Cleveland Plain Dealer 
in which he stated that he was against rearmament and would not allow the creation of a 
national German Army, but that he would consider “a German contingent in the frame-
work of the army of a European federation.” The cat was now out of the bag. The subject 
of German rearmament became an official political topic of discussion and the subject of 
the first Bundestag debate just two weeks later.
26
 
As early as 1946, over-optimistic U.S. hopes of maintaining the wartime alliance 
relationship with the Soviet Union, always rocky, were being dashed. It was becoming 
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obvious to both the United States and Great Britain that a defeated, apathetic, and virtual-
ly prostrate Germany was no longer the enemy to be feared but that the actions of the 
USSR, their former ally, had changed into those of a potential enemy. The works of John 
Lewis Gaddis, Melvyn Leffler and other historians of the Cold War, as well as the several 
biographies and autobiographies of Dean Acheson, make very clear the changes that took 
place in that relationship and the fears that somehow, without containing the USSR, a 
third World War would erupt even if the steps taken by the U.S. risked the very war it 
was trying to prevent.
27
  
The one exception to the above statement that German rearmament was limited to 
“rumor and speculation” was made during the aftermath of the Czech coup in February 
1948. This coup was the catalyst that saw the creation of the Brussels Treaty Organiza-
tion and its defense wing, the Western Union, the following month. It was in discussions 
during the formation of this organization that the question of a German military contribu-
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The literature about this pre-1950’s period is abundantly clear that from the end of 
the war until the September 1950 unilateral U.S. demand that West Germany be armed, 
the official U.S. position regarding Germany was that it remain disarmed and demilita-
rized. In November 1949, President Truman categorically denied rumors to the contrary 
and stated that the United States had no intention of creating a German army. An official 
British denial went even further, stating that there was not even a plan to rebuild the 
German police, and the London Times wrote that the Petersberg Agreement, signed on 22 
November 1949 by the High Commissioners of the United States, Great Britain, France 
and Chancellor Adenauer, was a clear guarantee that Germany would neither rearm nor 
contest the demilitarization measures imposed upon it. The agreement stated explicitly 
that not only would the now renamed Federal Republic of Germany remain disarmed and 
demilitarized but that all military related areas of scientific research, industry and even 
civil aviation would remain sharply restricted, if not totally forbidden. 
 Along with the revised Occupation Statute, a tri-partite Military Security Board 
was created to ensure that the demilitarization of Germany continued. The Board re-
mained in existence until the FRG was admitted to NATO in 1955 and never, during its 
existence, did the German government speak out against the disarmament regime the 
Board was tasked to enforce.
29
 Even Adenauer, following his Cleveland Plain Dealer in-
terview, went to great lengths to state that he was “fundamentally against the rearming of 
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It is also clear from the German literature that this U.S. and Allied position was in 
many quarters of Germany welcome. Georg Meyer quotes former German Interior Minis-
ter Gustav Heinemann as telling Adenauer in the fall of 1950 before the former’s resigna-
tion from the Cabinet that: 
As a result of the unconditional surrender the Allies 
are obligated to protect us against any attack and we must 
call upon them clearly to fulfill this obligation. Every step 
the government takes in that direction will have my full 
consent. Since one of the noblest Allied war aims was to 
disarm us and keep us disarmed into the future, and the Al-
lies have done everything during five years of occupation 
to make the German military despicable, to destroy our de-
fense capability, to include air raid shelters, and to educate 
the German people about military attitudes, it is therefore 
not for us to either search for or offer military measures. 
This would only bring about a spiritual confusion that 




The scholarly literature that covers this period is incomplete and misleading if not 
faulty. It is, however, underscored by two of the most often cited books on the German 
rearmament issue: Robert McGeehan’s The German Rearmament Question and David 
Clay Large’s Germans to the Front.
32
 McGeehan claims in his introduction that this issue 
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was “abruptly” raised by Acheson in September 1950 and that the Korean War was the 
specific stimulus.
33
 Written primarily from a political science perspective, his narrative 
seeks primarily to explain and understand the relationship between sovereign nations in 
an alliance. While he rightly claims that in the long run, the political integration of the 
Federal Republic was more important than the “eventual appearance of German soldiers,” 
he ignores the discussions that took place between 1947 - 1959 among personnel of the 
State and Defense Departments regarding the rearming of Germany. This results in a 
complete absence from his work of any discussion of the plans made and rationale given 
by these agencies.   
Similarly, Large’s work, written a quarter century after McGeehan’s, uses the 
German rearmament issue to discuss how Germany, the Europeans, and the United States 
“hoped to reorder the post-war world.” He also examines the issues of sovereignty, au-
thority and fundamental values that would confront a united Europe and how and where 
Germany would fit in. While Large also looks at the question of Germany’s history and 
asks what kind of military system could be devised to fit into the new, democratic Ger-
many, he too is more concerned with the post-1950 period and, like McGeehan, relies 
primarily on the secondary literature for the pre-1950’s period.
34
 
That said, unlike McGeehan, Large briefly addresses the pre-1950 period and he 
shows that the issues of German rearmament and sovereignty were pursued long before 
the September 1950 “Single Package” demand was presented. He mentions, for example, 
several discussions held between U.S., British and French leaders in 1948 in which the 
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need for a German contribution to the defense of the West was discussed. Most signifi-
cant is the number of senior French General Staff officers, including General Charles 
DeGaulle, who saw the need for a rearmed Germany. Large also relates that in April 
1949, Assistant Secretary of Defense Tracy Voorhees told General Lucius D. Clay, then 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and Military Governor of the U.S. Zone of 
Germany, that Voorhees’ “planners assume it may become reasonable for the West Ger-
mans to contribute to the armed security of Western Europe.” Clay agreed but cautioned 
not to make this public because of “our present emphasis on demilitarization.”
35
 
Lastly, within this array of literature, there are other gaps and omissions, contra-
dictory conclusions and an overall lack of detail. For example, while the literature 
acknowledges several previous calls for a “European Army” and France as having pro-
posed the “Pleven Plan” as the answer to Acheson’s “Single Package,” almost everyone 
is oblivious to the fact that it was the United States that first came up with a detailed plan 
for a European Defense Force or European Security Force. This proposal was worked out 
by John J. McCloy, then U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, and Colonel Henry By-
roade, then Director, Bureau of German Affairs, U.S. State Department, in the summer of 
1950.
36
 While it might have answered a question posed by President Truman who asked 
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in July 1950, “How can German manpower be used without establishing a German Ar-
my?” it begs the question why this scheme was not a part of the “Single Package” pre-
sented by Acheson. Given the subsequent hostile French reaction to the “Single Pack-
age,” one is left to wonder whether the result of that September 1950 foreign ministers 
meeting might have been different if Acheson’s offer had contained German contingents 
in a European army instead of a rearmed Germany.
37
 
Rearmament Historiography September 1950 - May 1955 
When the literature for the latter period, i.e., 1950 - 1955, is reviewed, one is 
again overwhelmed by the great number of books and articles dealing with the arming of 
West Germany, but as before, the main focus is again at the higher policy-making levels 
and how policymakers viewed the European Defense Community and the problem of 
how to integrate Germany into this entity, not on the ongoing plans to rearm Germany.
38
  
Shortly after the 12 September 1950 meeting of the foreign ministers of the Unit-
ed States, Great Britain, and France, and Acheson’s presentation of the “Single Package,” 
i.e., the U.S. demand that West Germany be armed - a step Acheson said was “never tak-
en before in history” - the entire issue was taken over by the French “Pleven Plan,” which 
subsequently was transformed into what became the EDC. This plan, which was to be the 
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cornerstone of a united Europe, was unquestionably a response to the U.S. demand to re-
arm West Germany but it also led to a number of unintended consequences that impacted 
and delayed the rearmament process over the next four and one-half years.. 
Among other issues missing from the mainstream literature of German rearma-
ment in this latter period is what Ted Galen Carpenter and Andrew Birtle have called “the 
great debate.”
39
After the “Single Package,” which contained a promise to send more 
troops to Europe, was presented, Congress became highly incensed at what appeared to 
them to be a lack of consultation. Congress was already full of an animosity toward both 
Truman and Acheson that reflected the discouraging events in Korea and Congress’ own 
fears of losing its voice in foreign affairs. The offer to send additional troops to Europe 
without consulting Congress led, in the early months of 1951, to a three-month debate in 
the Congress that, in turn, led to a resolution that could easily be called the forerunner of 
the Vietnam era War Powers Act.
40
 
While historians of the period tell us that by 1951 both Truman and Acheson, de-
spite their misgivings, came around to support the Pleven Plan/EDC, as did the Eisen-
hower Administration, the literature sidesteps the fact that while Eisenhower was 
NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), he vociferously opposed both German 
rearmament and the EDC. Grosser relates that in 1950, Eisenhower wrote that rearming 
the Germans “would repudiate a series of agreements extending from Potsdam in 1945 to 
the Petersberg Protocol of 1949.” Eisenhower continued that “…whatever gains from the 
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military point of view of adding six or eight divisions of German troops to the forces of 
NATO, politically German rearmament is full of dynamite.”
41
 Eisenhower, in fact, hated 
the Germans during World War II and although he subsequently began to support the Eu-
ropean army concept and made it a key element of his presidency, he initially considered 
it “as cockeyed an idea as a dope fiend could have figured out.”
42
  
That as president, Eisenhower became a strong supporter of EDC, as did his Sec-
retary of State, John Foster Dulles, is abundantly clear in the literature, but little is really 
known about Eisenhower’s conversion in favor of EDC when he was SACEUR or why 
he subsequently became so committed to EDC and how he influenced U.S. policy to 
make the success of EDC a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Jean Monnet claims to 
have converted Eisenhower during lunch at the Waldorf-Astoria in Paris and Schwartz 
and others tell us that as a result of his observations while SACEUR, Eisenhower came to 
believe that only a united Europe could solve Europe’s security problems. This eventual-
ly led him to see the EDC as a way to strengthen Europe and solve the German problem, 
a position he maintained as president.
43
 By 1953 however, Eisenhower had become skep-
tical of EDC’s prospects and he ordered a study to recommend possible alternatives, one 
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of which was for the U.S. to adopt the peripheral strategy and allow Western Europe to 
become the “third power” that had been hoped for at the end of the war.
44
 
For Eisenhower, a man whose policies were driven by his commitment to budget-
ary restraint, however, EDC was also a way to reduce the numbers of U.S. troops in Eu-
rope. Eisenhower had repeatedly said the U.S. troop presence in Europe was never meant 
to be permanent.
45
 Eisenhower’s thoughts regarding the U.S. troop presence in Europe 
also highlights another unintended consequence of the policy reversal, the open-ended 
commitment of U.S. forces to Western Europe that was made in 1955. Similarly, the fail-
ure of EDC in August 1954, despite U.S. attempts to keep it alive, highlights another un-
intended consequence, the creation of a national German army. Trachtenberg writes that 
both Eisenhower and Dulles “were livid” at the failure of the EDC in the French National 
Assembly but that they were left with no other option but to accept a national German 
army in NATO and the continued presence of American troops in Europe.
46
 
It is clear from the foregoing that while the question of German rearmament has 
been addressed, the scholarly literature has almost exclusively engaged it only at the level 
of very high policy - that is, the level of top civilian political executives. There is virtual-
ly little to no discussion of what the Pentagon was doing during this entire ten-year peri-
od., In addition, the literature on German rearmament has failed to deal adequately with 
the military problems brought about by the introduction of nuclear weapons, which had 
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generated political responses that created both reassurance and apprehension among U.S. 
allies and adversaries. The literature has also neglected to indicate that in some instances, 
particularly during the early period of the Cold War, military-diplomatic actions were 
taken without strategic guidance or even a strategic consensus. In addition, and as will be 
mentioned below, some of the foreign literature ignores U.S. archival material, and thus 
is necessarily based upon unsupported assumptions, which have led to unjustified conclu-
sions.  
British Historiography 
It is also in this latter 1950-1955 period that one finds for the first time scholarly 
British and German literature on this topic.
47
 Although this dissertation will not focus on 
this scholarship – it does not address U.S. military plans for rearming Germany - the lit-
erature brings a different perspective as well as interesting and little known information 
not found in the U.S. literature. For example, British authors disagree on the extent to 
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which British defense and foreign policy changed between 1950 and 1955. Saki Dockrill, 
for one, argues that because the British were obligated under the Brussels and NATO 
Treaties to aid the treaties’ signatories in the event of an attack against any of them, Brit-
ish defense policy remained constant throughput the period.
48
 However, the evidence she 
cites in her work strongly supports the position of Kevin Ruane that as a result of the 
German rearmament issue and EDC, Great Britain underwent a significant “agonizing 
reappraisal” of its continental policy by committing both ground and air forces to the con-
tinent.
49
 That said, British and German scholarship, while well-grounded in their own na-
tional archives, lacks U.S. archival documentation and depends primarily on secondary 
sources and the Foreign Relations of the United States series.  
Much like the United States, the British were very reluctant following the war to 
commit troops to the continent. London viewed the occupation as lasting no more than 
two years but they were also more concerned with their own economic situation and with 
Empire defense, primarily the Middle East. Due, in many respects, to financial considera-
tions, British actions toward the continent were a “succession of half-hearted reassuranc-
es and token promises” that not always successfully masked “a determination to mini-
mize peacetime engagements altogether.”
50
 It also appears from the British literature that 
continental policy was dependent primarily on the party in power. 
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Most British authors agree, however, that the British military recognized the So-
viet threat as early as 1944 while the Foreign Office only began to come around in 1946-
1948. In April 1946 Field Marshal Viscount Allenbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, stated that Germany should not be considered a threat unless it allied with the 
USSR. This view, that Russia was more dangerous than Germany, was reflected in the 
British Future Defence Policy Report of April 1947. That plan, adopted the following 
month however, saw no role for the British military in Germany.
51
 In February 1948, 
however, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin suggested that the Chief of Staff (COS) “exam-
ine ways of forming the West European national forces into a single force, and to work 
out the extra cost of providing two British divisions.” Referring to its World War II expe-
rience, Bevin wanted to insure that there would be no more Dunkirks.
52
 The issue of 
German rearmament, although discussed during the creation of the Brussels Pact and 
dismissed as premature, never surfaced in London until 1949.
53
 
By then, the British accepted the fact that an armed Germany was inevitable in the 
long term. It was, therefore, the British who first publically proposed in late 1949 to cre-
ate a Federal Gendarmerie as a first step in that direction and its incorporation into a Eu-
ropean Army, a subject then in early stages of discussion. The proposal was also designed 
to respond, on the one hand, to German Chancellor Adenauer’s argument that the Allies 
were “duty bound to maintain the security of the Federal Republic” and, on the other 
hand, to offset to some degree the creation and build-up of the East German Kasernierte 
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Great Britain had three goals according to the literature,: (1) to contain Germany 
within an evolving Western framework; (2) to prevent U.S. isolationism; and (3) to pre-
vent a Soviet reaction and escalation in the Cold War.
55
 
Nonetheless, British policy was influenced by the “Germanaphobia unleashed by 
two world wars” that made the British policy-making elite unwilling to consider early 
German rearmament. British policy was also stretched between the need to defend the 
West and insure a U.S. presence in Europe.
 56
 The British feared the U.S. would opt for a 
peripheral strategy, i.e., pull U.S. forces off the continent to bases in Great Britain, Spain, 
North Africa and Turkey. Thus, during this latter period 1950-1955, Great Britain, un-
willing to sacrifice its “special relationship” with the United States and its loyalty to the 
Commonwealth, reluctantly committed itself to the support of EDC. It was this same fear 
of U.S. withdrawal following the failure of the EDC in 1954 that was the impetus for then 
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden to use an expanded Brussels Treaty Organization to inte-




The Anglo-American literature focuses primarily on the need to get German 
“boots on the ground” rapidly, restore the conventional force imbalance and augment the 
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Alliance’s defensive capability against the Soviet Union. The German-language litera-
ture, on the other hand, while mindful of the Soviet threat, focuses more on the political 
aspects and ramifications of the rearmament issue such as West Germany’s desire to gain 
the trust of the Western Allies, regain its sovereignty, and integrate into Western Europe 
as an equal in all respects.
58
 
Aside from differences in terms of the degree to which reunification was tied to 
the rearmament question, German scholars are quite unified in their approach and inter-
pretation of this period of West German history.
59
 This literature is also somewhat unique 
in that it underscores several unexpected consequences the rearmament issue brought to 
the surface. Dieter Budde, for example, connects the total demilitarization of Germany at 
war’s end to the creation of the democratically-based Bundeswehr only ten years later, 
essentially saying that the latter would not have been possible without the former.
60
 Ger-
man scholars also argue that the initial U.S. demand to arm occupied West Germany re-
sulted in the violation of not only U.S. and Allied policy in general but also several spe-
cific Allied Control Council laws as well as obligations placed upon West Germany by 
the Occupation Statute and its subsequent revisions.
61
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While this latter fact did not add to the delays in negotiations over German rearm-
ament, it did lead to a “Catch-22” situation in which the U.S. promised sovereignty in 
return for rearmament while the German government insisted it could not arm until sov-
ereignty was granted. This temporary impasse, combined with an inherent distrust of 
German intentions, led to Allied complaints about German “demands” while the Germans 
saw their “requests” as attempts to gain the Allies’ trust. Western interest in German re-
armament, according to Julian Lider, gave Germany the opportunity to “press for rapid 
rearmament” and set “preconditions for her contribution.” Adenauer saw rearmament as 
an indispensible bargaining lever; it was the key component of sovereignty. 
62
 
The German-language literature cited in this dissertation supports several key 
themes during this period. Perhaps first and foremost is the theme upon which all the cit-
ed authors agree, namely that Germany’s rearmament policy was very much Konrad 
Adenauer’s personal policy; a policy primarily oriented on an internal security argument 
focused on protection against a possible East German aggression as opposed to a Soviet 
aggression.
63
 In this respect, Adenauer’s overriding goals were to prevent the U.S. from 
abandoning Europe, to integrate West Germany into Western Europe as an equal and re-
spected partner, and to forge reconciliation with France.
64
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A second key theme was Adenauer’s insistence that no national German army be 
created. For him, participation in an integrated European force and the establishment of a 
strong police force was the only way to insure German security. Despite his disdain for 
the initial Pleven Plan, Adenauer saw the subsequent EDC as an “end in itself, not a 
means to an end.” For him, integration was the shortest route to unification. In addition, 
in Adenauer’s eyes, the EDC fulfilled France’s highest political needs and the integrated 
army it promised also promised France security both for Germany and from Germany.
65
 
Similarly, Adenauer’s willingness to accept limitations on its military contribution was 
designed to build trust among the German population as well as among the Allies and to 
counter those who feared a resurgence of German militarism.
66
 
In this respect, German scholars point out that throughout the entire five-year pe-
riod from the initial U.S. demand for German rearmament to the Federal Republic’s ad-
mission to NATO, no military preparations of any kind were undertaken by the Bonn 
government; no barracks were built, no uniforms ordered, etc. Not even the Bun-
desgrenzschutz, the armed border police, were used to establish a training school for fu-
ture German NCO’s, as had been suggested, for fear it would be seen as an attempt to 
create a “secret army” like the Black Reichswehr following World War I.
67
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This did not mean, of course, that no military security considerations were under-
taken by the government during that period. Wiggershaus writes that as early as 1948 
former German General Hasse von Manteuffel prepared a secret memorandum at Aden-
auer’s request and in late 1948 Lt. General Hans Speidel wrote six memos dealing with 
the military-political situation in West Germany and the requirements necessary for a 
German contribution.
68
 In 1950, both Theodor Blank and Gerhard Graf von Schwerin 
were appointed to advise Adenauer on military and security issues. Also in October 1950, 
the famous Himmeroder Denkschrift (Himmerod Memorandum), written by a group of 




A third major theme in the German-language literature, also found in the Anglo-
American literature, holds that the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was the cata-
lyst that made German rearmament a necessity. The Korean War became the rationale for 
America’s fear and threat perception and thus the need to demand, on the one hand, the 
rearming of a country still seen by many as the enemy that needed to be controlled and on 
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The Korean War was a shock to West Germans who saw parallels to their own 
divided situation. West Germany’s main concern, however, was that the Allies would see 
an attack by East Germany as a civil war and not respond. According to Lider and others, 
as early as April 1950 Adenauer had requested authority to form a mobile Gendarmerie 
to offset the creation in East Germany of the Kasernierte Bereitschaftspolizei. Adenauer 
feared that the USSR would detach East Germany and give it a degree of independence, 
thus raising the question of how the occupying powers would respond if the East German 
Bereitschaftspolizei invaded their zones.
71
 These fears most likely stemmed from the 
memos written by both Generals Speidel and Heusinger in 1949, the central point of 
which was that the Kasernierte Bereitschaftspolizei was the forerunner of an East Ger-
man army designed to win a civil war in Germany once the occupation ended. The mem-
os stressed that NATO did not provide any greater security for the Federal Republic, 




The objectives of the 1950 decision to arm the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), aside from the goal of strengthening the defense of Western Europe, were two-
fold: to bind the western half of the divided German nation to the West by forming a 
West German army within an integrated West European edifice, and to withdraw U.S. 
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occupation forces from the European continent.
73
 The outcomes – a West German “na-
tional” army and a U.S. commitment to a virtual permanent military presence in Western 
Europe - were, however, completely at odds with established U.S. national policy.  
That said, between 1946 and 1955, the United States made numerous statements 
and pledges regarding the continued demilitarization of Germany and the duration of the 
U.S. troop presence in Western Europe. Thus, the 1955 pledge to retain troops in Europe 
was one of several unplanned consequences of the U.S. decision in 1950 to arm the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and was designed to regain U.S. control and leadership of the 
Western Alliance that had been lost during the five-year period that followed. The pledge 
also sought to undergird a “double containment” policy, i.e., to protect Western Europe 
against a Soviet invasion and to protect all Europeans against a possible resurgent Ger-
many.
74
 The NATO treaty imposed no requirement on any member nation to station 
troops either on the continent or in Germany, therefore, discounting altruism as a motive; 
the U.S. commitment was made to balance military imperatives with political realities. 
Regaining the initiative in and leadership of the Alliance would do just that. 
While the initiative to arm the Federal Republic in 1950 came from the United 
States, the process did not proceed in a vacuum. Both Great Britain and France, the 
U.S.’s main NATO allies, had also been considering the matter. This dissertation will, 
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therefore, discuss, albeit to a lesser extent, the interaction of the United States, Great 
Britain, and France, together and alone with West Germany in pursuit of that policy. In 
that vein, the dissertation will show that while the objectives of the NATO allies were the 
same, i.e., the containment of possible German revanchism and deterrence of Soviet ad-
vances, the means were not. Each nation found itself at times working at cross-purposes 
to the others and even resorting to deception as its perception of political realities and 
strategic imperatives demanded. 
Just as wars have their unintended consequences, so too does peace - or at least at-
tempts to maintain peace. The irony of the rearming of Germany, as Heinz Schultz notes, 
is that it was agreed by all parties at the Potsdam Conference that Germany should be 
disarmed and demilitarized and that “all forces and all institutions or organizations which 
serve to keep alive the military tradition shall be completely and finally abolished.”
75
 
That said, Budde correctly underscores the most significant consequence of the changed 
policy when he writes that the Korean War made the Allies accept the reality of and need 
for German rearmament despite the lack of trust that still existed.  
As an aside, and because of the focus of this dissertation, i.e., the actions of the 
U.S. government and military establishment to arm Germany, this dissertation will not 
delve into Soviet actions or policy except where it directly impacted the rearmament pro-
cess. The Soviets were seen and continually portrayed as a growing threat to the West, 
particularly since the Czech Coup and the Berlin Blockade in 1948, but even more so af-
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ter the suppression of the 1953 Berlin uprising. Nevertheless, with the exception of the 
occasional proposal for a Four Power or Foreign Minister Conference to discuss the de-
militarization or neutralization of Germany, the Russians were relatively quiescent during 
this period as regarding German rearmament. In fact, during the 1954 Four Power Con-
ference, the issue of West German rearmament was not even mentioned. It may be as 
Trachtenberg states that as long as Germany could be kept dependent, the status quo in 
Europe would not change. The Paris accords, which brought the FRG into the Western 
European Union and NATO, provided them with a constrained sovereignty. The newly 
authorized West German army would be integrated into NATO but not authorized to op-
erate independently.
76
 This apparently was a solution the Soviets could live with. 
My goal in this dissertation is two-fold:  to show by using archival documents, 
that there was much more to the process of rearming Germany than is evident in the ex-
isting literature, particularly the involvement of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the in-
dividual military services. It is also to test the hypothesis that despite the planned creation 
of what was to become the Bundeswehr, and despite long-held plans to remove U.S. forc-
es from Europe, i.e., to build down as the Germans built up, the U.S. acquiesced to a Brit-
ish incentive to solve the problem of German rearmament by building up in order to facil-
itate an FRG military buildup. As a result, the United States was forced to assuage Euro-
pean fears of a resurgent Germany by promising an open-ended commitment to keep sig-
nificant U.S. forces on the continent. One must remember that the U.S. envisioned a unit-
ed Europe as a great “third power” and the EDC  as the embodiment of that power; a 
power capable of taking care of itself and allowing the U.S. to withdraw its forces from 
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 The failure of the EDC forced the U.S. into exercising a “double containment” 
policy, i.e., the U.S. was now called upon to protect Western Europe against a Soviet in-
vasion and to protect all of Europe against a possible resurgent Germany. The end result 
was an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces on the European continent, which re-
mained there in significant numbers until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991, and 
residually even after.  
Had Germany not been so thoroughly disarmed following World War II, simulta-
neously destroying the remnants of Prussian militarism, West Germany would not have 
been able to create a new army based on democratic ideals that led to an acceptance and 
partnership at all levels by the Allies in a relatively short period of time.
78
 Thus, in the 
end, the U.S. policy to first disarm and then rearm the Germans succeeded.  
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Chapter 2: Operation ECLIPSE  
It is well known that on 6 June, 1944, the day Operation OVERLORD -  the inva-
sion of Normandy - began, Eisenhower, then Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary 
Forces, placed in his pocket a note in which he had written that he accepted blame for the 
failure of the invasion if that happened.
1
 What is almost unknown is that just over a year 
earlier, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, the same officer responsible for the 
preparation of OVERLORD, had been tasked to prepare a plan to totally disarm and de-
militarize Germany. While Eisenhower was prepared to lose a battle, the Allied govern-
ments were preparing for total victory.  
This plan, originally called Operation RANKIN and then Operation TALISMAN 
before it became Operation ECLIPSE, was two years in the making, and this chapter, 
which relates it’s never before written history, also serves to establish a counterpoint to 
the underlying theme of this dissertation - the rearmament of Germany - and the problems 
encountered by the United States as a result of its policy reversal. This chapter also high-
lights the lack of governmental guidance given to U.S. military forces as they prepared to 
occupy Germany and even, to a lesser extent, the belated and misguided plans and prepa-
rations of the government for civilianizing the occupation without a full understanding of 
what the occupation entailed. 
Following World War II, Germany was, in fact,  totally disarmed and demilita-
rized. However, the disarming of Germany, a goal first enunciated in the Atlantic Char-
ter, involved much more than simply collecting the weapons of its surrendering soldiers, 
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sailors, and airmen. It meant a policy of total disarmament, demobilization, and demilita-
rization, prompted by the belief, held by the two western Allies, the United States and 
Great Britain, that German militarism was ingrained in German politics and culture. It 
was this militarism that made Hitler inevitable and only by uprooting it could Germany 
ever be made to become a productive and peaceful neighbor in Europe. Thus, the total 
demilitarization of Germany became a major undertaking that required the development 
of agreed-upon guidance, policy directives, manpower and time.  
The ideas concerning the post-hostilities period and the total demilitarization of 
Germany first began to take shape in summer of 1943. Ideas and plans were developed at 
various levels and in various agencies on both sides of the Atlantic, which found them-
selves embroiled in interdepartmental rivalries and tensions, left to act in the absence of 




The initial plans for the demilitarization of Germany were initiated by COSSAC - 
Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander - an organization established to pre-
pare for the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander, under the direction of Lieu-
tenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, who was also tasked to prepare the initial plans 
for Operation OVERLORD, the allied invasion of the continent. 
In July, 1943, the British War Cabinet revised its 1942 organization to create a 
Post-Hostilities Sub-Committee under COSSAC with which to tackle the question of how 
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Germany was to be treated after victory was achieved. The purpose of this new commit-
tee was “confined to the consideration of drafts for instruments to conclude hostilities and 
to enforce compliance with armistice or surrender terms.”
3
 It assigned Colonel T. N. 
Grazebrook
4
 (UK) and tasked the new sub-committee to “prepare drafts of docu-
ments…required in connection with the formal suspension of hostilities…and to submit 




In December 1943, a British government report entitled Occupation of Germany 
outlined the case for and against total occupation and whether it was necessary. It speci-
fied that one of the United Nations’ objectives upon cessation of hostilities should be the 
“rapid and total disarmament of Germany and the breakup of the German military ma-
chine.” The case was made that the situation that obtained following WWI should not 
again be tolerated and that sufficient armed force should be distributed throughout Ger-
many to prevent the delay, obstruction and difficulty in enforcing the terms of surrender 
that followed the Versailles Treaty. The point was further made that the sooner Germany 
was disarmed, the sooner the work of reconstruction could begin. It was believed that it 
would take two years from the cessation of hostilities to complete the total disarmament 
of Germany and destruction of its armaments industries.  
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 Colonel Tom Neville Grazebrook, D.S.O., C.B.E, was an officer of the Glouchester Regiment who had 
seen action as commander of the 6
th
 Inniskilling Fusilliers in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. He was subse-
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To insure no repeat of the post-World War I scenario, the British proposed that to 
supervise the first two years of the post-hostilities period 11 divisions of land forces, sev-
en regiments of armored cars plus the necessary non-divisional units would be required 
for a total of 310,000 personnel. To back this force up, 28 Air Force squadrons, to include 
light- and fighter-bomber, as well as reconnaissance aircraft, would be needed.
6
 The as-
sumptions made in that report showed the distrust with which the British held Germany 
as well as British fears that a resurgent Germany would somehow find a way to circum-
vent the disarmament regime that would be imposed upon it.  
The British also believed that once the Allies entered Germany they would find a 
significant amount of civil disorder as well as large numbers of German troops who 
would need to be disarmed, hence the need for the large number of ground forces. The 
report also indicated that the presence of a large number of Allied air forces would have a 
considerable effect on German morale by having mass formation flights from time to 
time to remind the Germans that Germany had, in fact, been defeated.
7
  
It was not until 1944, however, that the broader concepts of occupation began to 
be reflected in Allied planning. With the establishment of Supreme Headquarters, Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) under Eisenhower in January 1944, the disarmament and 
demilitarization issue became the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Opera-
tions (G-3), then Major General Harold R. Bull (U.S.) and following the cessation of hos-
tilities, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs (G-5), Lieutenant General A.E. Grasset 
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 What little direction SHAEF could get came from the U.S. War Department, the 
British War Office, and the joint European Advisory Commission (EAC), established by 
the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943.
9
 It was, however, in the 
Post-Hostilities Sub-committee, now part of SHAEF’s Operations (G-3) Division, that 
many of the most important demilitarization staff studies and memoranda were devel-
oped.  
Among the various agencies responsible for formulating pre-surrender and post-
hostilities policy for Germany, those in Washington were slow to recognize the need for 
post-hostilities planning and also were plagued by serious divisions and fundamental dif-
ferences in outlook. Despite the creation in December 1943 of the Working Security 
Committee (WSC), composed of War, Navy and State Department representatives, 
agreement on the function of the Committee was never really reached. The perspectives 
of the State and War Departments as to the tasks to be performed by Allied military forc-
es during the occupation were greatly at odds with one another. As an example, when the 
EAC held its first meeting in January 1944, three months after it was formed, Ambassa-
dor John G. Winant, the U.S. representative, had not received any guidance from Wash-
ington concerning the main task of the Committee, i.e., preparing surrender terms for 
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Germany. The infighting within the WSC precluded any effective communication or co-
ordination until early March 1944.
10
 
According to Winant’s biographer, the Ambassador received only one policy di-
rective with authoritative clearances between March and October 1944. During this peri-
od, Winant sent his political advisor, George F. Kennan, to Washington to seek guidance 
but to no avail, and in July 1944, Winant’s military advisor, Brigadier General Cornelius 
W. Wickersham, also personally appealed to the WSC for policy guidance with little ap-
parent success. Washington’s failure to provide guidance was also felt by Eisenhower, 
who, following the entry of U.S. combat forces into Germany in September 1944, urgent-




From the archival documents available, it appears that the multiplicity of military 
and civilian agencies, in both the United States and Great Britain, made the post-
hostilities planning process, albeit thorough and extremely broad in its coverage, overly 
bureaucratic, cumbersome and to some degree duplicative. From the end of the war in 
Europe until the Soviets walked out of the Allied Control Council in 1948, the disarma-
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ment and demilitarization process became increasingly encumbered by political obstacles 
that left many tasks unresolved and, therefore, undone. Thus, as will be seen, it was left 
to SHAEF to formulate the plans that would permit Eisenhower to carry out his com-
mand’s required post-hostilities tasks to disarm German soldiers, disband and demobilize 
Germany’s armed forces, dispose of German war materiel and begin the process of de-
militarizing Germany.  
Initial Thoughts on Disarming Germany 
In late November 1943, using the initial post-hostilities plan Operation RANKIN, 
Case ‘C’ (see below) COSSAC drafted an initial study suggesting the composition of dis-
armament detachments to supervise the process to be effected by the German High 
Command (OKH). This was, of course, predicated on the belief that German troops re-
mained subject to the discipline of the German High Command. The disarmament de-
tachments, as proposed by this study, were to be small and consist only of sufficient per-
sonnel to communicate the orders of the Allied High Command and supervise their ob-
servance.
12
 In a follow-up study, a compilation of comments on the original paper high-
lighted several areas of concern, such as the guarding of dumps and the responsibility for 
disarming the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) and Navy (Kriegsmarine). It was also 
brought out that as the location of naval ports and facilities were on land, creating points 
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On December 23, 1943, the first full draft for General Staff Officers (GSO’s 1) of 
the COSSAC disarmament study was forwarded.
14
 Its objective assumed a similar organ-
ization as that following World War I in that it outlined the steps to be taken by the Su-
preme Commander (SCAF) to enforce disarmament of the German Army in his area of 
responsibility (AOR) between the time of the envisioned Armistice and the transfer of 
responsibility to a Disarmament Commission. The scope of this paper covered German 
forces outside Germany, German forces in transit over the frontiers of Germany, and 
German forces in Germany. Contrary to the initial study, it stated that naval disarmament 
was an Admiralty responsibility and thus would not be considered in the paper. 
The paper indicated further that the Post-Hostilities Sub-committee was drafting a 
paper on the composition and functions of a European Disarmament Commission for 
consideration by the Chiefs of Staff and, upon approval by the British Government, for 
submission to the EAC. That said, the paper postulated that the SCAF would be responsi-
ble for the complete disarmament of the German Armed Forces until the transfer of re-
sponsibility to the Disarmament Commission took place – a period expected to take ap-
proximately two months. It absolved the Supreme Commander from any responsibility 
for the disbanding of the German Armed Forces or the dismantling and destruction of 
German fortifications and “similar works.” 
Of the several main considerations to be followed in this paper, the admonition 
that disarmament was to be immediate and that no German should be allowed to enter 
Germany bearing arms was one. The paper cited the experience following World War I, 
stating that “after the last war it was possible for the Germans to pretend that the German 






Army had never been beaten in the field because it returned to Germany still bearing its 
arms. This is another mistake which must not be repeated.” The paper prefaced this cau-
tion by reminding its readers that the German Army had been able to hinder the effec-
tiveness of the Military Control Commission after the last war, hence total disarmament 
must be carried out immediately after the armistice without exceptions. By 1 January 
1944, the second draft of this study had grown in size and detail, adding sections for ac-
tion by the Air Commander-in-Chief, ground and Air Force commanders. 
An unofficial assessment of this disarmament issue by the Land Forces Sub-
committee estimated that the British alone would require 270 officers and 1300 other 
ranks to man the necessary disarmament detachments, both fixed and mobile. Aside from 
the security of dumps, depots and stores of war materiel, two key concerns were the be-
lief it would prove difficult for Allied forces to enter Germany fast enough to ensure the 
rapid disarmament of the German forces already inside Germany, and their ability to su-
pervise the expected millions of disarmed German soldiers found in barracks and camps 
both inside and outside Germany was questioned.
15
 That said, the British appeared to be-
lieve that creating new staff for disarmament at this time was a waste of scarce manpow-
er. In its stead, it was determined to relieve a number of personnel from the Staff Duties 
Section to form the nucleus of a disarmament staff until RANKIN ‘C’ conditions ob-
tained. Colonel Grazebrook was named to undertake this task.
16
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 German evasions of the terms of the Versailles Treaty and their protestations that 
the war had not been lost were themes repeated both in Washington and London. Accord-
ing to the terms of the WWI Armistice, the Germans were required to evacuate German-
occupied territories on the Western Front within two weeks. Any troops remaining in  
these areas were to be interned or taken as prisoners of war. Allied forces were to occupy 
the left bank of the Rhine within a month, and a neutral zone established on the right 
bank. In terms of military equipment, the Germans were to turn over to the Allies 5,000 
artillery pieces, 30,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 2,000 aircraft, 5,000 locomo-
tives, 150,000 railway wagons, 5,000 trucks and its entire submarine fleet. The majority 
of Germany's surface naval fleet was interned; the remainder was disbanded.
17
  
A memo by a prominent German lawyer who had fled to the United States and 
joined the U.S. Army, prepared for Major General John H. Hilldring, Chief of the newly 
formed Civil Affairs Division in the War Department, and written from personal 
knowledge, stated that when the Armistice was signed in 1918, it had been signed: 
[a]t Compiegne at a time when the German armies 
were holding in Russia, Turkey, the Balkans, Belgium and 
France. The German soldier did not realize he was defeat-
ed. … [that] after the proclamation of the Armistice the 
German troops going back through France and Belgium 
gave the appearance of well organized fighting units. They 
had observed good marching discipline, and were fully 
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equipped with rifles, machine guns and cannons. Their 




On 14 January 1944, Major General C.A. West, Deputy CoS (G-3), highlighted 
the fact in a COSSAC Memo that there was a complete lack of United Nations policy to 
help deal with problems arising from Operation RANKIN. General West specifically ad-
dressed the issue of armistice terms and disarmament, stating that there had been consid-
erable guidance from British sources but that they dealt exclusively with long-term policy 
after the initial occupation of Germany. It was essential now, he wrote, that papers on all 
these problems be prepared with some urgency. This would allow the SCAF to lay down 
policy for the first 90 days following the armistice. He then outlined ten issue areas that 
needed addressing to include armistice terms and disarmament, and he assigned both G-3 
and G-4 divisions the responsibility for developing these papers. He also addressed both 




By 25 January, the draft COSSAC disarmament paper had become a SHAEF pa-
per (SHAEF/21540/SD) and was sent to SHAEF’s “Head Planners” indicating that sig-
nificant amendments from the previous meeting had been incorporated and that unless 
controversial points arose (during the coordination process) there would be no further 
meetings on that paper. Among the various changes incorporated was a War Establish-
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ment/Table of Organization (WE/TO) for the disarmament mission that now included 
manning for separate U.S. and British units.
20
 
The paper was released under the signature of Colonel Grazebrook, then Deputy 
Chief, Staff Duties Section, G-3 (Operations) Division. The 15-page paper contained four 
appendices and a map. Extremely detailed, it included suggested sizes and compositions 
of disarmament detachments to be set up in German military districts (Wehrkreise) as 
well as mobile missions, and outlined the responsibilities of SHAEF and the German 
commanders who were to be used to effect disarmament under Allied supervision. In 
April, the study, now entitled Primary Disarmament of the German Armed Forces, was 
forwarded to the SHAEF Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, for approval. The 
cover letter indicated that the total personnel requirement for the necessary disarmament 
missions totaled 272 officers and 165 enlisted men/other ranks. This study, which was the 
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21





There was, however, one aspect of this study to which the Foreign Office object-
ed. The offending paragraphs stated that German forces would be used to guard German 
arms and supply depots in liberated territories to prevent them from being raided by Al-
lied nations. The Foreign Office suggested that Allied governments would be offended to 
learn that after their liberation from the Germans, German troops were being retained on 
their territory to do a job the Allies could do. Furthermore, the Foreign Office believed 
the Allies would be none too pleased that Germans were needed to protect the dumps 




Several days later, a memo from the Allied naval staff was sent to the Admiralty 
asking for guidance on disarmament. The memo requested guidance on naval objectives 
that still needed to be occupied and on additional naval operations that were to be carried 
out. It also suggested that naval disarmament requirements could be met by including na-
val representation in the disarmament missions then being prepared by SHAEF. Lastly, 
an enclosure included a timetable establishing when various ports were to be occupied 
under the present plan as well as under an accelerated, modified plan. The timetable indi-
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In early February, the War Office sent a memo to SHAEF asking for estimates of 
manpower needs for the control/disarmament commission. The Memo indicated that the 
bulk of the requested technical personnel would come at the expense of 21
st
 Army Group 
and forces in the UK that were otherwise required for reinforcement or maintenance. The 
War Office then requested that requirements be kept as small as possible, deferring as 
much as possible until the war was over. A summary of British Army personnel required 
totaled 383 officers and 2,586 other ranks for the disarmament process.
24
  
Responsibilities of the Supreme Commander 
Concurrent with the planning taking place in SHAEF during 1944, questions con-
cerning the post-surrender responsibilities of the Supreme Commander continued to be 
raised. In May, 1944, Eisenhower received his first directive on Military Government in 
Germany. Known as CCS 551, Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to 
Defeat or Surrender, the directive vested in him supreme legislative, executive and judi-
cial powers but contained nothing regarding disarmament or demilitarization.
25
 The re-
ceipt of CCS 551, and its guidance for military government in those areas of Germany 
captured by the Allies before the war was terminated made the lack of definitive guidance 
regarding Eisenhower’s responsibilities following Germany’s surrender even more ur-
gent. Accordingly, and shortly before planning for the post-hostilities plan Operation 
TALISMAN began, two additional documents, a staff study and a memorandum, the 
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first, entitled Preparations for the Armistice and Post Hostilities Middle Period and the 
second entitled Short Term Post-Hostilities Responsibilities and Planning, addressed the 




The key feature of the staff study was its recommendation that the OKW should 
be used to impose the will of the Allies upon a defeated Germany. Acknowledging that 
the EAC was still working on the Instrument of Surrender and that directives to comple-
ment the surrender document were still required from CCS, the study went on to consider 
the kind of problems the Supreme Commander would confront during the “Middle Peri-
od” and before an Allied Control Authority was established. Among the problems dis-
cussed were: 
 Control of the German High Command, which it was believed would re-
main in existence for some undefined period to insure the terms of surren-
der were met. 
 The initial stages of disarmament, subsequent problems associated with 
the disposal of enemy war materiel and captured arms, and the destruction 
of enemy fortifications. 
 The disbandment of the German armed forces, to include their discipline, 
provisioning and use as labor before being demobilized, and 
 The disposal of the German police forces and Gestapo and the denazifica-
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 Many of these problems were subsequently addressed by papers and directives that eventually appeared 





The memorandum, written by Major General Bull, reflected the contents of a 
memo sent to the Deputy Chief of Staff by Grazebrook one month earlier. In his Memo-
randum, General Bull bemoaned the still confused state of post-hostilities planning and 
preparation and the fact that the CCS had yet to send any guidance relating to the Su-
preme Commander’s responsibilities. Many different bodies, he continued, primarily in 
the UK were studying the problem in a vacuum but there was no real coordination be-
tween them nor in SHAEF, despite the “great deal of planning” that had been carried out 
by the various divisions.  
Attached to Bull’s memorandum was a second memorandum designed to be sent 
to the CCS by Eisenhower outlining action that needed to be taken by SHAEF to provide 
him with the necessary “special staffs” he would require to initiate plans for the immedi-
ate post-surrender period. Most important, it recommended that the SHAEF Planning 
Staff be placed at the disposal of the EAC for “consultation and exploratory work.”
28
 The 
attached memorandum recognized that it was not possible to predict when Germany 
would surrender and, while acknowledging that the EAC was working on establishing the 
necessary post-defeat machinery to be set up in Germany (and Austria), the actual sur-
render could come about before the Allies had agreed on what needed to be done. There-
fore, the memorandum continued, it stood to reason that Eisenhower, as the Supreme 
Commander, needed to be prepared to initiate the occupation and control of Germany 
immediately following the cessation of hostilities, and that his responsibilities in that re-
spect would continue for some indeterminate period. 
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The attached memorandum also highlighted the fact that the British Chiefs of 
Staff had already established a Control Commission Military Staff (CCMS) and that ex-
tensive planning had been accomplished on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff. Fur-
thermore, it recognized that various working committees had been established in the Brit-
ish Foreign Office and other Ministries but that apart from the military staffs of each na-
tion in the EAC, he, Eisenhower, was unaware of any comparable post-hostilities plan-
ning by either the Soviet Union or the United States except for that already done within 
SHAEF. 
The memorandum then ended with a series of conclusions and recommended ac-
tions to wit: 
 There might not be enough time for the EAC to complete its 
work nor select and train the specialist staffs needed for the 
part of Germany that will be occupied by the Allied Expedi-
tionary Force. 
 That the Supreme Commander must be prepared to cope with 
this outcome but would confine his responsibilities to only that 
portion of Germany to be occupied by U.S. and British forces. 
 That there could be no duplication of effort. Those staffs se-
lected by the Supreme Commander must be so organized as to 
fit the final British and U.S. organization for control in Germa-
ny and that SHAEF and the EAC must coordinate closely. 
 
To that end, Eisenhower proposed to: 
 
 Set up a short-term post-hostilities organization within his 
headquarters under a designated member of his staff. 
 Obtain from British Service ministries and from the European 
Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA) addi-
tional British and U.S. personnel as necessary to implement the 
planning and executive staff. 
 To approve directives to these staffs and subordinate field 
commanders for “essential military action required to  inter 
alia: 
 




o Seize control at all levels within the occupied territory of 
the German military, administrative and political machin-
ery. 
o Disarm the German forces in Western Europe. 
 
 
The memorandum closed by stating that if the CCS agreed to the above, they 
might wish to modify the terms of reference for the CCMS as the Supreme Commander’s 
planning for the immediate post-surrender period and the training of specialist staffs that 
would have already taken place. Additionally, it reemphasized the need for extremely 
close coordination between the EAC and SHAEF’s post-hostility staff to ensure that the 
SHAEF staff marched in step with the EAC. Lastly, it recommended as desirable Russian 
representation on the planning staff “at the earliest possible opportunity.”
29
 Before the 
memorandum could be sent, however, a cable arrived from the Combined Chiefs that, as 
interpreted by SHAEF, gave “the Supreme Commander the responsibility to act for a pe-
riod after the signing of the Armistice.”
30
 
At approximately the same time, and for the reason outlined in Bull’s memoran-
dum, Eisenhower requested the establishment of the nucleus of an American Control 
Council to prepare for the post-surrender period. In a memo hand-carried to the JCS by 
General Wickersham, Eisenhower cited the existence of a British Control Council ele-
ment while bemoaning the lack of any parallel U.S. or Soviet group in the UK aside from 
those assigned to the EAC. He also indicated a lack of knowledge of what, if any, such 
planning staffs existed in either the U.S. or Russia. 
                                                     
29
 Tab ‘A’ to SHAEF/21542/Plans, Short Term Post-Hostilities Responsibilities and Planning, June 1944, 
Loc. cit. See also Planning for the Occupation of Germany, pp. 50-52. 
 
30





Eisenhower related that SHAEF had begun a great deal of post-hostility planning 
and that U.S. and UK specialist personnel had been earmarked for training. A basic man-
ual for military government had also been drafted based on previously received pre-
surrender guidance. The problem, however, was the lack of top-down planning, i.e., noth-
ing had been done to provide senior leadership for Allied Control Staffs, policy guidance 
or key personnel. The stage had now been reached, Eisenhower continued, where the ap-
pointment of a nucleus group had become an urgent necessity. Eisenhower then recom-
mended that immediate appointments be made for deputies to the yet-to-be-named chiefs 
of the Control Council, for a U.S. equivalent to the British element to fill appointments in 
the Disarmament, Demobilization and Demilitarization Group, and for key personnel in 
the Military Government Group.
31
 
On 4 August, the JCS approved Eisenhower’s request and agreed that U.S. per-
sonnel should be so assigned. The JCS further concurred in the appointment of a General 
officer to be the Acting Deputy to the Chief, U.S. Representative to the Control Council 
and named Wickersham, still the U.S. Military Representative to Ambassador Winant on 
the EAC to fill the position. Ten days later, the JCS authorized the assignment of 289 of-
ficers, 32 warrant officers, and 356 enlisted personnel, some of whom were to come from 
the European Theater, as well as the War and Navy Departments, to man the U.S. ele-
ment Eisenhower had requested.
32
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The failure to provide guidance to Eisenhower, however, remained unresolved as 
late as the fall of 1944. In mid-October 1944, Grazebrook submitted a number of papers 
to the Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAEF, outlining the need for a senior officer to be in 
charge of post-hostilities planning due to the failure of the EAC to devise any such poli-
cies, and the lack of agreement by the three Allied powers on any final policy as of that 
date. This vacuum meant that the Supreme Commander would not be afforded the luxury 
of having guidance provided him regarding the occupation of Germany. Grazebrook felt 
that a senior officer could direct a survey of all the tasks and responsibilities that would 
face the Supreme Commander to ensure that the plans, now coming to fruition in 




Once Grazebrook learned his memo had been approved, he submitted a second 
paper that contained recommendations to execute his proposal, a list of agencies with 
whom coordination would be essential, and the suggestion that due to its familiarization 
with the issues to be confronted, the Post-Hostilities Sub-section (G-3), of which he was 
chief, become the staff of the new senior officer/co-coordinator for planning. Grazebrook 
then appended a list of important papers that had been or were being prepared by SHAEF 
or outside agencies as well as a list of matters that required further attention, many of 
which were incorporated into subsequent studies, occupation directives and laws.
34
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This planning coordination was undertaken by the Deputy Chief of Staff and the 
first meeting to coordinate plans and policies was called for 8 November 1944.
35
 This 
initial meeting had far reaching results in that it highlighted a number of issues that need-
ed review, revision or initiation, and a progress report issued a few weeks later, showed 
that various SHAEF staffs were rapidly working to resolve these issues.
36
  
Another April 1944 SHAEF Staff Study, Preparation for the Surrender and Post 
Hostilities Middle Period attempted to lay out the conditions and define the responsibili-
ties that would confront the Supreme Commander upon the cessation of hostilities in Eu-
rope.
37
 In terms of the need to disarm and demilitarize German forces on the continent, 
the study initially envisioned retaining the OKW intact in order to control the German 
Armed Forces. While SHAEF was to remain initially in Great Britain, it was deemed im-
portant for propaganda and psychological reasons to locate U.S. and British officers at 
the OKW to establish appropriate control and to transmit necessary directives from 
SHAEF to the German military. 
The study also addressed the question of disarmament (excluding naval forces), 
placing responsibility on the Supreme Commander. Details had not yet been worked out 
but the assumption was made that disarmament would be controlled by the OKW while 
its execution would be supervised by Allied missions and mobile detachments. Disarma-
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ment policy was to be formulated by the Supreme Commander with the advice of a yet-
to-be-formed Control Commission. Additionally, the OKW was to remain responsible for 
the provisioning, maintenance and housing of German forces under its command. While 
the study stated that the terms of surrender would prohibit all forms of military training, it 
also indicated that demobilization might be delayed for a considerable time as there 
might be a requirement to use German manpower for labor, either in Germany or in the 
liberated countries.  
In early July 1944, SHAEF sent a notice to the naval, air force, and major SHAEF 
staffs that a CCS message, which summarized the three stages of occupation in Western 
Europe, was understood to give the Supreme Commander the responsibility to act for an 
indeterminate period of time after Germany surrendered. As a result, the addressees were 
told that SHAEF now had to decide on the scope and limitations of those responsibilities. 
Two appendices were attached to the notice. The first was a draft that outlined the basis 
for Operation TALISMAN planning as it only covered the movement of Allied forces 
into the liberated countries and Germany and not what was required to enforce the terms 
of surrender. The scope of this latter issue was covered in the second appendix, entitled 
Outline of Post-Hostilities Functions, and it was meant to cover the period between the 
surrender of Germany and the assumption of responsibility for Germany by the Allied 
Control Commission (ACC). 
The objectives of the post-surrender occupation of Germany, as stated in this ap-
pendix, were derived from an EAC document of 31 May 1944 and were as follows: 
 To complete the disarmament Germany and the destruction 
of the German war machine. 





  To destroy the National Socialist Party and system.  
 To ensure that German militarism and National Socialism 
did not continue to operate underground.  
 To lay the foundation for the rule of law in Germany, and  





According to the appendix, the documents and proclamations being drafted by the 
EAC lacked the detail necessary to issue the required orders to the Germans pertaining to 
the occupation and the German Armed Forces. It was determined that SHAEF would 
therefore have to prepare these orders. The appendix stated further that as disarmament of 
German forces was an essential prerequisite of occupation, SHAEF would also have to 
provide special disarmament personnel with the requisite technical knowledge to assist in 
the disarmament and control of German bases and supply depots. In this vein, the outline 
recommended that planning be restricted only to the “immediate disposal” of surrendered 
war materiel and that the control of Germany’s armaments industry was not considered a 
priority. 
The appendix also addressed the issue of the control of German forces, which it 
considered essential. It suggested that control staffs, placed at various German military 
headquarters would suffice and that the provision of previously trained personnel would 
also fall upon SHAEF but that they could be found in the several SHAEF headquarters 
and staffs. 
 The appendix erroneously assumed that demobilization and disbandment of 
German forces would not take place during this period and thus should not be included in 
this post-surrender planning without further instructions. As will be seen below, within 
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six weeks following Germany’s surrender, virtually all members of the German Armed 
Forces, with the exception of those cited as “war criminals,” security suspects, or mem-
bers of the S.S., etc., were disbanded and demobilized.  
Lastly, to provide guidance to subordinate commanders, the appendix recom-
mended that a post-surrender Handbook be prepared to obviate the necessity of preparing 
and issuing innumerable addition directives. 
 
Operation RANKIN 
Planning for the occupation and demilitarization of Germany was a complex mat-
ter. Planners were asked to envision the situation as it would be when the time came. 
Thus planners were given an “intellectual exercise of unusual difficulty,” one that in-
volved a task much broader that what military planners are normally given. In other 
words, since the plan they were asked to develop would cover the period following Ger-
many’s surrender, Germany’s defeat would not be the objective. Instead, the plan would 
have to cover a myriad of problems ranging from displaced persons and allied prisoners 
of war to the disposal of captured German war materiel, the disbandment of the German 
Armed Forces, and the destruction of Germany’s industrial war-making potential.
 39
 
When COSSAC, under the direction of Lieutenant General Morgan, was estab-
lished following the Casablanca Conference in 1943, he was charged with three tasks by 
the British Chiefs of Staff. Their directive, issued on 26 April 1943, read as follows: 
You will accordingly prepare plans for: 
a. An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending 
over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy 
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in West and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale 
cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at 
least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an 
air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and 
the United States 8
th
 Air Force. 
b. A return to the continent in the event of German disintegra-
tion at any time from now onwards with whatever forces 
may be available at the time. 
c. A full-scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early 
as possible.40 
 
 The first and third tasks were pure combat operations, i.e., to plan deceptive op-
erations to keep German divisions in Western Europe and thereby help relieve the pres-
sure on the Soviet Union, and to plan for the invasion of the Continent, i.e., to plan for 
what became Operation OVERLORD. Behind this directive was the idea, based on expe-
rience derived from the end of World War I, that Germany might suddenly collapse. It 
was also supported by naïve and wishful thinking that stemmed from recent German de-
feats in North Africa and Stalingrad and the planned Allied invasion of Sicily. This idea 
of German disintegration was voiced by Morgan in a directive that initiated the planning 
for the occupation of Germany that began on 22 May 1943.
41
 In the directive for the plan, 
which was given the code-name RANKIN, Morgan said that the expected German “disin-
tegration” would not necessarily take the form of a complete collapse but that it could 
also be a partial withdrawal from occupied territory or the result of an Allied break-
through.  
This belief in a German disintegration was repeated by Morgan in the summer of 
1943 and in the opinion of the Joint Intelligence Committee that, following its review of 
                                                     
40
 Ibid., p. 9. 
 
41





the German situation, was reflected in the RANKIN plan in August of that year as fol-
lows: 
…the general situation as it exists today must appear to 
the German military leaders as verging on the desperate…. 
They are now faced with a serious situation of the Russian 
front and with the urgent problem of stopping the breach de-
veloping in Italy and the Balkans. Their U-boat campaign has 
met with a serious set-back. Finally, the ever-increasing Allied 
air offensive, to which there is no serious likelihood of a reply 
being possible, must be making the planning of the production 
increasingly difficult and must be causing serious doubts as to 
how long the home front can stand up to the combined strain of 




As has been and will be repeated throughout this chapter, there was a dearth of 
guidance provided to the SHAEF planners. From the documentation available, it appears 
that “no theme is more prominent and continuous in papers relating to the planning for 
the occupation then the complaint that the military planners were left without guidance as 
to the policies of their governments.” The fact that SHAEF had to undertake these coor-
dination meetings underscores this lack of guidance. That I have included reference to 
them and to the studies that were written as a result further illuminates the extremely 
broad and complex nature of the military and non-military problems the SHAEF staff 
was forced to solve on their own. 
A clear example of this lack of guidance was voiced by Morgan in the transmittal 
letter to Operation RANKIN. In that letter he addressed “the essential difficulty in plan-
ning operations before the clear establishment of the political policy whence those opera-
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tions derive their necessity.”
43
 Post-hostilities planning was still being debated at the 
highest levels of government and a serious lack of agreement existed both within the Al-
lied governments and between them. Much of this can be understood by realizing that 
post-hostilities thinking, aside from the obvious task of disarming German forces, was 
focused on the re-establishment of civil government in the liberated areas, the enforce-
ment of the terms of surrender on Germany, and the establishment of military govern-
ment in Germany to restore law and order.
44
 
While the first Quebec Conference provided no guidance to the COSSAC regard-
ing post-hostilities planning, it did provide support for a continued planning effort.
45
 
Planning for Operation RANKIN therefore continued, developing three scenarios that 
were envisioned as signaling the end of hostilities. The first scenario, named RANKIN, 
Case ‘A,’ simply foresaw a rapid collapse or “substantial weakening” of German strength 
and morale, allowing Allied forces to land on the continent earlier than planned. The se-
cond scenario, RANKIN, Case ‘B,’ saw a German pull-back to its pre-war borders, also 
allowing Allied forces an early entry on the continent. Rankin Case ‘C,’ the third and fi-
nal contingency, which foresaw an unconditional surrender, thereby allowing for an un-
opposed Allied entry into Germany with a force of approximately twenty-five divisions.   
RANKIN Case ‘C’ did not, however, consider much beyond the immediate dis-
armament of the German armed forces. The plan provided only for stationing troops in 
certain strategic areas but not all those that eventually came under the responsibility of 
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the Supreme Commander. Furthermore, it failed to address what to do with German mili-
tary forces once they were disarmed or how to treat German police or para-military forc-
es. Neither did it address how Allied forces would be able to take up their positions with 
sufficient speed to disarm the German troops before they were able to retreat into Germa-
ny. In addition, it failed to address the question of Germany’s military-industrial complex 




With support for continued planning from the Quebec Conference, General Mor-
gan gave priority to RANKIN, Case ‘C’ and a final draft was prepared in October 1943 




 Army Groups. 
The revised plan now included occupation areas deep in Germany and included Berlin. It 
also specified the involvement of U.S. Forces. There remained, however, no additional 
guidance regarding the disarming of German forces. The above notwithstanding, Opera-
tion RANKIN - whose target date was set for 1 January 1944 - never went into effect. 
Despite the great effort and time that went into its planning, RANKIN continued to be 
based on what proved to be false assumptions. As late as July 1944, the senior officer of 
the British Control Commission Military Section (CCMS) stated his opinion that “the 
German surrender probably would take place with our forces still well outside the Ger-
man frontier” and that planning in the CCMS was being conducted on that basis.
47
 
RANKIN’s significance according to McCreedy, however, was that it began a “process 
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of thinking and preparing for post-conflict operations that would continue through the 
rest of the war.”
48
 
This process was supported by General West, who underscored the importance of 
not waiting for policy to be laid down by the Allied powers. It was essential, he wrote in 
January 1944, “that we should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these 
problems,” i.e., armistice terms, disarmament, and the disposal of captured war materiel 
among other issues.
49
 Thus, as D-Day approached, there was an explosion of planning 
activity and as early as April 1944, two post-conflict staff studies were underway and the 
subjects listed by General West as needing urgent attention eventually became Operation 
ECLIPSE Memoranda or Administrative Memoranda.
50
 Thinking shifted from anticipa-
tion of a sudden military collapse, as envisioned by RANKIN, to the realization that the 
war would only be brought to an end by military operations.  
Following Major General Bull’s direction to all chiefs in the G-3 division to sub-
mit to him a weekly progress report covering the activities they had completed or taken 
under study during the previous week, reports began to arrive. On 26 April, the post-
hostilities planners indicated that two papers - Primary Disarmament of German Forces 
and Preparation for the Armistice and Post-Hostilities (Military) Period, PS-SHAEF(44) 
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9, had been approved by the Chief of Staff. The 31 May report stated that Operation 





By mid-June, the Post-Hostilities Sub-section, under Colonel Grazebrook, ap-
peared to be fully engaged on several drafts dealing with the control and disposal of 
German forces and on 9 July, planning for Operation TALISMAN formally began.
52
 The 
objectives of TALISMAN were, inter alia, to disarm the Germans in the West to prevent 
a resurgence of hostilities and to occupy strategic areas on the continent to enforce the 
terms of surrender, all of which was to be accomplished in three stages. A supplement to 
the initial outline plan concluded that the Supreme Commander’s first three responsibili-
ties would include (1) Disarmament of the German forces, (2) Short-term disposal of sur-
rendered war materiels, and (3) Control of German forces through subordinate headquar-
ters but not through the High Command.
53
 
The plan encompassed a very narrow view of occupation and thus rejected re-
sponsibility for control of the German munitions industries, the disposal of enemy war 
materiel, and the disbandment of German forces.
54
 The Planning Directive, initially is-
sued in draft on 25 July, condensed the scope of the operation and made several technical 
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changes to the three stages of the operation. Additional functions and tasks were also 
added to include the partial demobilization of the German armed forces for use as labor. 
The directive also defined TALISMAN as: 
Plans and preparations for operations in Europe 
(excluding Norway and the Channel Islands) in the event of 
German surrender. Operations in Europe will include the 
liberated countries until their indigenous governments are 
firmly established and in complete and independent control, 





The TALISMAN Outline Plan was distributed as a planning directive on 13 Au-
gust 1944 and it included a number of significant changes, to include the assignment of 
responsibilities to the major commands. It also redefined surrender as a “formal surrender 
signed by properly constituted German authorities, or the capitulation of the major por-
tion of the German forces opposing the Allied Expeditionary Force.” In this latter case, 
the Supreme Commander would designate a date, to be known as ‘A’ -Day, signifying 
the beginning of TALISMAN. Thus, the plan allowed more flexibility in that it could be 
implemented not only upon Germany’s surrender but, at the discretion of the Supreme 
Commander should a significant portion of Germany’s forces surrender. In addition, the 
definition of German forces was expanded to include both para-military forces and the 
police, and a distinction was made between primary and complete disarmament and con-
trol of German forces.
56
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On 16 August 1944, Clay, then a Lieutenant General and Commander, 12
th
 Army 
Group, and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, Commander, 21
st
 Army Group, were 
directed to initiate plans and preparations in the event of a German surrender, which was 
not expected before 1 September 1944.
57
 This operation, had four main objectives: 
 The primary disarmament and control of all German forces. 
 Enforcement of the terms of surrender. 
 Establishment of law and order. 
 The initiation of steps to control and completely disarm all 
German forces within SCAEF’s area of responsibility. 
 
To this end, both Army Groups were expected to plan and execute the operation 
in their area of responsibility (AOR) and to collaborate closely with one another. Appen-
dices to the Outline Plan provided the estimated number of troops available to both com-
mands between 1 August 1944 and 1 January 1945 as well as the number of troops re-
quired for each of the plan’s three stages. Clay was informed that his Army Group would 
have a large surplus of forces in all three stages that might be required by 21
st
 Army 
Group. One week later, both commanders were provided with drafts of the Directive for 
Military Government of Germany for their concurrence.  
In early September, however, Lt. General Smith, SHAEF’s Chief of Staff, sent a 
letter to the Chief of Staff, Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Expeditionary Forces 
(ANCXF), the Senior Air Officer, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF), and key 
SHAEF staffs stating that as Allied forces would soon be entering Germany and thus fac-
ing TALISMAN conditions, it was essential that Army Groups and Air Forces receive 
early guidance. He therefore requested that memoranda for which they were responsible 
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be prepared for distribution as soon as possible, even if incomplete. Several days later, 
Colonel Grazebrook, was authorized to issue several memoranda on a provisional basis.
58
 
Operation TALISMAN planning increased the size of the force required to thirty-
nine and two-thirds divisions. A revised TALISMAN Outline Plan, distributed in Octo-
ber, delineated Zones of Occupation as decided on by the Second Quebec Conference.
59
 
On 30 October, 21
st
 Army Group notified Supreme Headquarters that a captured German 
document indicated that the code name ‘TALISMAN’ was compromised. On 11 Novem-
ber, the new code name Operation ECLIPSE was substituted and planning continued un-
der the new name. Two weeks later, on 24 November 1944, the Outline Plan for TAL-
ISMAN was officially superceded.
60
 
Operation ECLIPSE incorporated a number of items from TALISMAN, including 
the definition of its code-word name ‘ECLIPSE’ as “Plans and preparations for opera-
tions in EUROPE (excluding NORWAY and the CHANNEL ISLANDS) in the event of 
German surrender.”
61
 ECLIPSE was different than its predecessors in that it specified 
that operations in Europe included “Operations in GERMANY until control there is taken 
over from the Supreme Commander by the Tripartite Military Government or by U.S. 
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and British Commanders” while retaining the definition of ‘surrender’ from TALIS-
MAN.
62
   
The “outline” of Operation ECLIPSE indicated that operations would most likely 
take place in two phases: the first would involve advancing to secure “especially im-
portant strategic areas deep within Germany, including BERLIN….” and the second 
would be, in part, to deploy forces to secure additional strategic areas and to “carry out 
the disarmament and disposal of enemy forces in GERMANY.”
63
 The plan then provided 
guidance to the several Allied Army Groups and Air Forces as to their respective respon-
sibilities in both phases, among which were the primary disarmament and masking of en-
emy forces in contact with Allied forces; flanking or astride the Allied axis of advance; 
the controlled concentration of enemy forces in areas selected by the Allies; the arrest and 
detention of individuals on the ‘black list;’ and the seizure and control of German war 
materiel. In this respect, the objectives of ECLIPSE were broadened to encompass not 
only the primary disarmament and control of the German forces, but para-military organ-
izations and the police as well. 
Operation ECLIPSE accepted the possibility that an overthrow of the Nazi regime 
by internal forces was remote and postulated that there would be no collapse of the Ger-
man armed forces nor unconditional surrender until Germany had suffered “a further ma-
jor defeat” that would enable the Allies to penetrate the homeland. The plan briefly dis-
cussed conditions expected to be found in Germany following its collapse and indicated 
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that while there might be some resistance and sabotage, it would be isolated. The possi-
bility of civil war, however, was not discounted.
64
 
Between 28 September and 13 December 1944, progress reports indicated that a 
study entitled  Disposal of the German Military Caste had been circulated to planners and 
that TALISMAN Memo 9 (Army disarmament) and the Operation ‘ECLIPSE’ Apprecia-
tion and Outline Plan had been approved and issued. They also reported that the Hand-
book had been approved by the Chief of Staff and was in publication.
65
 Also in prepara-
tion was the first draft of memo suggesting priorities for the destruction of war structures 
in Germany and the first draft of ECLIPSE Memo #17 (Disbandment of the German 
Armed Forces). In addition, the final draft of Memo 10 (Air Force disarmament) had 
been approved by the Planning Staff but despite General Smith’s request, of the 16 
ECLIPSE memoranda, only 10 had been issued by late January 1945 
The ECLIPSE Memoranda 
Operation ECLIPSE was spelled out in the Appreciation and Outline Plan and in 
nineteen Memoranda, of which five are of primary interest to the issue of disarmament, 
demobilization and disbandment of the German armed forces.
66
  
ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 1, Instrument of Surrender, Surrender Order and 
Sanctions, was originally issued in November 1944 but revised in April 1945. It was a 
lengthy, detailed Memorandum that contained a short series of opening paragraphs that 
laid out what would take place in the event of (1) a formal surrender, with or without an 
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EAC-agreed Instrument of Surrender, in which case special orders to the German High 
Command had been prepared by SHAEF and were appended to the Memo as Appendix 
‘A,’
67
 or (2) there was no formal surrender; and (3) sanctions that would be imposed if 
resistance to either form of surrender were encountered. 
The main elements of this Memorandum were included in five additional Appen-
dices: 
Appendix ‘B’: Supreme Commander Special Orders to the 
German High Command (OKW) of common concern to 
all three services or the direct concern of OKW only. 
Appendix ‘C’: Special Orders to the German High Command 
(OKH) relating to Land Forces. 
Appendix ‘D’: Special Orders to the German High Command 
(OKM) relating to Naval Forces. 
Appendix ‘E’: Special Orders to the German High Command 
(OKL) relating to Air Forces. 
Appendix ‘F’: Measures which may be taken to enforce the 
terms of surrender or in the event of no surrender to 
compel the enemy to comply with the Laws of War. 
 
Part I of Appendix ‘B’ was quite all-inclusive and held the German High Com-
mand personally responsible for carrying out the orders of the Allied representatives and 
for ensuring that the commanding officers of all units of the German Armed Forces and 
their subordinates were notified that they would be held personally responsible for carry-
ing out orders of the Supreme Commander in their areas of responsibility. It also estab-
lished timelines by which the Allies were to be given information regarding the location 
of the High Command and all its departments and branches, as well as the location of all 
experimental/research facilities, underground installations of all kinds, and missile 
launching sites. 
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Part II of this Appendix was devoted to the “Control, Maintenance and Disarma-
ment of the Armed Forces” and made the German High Command responsible for its 
“immediate and total disarmament.” It also provided initial guidance regarding the 
maintenance and guarding of war materiel, specifying that none was to be destroyed 
without prior orders from the Allied representatives and that all land minefields were to 
be clearly marked and that mines and obstacles on roads, railroads, waterways and ports 
were to be removed immediately. It also ordered the removal and destruction of all booby 
traps, demolition charges and concealed explosives.
68
 The remaining parts dealt with Al-
lied POWs and Civilian Internees, Telecommunications, Merchant Shipping and Ports, 
etc., and contained four Annexes, one of which contained a list of war materiels to be 
withdrawn from the Germans while a second contained a list of war materiel to be re-
tained. 
Part I of Appendices ‘C’ through ‘E’ mirrored Appendix ‘B’ by requiring each 
individual German armed force to provide information as to their order of battle and the 
location of their units, weapon systems, ships, etc. within a specific period of time. Part 
II, then, followed a similar pattern, specific to each particular service, e.g., all ships and 
submarines at sea were to report their positions and head for the nearest German or Allied 
port, breech blocks were to be removed from all guns and all torpedo tubes were to be 
unloaded. Aircraft were to be grounded and immobilized by methods described in the 
Appendix, removed from runways, guns unloaded and bombs removed. German Field 
and Home Armies’ armaments were to be placed in dumps as directed by “appropriate” 
Allied representatives and various classes of war materiels, delineated by the Allied rep-
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resentatives e.g., armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, ammunition, etc.,  were to be 
laid out in stacks or parks within each dump. All other war materiel in factories, dumps, 
depots, etc., were to be maintained but were to remain where located. War materiel in 
transit, in the absence of orders to the contrary, would be allowed to proceed to its desti-
nation where it would then be placed in dumps/depots.  
The three Appendices to the Memorandum also required all German commanders 
to immediately inventory all war materiel of any kind in any location within their area of 
responsibility. These lists were to be prepared in quadruplicate and were to be completed 
within two months following the cessation of hostilities. Standardized forms were at-
tached to the Memorandum to be used for the inventory. Lastly, German Authorities were 
made responsible for handing over and delivering in good condition any war materiel that 
was requested by the Allies and they would remain responsible until such materiel had 
been accepted by the Allied representatives. 
ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 9, Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces, 
ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 10, Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces, and 
ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 11, Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces, dealt 
specifically with the three services and were, for the most part, quite similar. Memoran-
dum No. 9 was, however, the most comprehensive of the three. It began by defining war 
materiel as “materiel intended for war on land, at sea, or in the air,” and included: 
a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies 
and other implement of war of all kinds. 
b. All naval vessels of all classes, surface and submarines, auxiliary naval 
craft, all merchant shipping whether afloat, under repair or construction, 
built or building. 
c. All aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices. 
d. All military installations and establishments including air fields, seaplane 




land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together 





It continued by outlining the objectives of primary disarmament, which were to 
prevent a continuance or renewal of hostilities, to safeguard the deployment of the Allied 
Expeditionary Force during Operation ECLIPSE, and thereafter to facilitate the estab-
lishment of law and order in the Supreme Commander’s are of responsibility. 
Although this memorandum addressed the primary disarmament of German land 
forces, it also delineated the responsibilities of the Allied ground forces in the disarma-
ment process by defining what comprised the German land forces. Thus, the Herman Gö-
ring Parachute Panzer Corps and German Air Force Field Divisions, Parachute For-
mations and other similar Luftwaffe units attached to the German Army became an Allied 
ground force responsibility. Similarly, the disarmament of German naval forces ashore, 
Luftwaffe and naval flak organizations, and the Nazi Party Flieger Korps also were also 
determined to be Allied ground forces responsibility. 
Of particular interest was the guidance given that where the provision of Allied 
forces to guard and control dumps containing enemy war materiel was not possible, con-
trol would be maintained by German forces under the close supervision of the Allied 
commander in whose area the enemy war materiel was located. In fact, the Memorandum 
specified that “The fullest possible use will be made of the existing German military ma-
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chine, and orders will be issued through the recognized German channels of command 
wherever they survive the process of occupation.”
70
 
In line with ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 1, the maintenance, classification and 
inventory of enemy war materiel were made a German responsibility under strict Allied 
supervision. Lists of enemy war materiel that had to be surrendered and lists of materiel 
that could be retained in order that German forces could carry out orders given to them, 
to include limited numbers and types of weapons, e.g., rifles and pistols, were provided in 
two appendices. 
Similarly, ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 10 set out plans and policies for the pri-
mary disarmament of the Luftwaffe. For this task, the Memorandum specifically named 
the commanders of the Ninth (U.S.) Air Force and the Second (UK) Tactical Air Force 
respectively. This memorandum also defined what formations, units and personnel were 
included in Luftwaffe and followed Memorandum No. 9 in allocating primary disarma-
ment responsibility for some Luftwaffe units to Allied ground forces. 
This memorandum further delegated the exercise of the Air Commanders’ respon-
sibilities to USAAF and RAF Air Disarmament Staffs and, given that the tactical situa-
tion on the ground did not reflect what would become the final zones of occupation, 
guidance was provided regarding the coordination and operational control of the national 
Disarmament Staffs while operating in the area of responsibility of a different national 
Allied commander, e.g., RAF units operating in Ninth Air Force areas. The memorandum 
also referenced ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 1, Administrative Memorandum No. 5, and 
                                                     
70








Similar to ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 9, the Air Forces plan recognized the pos-
sibility that sufficient Allied forces personnel might not be available to guard every Luft-
waffe establishment to effect direct control over Luftwaffe war materiel. Thus, German 
Air Force commanders were to be held responsible to ensure Allied orders regarding such 
materiel and its inventory were followed. 
The memorandum expected that USAAF and RAF Air Disarmament Staffs would 
be in position behind advancing Allied forces and thus insure that German Air Force 
units, located within the area of advance were properly disarmed. It also specified that a 
“Reconnaissance Party” provided by both the U.S. and British Control Councils would be 
sent to the Air Ministry and that other elements would go to various Luftwaffe headquar-
ters to compel compliance with the terms of surrender, if required. Specific tasks of these 
units were set out in an appendix to the Memorandum and two other attachments con-
tained organizational diagrams of the respective U.S. and RAF disarmament organiza-
tions. 
The third memorandum of this group, ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 11, covering 
naval disarmament, was the briefest, being only two pages in length.
72
 It accepted the re-
sponsibility for disarming all German warships and merchant vessels, delegating the ac-
tual exercise of that responsibility to U.S., British and Allied naval officers-in-charge in 
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the areas under their control in accordance with instructions laid out in the SHAEF Mili-
tary Occupation Handbook. In addition, it followed the line of responsibility for disarm-
ing naval forces ashore as stated in ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 9.  
Section III of the memorandum addressed naval demolition stating that the demo-
lition of naval defenses in Germany, which included submarine pens, fortifications, and 
underground storages, to name a few, would most likely not take place during the Su-
preme Commander’s period of responsibility. Such demolitions, it indicated, would be 
carried out as part of a long-term policy by the Allied Control Council. 
The last key memorandum, ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 17, Disbandment of 
German Armed Forces, was put into operation on 9 May 1945, the day after Germany 
surrendered.
73
 This memorandum laid down the policies by which Army Group com-
manders would carry out the disbandment of the German Armed Forces. Like many of 
the other memos, this memo began by stipulating that it was impossible to forecast condi-
tions in Germany when the war ended. It therefore posited several assumptions upon 
which the plan was based, the essence of which was that Allied forces would have pene-
trated deep into Germany by the time hostilities ended and that those German forces, not 
already in POW camps, would have been moved into containment areas under the control 
of their own officers working under close Allied supervision.   
Additional assumptions were that those Germans eligible for discharge would be 
released with as little delay as possible to avoid large-scale desertions. Furthermore, it 
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was believed that it would take as much as six months before the occupation armies were 
fully deployed in their respective zones. 
While various memoranda and documents dealing with the anticipated surrender 
maintained the need for German military machinery to effect the terms of surrender and 
the control of surrendered German forces, the discharge plans of ECLIPSE Memorandum 
No. 17 was designed not to utilize German machinery in the discharge process if it could 
be avoided.
74
 The discharge of captured and surrendered German forces would begin 
when directed by the Supreme Commander but would first be subject to the manpower 
needs of the Allied forces to assist in the occupation or those of the governments of Al-
lied or “Liberated Territories” for purposes of reconstruction.  
The remainder of the memorandum outlined very specific principles and respon-
sibilities regarding the discharge process to include a very detailed set of statistical pro-
cedures by which members of the German armed forces were to be documented and pri-
oritized for discharge. These procedures included the transfer of personnel who had been 
recruited in a different zone of occupation, non-German personnel, stragglers, deserters, 
and members of the Volksturm. Part II of this memorandum dealt specifically with the 
discharge of members of the Waffen SS and para-military organizations. 
Shortly after this memorandum was issued, Major General R. W. Barker, Assis-
tant Chief of Staff (G-1), SHAEF, wrote Lieutenant General Morgan, SHAEF’s Assistant 
Chief of Staff, that the memo lacked both a “clear definition of the object to be obtained” 
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and “[P]ractical guidance to the recipients.”
75
 With regard to the first omission, General 
Barker wrote that he would have a paper prepared that would provide a foreword or 
opening statement which would explain the purpose of the disbandment procedure. As to 
his second comment, Barker indicated that the disbandment issue had been more than ad-
equately covered in the Occupation Handbook and that the Eclipse memo was “merely an 
extension of that handbook.” 
That said, Barker indicated that the memo did offer a “systematic and efficient 
procedure” for implementing the disbandment under any of the various conditions that 
might arise. Furthermore, he added, the statistical and documentation procedures had 
been thoroughly considered by commanders and appeared to meet the needs of the Zone 
Commanders and SHAEF. The only difficulty with the documentation issue, he conclud-
ed, was the vastness of its scope. 
Barker’s memo also stated that he did not believe SHAEF would be confronted 
with a shortage of guards as there were, on the U.S. side alone, 60 divisions in the field.
76
 
Barker also felt that the surrendered German forces would not have to be heavily guard-
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ed, believing that “…from the German point of view, the advantages of obeying or-
ders…under this plan, exceeded the disadvantages….”
77
 
Despite promulgation of the Appreciation and Outline Plan for Operation 
ECLIPSE in November of 1944, of the three memoranda dealing with the disarmament of 
German Armed Forces discussed above, Memorandum 10 (Air Force disarmament) had 
not been completed or issued as of 31 January 1945. On 1 February, Lieutenant General 
Morgan directed that all memoranda that had not yet been issued be completed and those 
issued revised and/or amended by 10 February.
78
 These memoranda were subsequently 
completed and confirmed as directives on administrative procedures in the disarmament 
of Germany on 10 March 1945.
79
 That said, the first four months of 1945 saw accelerated 
progress in the development and issuance of additional memos and directives, to include 
ECLIPSE Memo 11 (Naval forces disarmament) issued, the Interim Directive for Occu-
pation of Germany approved, Memo 17 (Disbandment of the German Armed Forces) ap-
proved by the Planning Staff and issued, as was  Memo 10.
80
 
Demobilizing and Disbanding the German Armed Forces 
More than a year before the final surrender of Germany, SHAEF’s G-3 (Ops) Di-
vision was considering the manner in which members of the German Armed Forces were 
to be demobilized. Among the issues for which decisions needed to be made were: 
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 What to do with non-German members of the German Armed 
Forces. 
 Where to send Germans for demobilization, particularly those 
who had been recruited in what was to become the Russian 
zone of occupation. 
 What demobilization papers would be needed and what form 
would they take. 
 What pensions and/or gratuities would be allowed demobilized 
Germans. 
 What articles of clothing and personal equipment would demo-
bilized Germans be allowed to retain. 





On 15 July 1944, a draft Directive entitled Disposition of German Armed Forces 
Subsequent to Surrender was submitted by the Planning Committee of the U.S. Advisor 
to the EAC for consideration and for forwarding to the Department of State and the Sec-
retariat, JCS. The Directive ordered the three Allied Commanders-in-Chief to implement 
the surrender terms and made them responsible for the demobilization and disbandment 
of the German armed forces in their respective zones and theaters of operation.” It di-
rected the dissolution of the OKW and the Service Commands at the earliest possible 
date, but authorized temporary retention of portions of those organizations in order to ef-
fect the controlled administration of the German Armed Forces during the demobilization 
and disbandment. 
This draft further authorized the Commanders’-in-Chief to keep and use disarmed 
German forces or prisoners of war (POWs) as required to accomplish tasks deemed nec-
essary, such as the destruction of fortifications, rehabilitation projects, safeguarding sur-
rendered German armament and equipment, etc. In addition, and in line with the ultimate 
objective of totally demilitarizing Germany, the Commanders’-in-Chief were directed to 
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“impress upon the German people the complete defeat of the German armed forces.” Ac-
cordingly, demobilized German personnel would be allowed to return home with only 
their approved personal effects and enough money and supplies to make the journey. Un-
der no circumstances were returnees allowed to return home in military formation or with 
bands playing or flags flying as had been the case following the Armistice that ended 
World War I. 
Other paragraphs of the draft directive dealt with the return of German units out-
side Germany’s 31 December 1937 borders and non-German personnel in the German 
Armed Forces. Lastly, Commanders’-in-Chief were cautioned to refer to an as yet unwrit-
ten guidance for instructions on the treatment of war criminals before disposing of Ger-
man personnel or POWs. 
This draft, circulated as U.S. Directive No. 15 and EAC(45)1, underwent several 
amendments and changes but was never approved and thus, never provided to SHAEF as 
official guidance. On 6 December 1945, more than a year later, and months after the war 
had ended and long after most disarmed German forces and POWs had been demobilized, 
the Allied Control Council issued Control Council Directive 18, For Disbandment and 




In mid-1944, a key assumption of another draft study outlining the planning pro-
cess for the disbandment of the German Armed Forces was that the bulk of these forces 
in the West would be outside Germany’s 1937 borders. Other assumptions were that 
some surrendered German forces would be used for labor in the liberated areas and that 
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some arrangement would have to be made with the Russians to transfer surrendered per-
sonnel to and from the Russian zone. What was decided at that time, however, was that 
disbandment during the Middle Period would be solely based upon the need for labor 
with priority given to medical personnel, agricultural workers and workers in certain es-
sential industries. The draft also included details as to what articles of clothing would be 
issued to disbanded German Armed Forces members based on their rank (whether their 
clothing had been issued or paid for by the individual) and the availability of their own 
clothing. Pay, initially set at 60 Reichmarks for officers and 30 Reichmarks for other 
ranks and later modified to 80 and 40 Reichmarks respectively, as well as food allowanc-
es were also specified in this study.
83
 
On 28 November 1944, the SHAEF Post-hostilities Planning Staff produced a 
study which essentially recommended that with the exception of certain categories of per-
sonnel, all surrendered German Armed Forces personnel should be discharged and sent 
home as soon as possible. It portrayed the elaborate and bureaucratic procedures that 
were being developed and using the need for labor as the primary criterion as delaying 
discharge as long as eight months. It stated further that the large numbers of POWs, esti-
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Disposal of Germany’s “Military Caste” 
Along with discussions of the disbandment of the German Armed Forces and de-
militarization of Germany in general to be discussed below, the issue of what to do with 
German general officers, especially the German General Staff Corps, collectively known 
as the “Military Caste” was a major issue. On 24 September 1944, Grazebrook dissemi-
nated a staff study for comment on “The disposal of the German Military Caste.” The 
staff study indicated that one of the primary objects of defeating Germany was to effect 
Germany’s “complete demilitarization and eradicate her traditional militarism.” It contin-
ued that although plans had been made to disarm and disband the military and destroy its 
war-making potential, these plans were superficial. Germany’s militaristic spirit and mili-
tary caste of highly trained, professional officers remained. They contained not only the 
ability to rebuild the Wehrmacht but “the burning desire” to do so.
 85
 
The study continued, explaining that although the Versailles Treaty forbade the 
re-establishment of the Great German General Staff, it was nonetheless resurrected in 
other forms. Grazebrook expressed his fear that while the surreptious methods used in the 
1920’s would most likely not succeed in the 1940’s, he was convinced that other methods 
would be found unless steps were taken to prevent that from happening. As long as quali-
fied officers remained in Germany, they would remain a source of danger. This danger 
could be prevented by “the complete destruction or removal from Germany of the best 
brains of the military caste.” 
Grazebrook’s study went on to distinguish General Staff Corps officers from a 
lack of a parallel organization in either the German Navy or Air Force, as well as from 
                                                     
85
 SHAEF/21544/PHP and GCT/387.4-5, Subject: Disposal of the German Military Caste, 24 September 




the German officer corps in general. The study did specify, however, that German gener-
als should not be allowed to retain any of their power or be allowed to continue in office 
in any capacity. The study concluded with the recommendation that to render these offic-
ers “impotent,” they be detained after their surrender and permanently exiled from Ger-
many. 
Because of the nature of the problem, which went well beyond the Supreme 
Commander’s level and was a tripartite matter, SHAEF indicated all it could do was rec-
ommend to CCS that a long-term policy statement be prepared.
86
 A second draft of the 
study, apparently written on 12 November and designed to reach conclusions that would 
be incorporated in an attached draft cable to be sent to CCS, included policies suggested 
by both U.S. and British authorities but also highlighted discrepancies between the two. 
On the one hand, the U.S. Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander regarding Military 
Government of GERMANY following the cessation of organised resistance” that the JCS 
had given the CCS for consideration stated that: “All General Staff Corps officers who 
are not taken into custody as prisoners of war should therefore be arrested and held pend-
ing receipt of further instructions as to their disposition. You will receive further instruc-
tions as to how to deal with other members of the German Officer Corps.” A similar Brit-
ish directive submitted to the EAC, on the other hand, made no specific mention of the 
German officer corps or General Staff but stated instead: “You will be guided in the gen-
eral disposal of forces under German Command by the following considerations: (1) All 
sections of the OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL and staffs which are not required for essential 
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administrative control purposes will be detained under guard or disbanded as you may 
direct as early as practicable.”
87
 
The five-page staff study, which incorporated much of Grazebrook’s earlier 
statements,  under-scored the importance of the problem by referring to history as having 
abundant examples of how the “German Armed Forces reduced by peace treaties to ap-
parent impotence, reemerged in an astonishingly brief period as an effective and poten-
tially dangerous organization.” Thus, the objective of the defeat of Germany, the study 
continued, was to “prevent a recurrence of this disastrous cycle by effecting the complete 
and permanent demilitarization of GERMANY.”
88
 
The study then divided the “Military Caste” into three categories: The Generals, 
The General Staff Corps, and The Professional Officer Corps. After dealing briefly with 
“The Generals,” and allowing that Generals who surrender should not be allowed to re-
tain any vestige of authority or continue in office in any capacity, the General Staff Corps 
received the greatest censure. Defined as the “high priesthood of the German cult of 
war,” the General Staff Corps was cited as being “the repository of expert knowledge re-
sulting from exhaustive study and experience, and who sought to perpetuate the teaching 
of von Clausewitz.” The study warned that unless drastic steps were taken, the General 
Staff Corps would plan and develop a future Wehrmacht, going even so far as to state that 
“The only fully successful method [of preventing a repeat of the rebuilding of the General 
Staff Corps after WW I] would be the extermination of the military caste,” but it immedi-
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ately recognized that if this would not be acceptable, some form of permanent control 
over all members of the General Staff Corps was essential.
89
 
The remainder of the study dealt with the need to detain these officers and when 
that detention should occur. It also advised that a number of German commanders and 
staff officers would be required to assist in the administration and disbandment of the 
German armed forces and that close supervision was needed. The study also cautioned 
that the detention of all potentially dangerous officers was needed to demonstrate Allied 
determination to stamp out German militarism. 
 A few days after the study was distributed, Colonel C.R. Kutz, the Chief, Ops A 
Sub-Section, forwarded his comments on this second staff study. He concluded that seg-
regating or eliminating the German General Staff Corps would be, at best, a temporary 
expedient as long as German military writings remain. He also felt that their physical ex-
termination (which had been recommended earlier) would only make martyrs out of them 
and give General Staff Corp officers even greater prestige. Kutz recommended that a way 
be found to discredit them in the eyes of the German people, that they be kept under strict 
surveillance and be required to report periodically to Allied authorities (presumably after 
discharge). He also recommended that SHAEF’s Psychological Warfare Division be di-
rected to study the measures that could be used to discredit General Staff officers. 
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A draft cable  was attached to this second staff study requesting guidance from the 
CCS regarding the ultimate disposition of German General Staff Corp officers and Gen-
eral officers “now being arrested” as none of the existing guidance provided an answer to 
that question. The draft cable suggested that “drastic steps” be taken and actually includ-
ed the recommended “physical extinction” of these officers. If that was unacceptable, the 
draft continued, permanent exile or life imprisonment was to be considered. A policy de-
cision was requested “as soon as possible” in order to “coordinate plans and put them into 
action.” Although this solution was not acceptable in the long run, the staff study, signed 
by Major General E.W. D. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, recommended approv-
al!
90
 Toward the end of December, however, General Morgan disapproved the several 
recommendations regarding this issue, stating that although not yet approved, the JCS 
directive, cited above, provided sufficient guidance.
91
 
While indicating that final disposal of senior commanders and staff officers of the 
German Armed Forces had not been determined, guidance provided by SHAEF, which 
also included ECLIPSE Memorandum No. 7 and the Handbook Governing Policy and 
Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany specified that both active duty and 
retired General Staff Corps officers were to be arrested, not to punish them but to prevent 
them from again making plans or preparations for future wars and to ensure that their 
ability to mount subversive activities against the Allies were reduced to the minimum. 
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Additional guidance, signed by the SHAEF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter 
Bedell Smith, indicated that they were to be segregated completely in special internment 
camps. Similarly, General officers, not needed to administer and control German Armed 
Forces personnel awaiting disbandment, were to be deprived of all authority, not permit-
ted to wear decorations or “other symbols of military achievement,” and be sent to regu-
lar concentration areas. They were not to be discharged without the authority of Supreme 
Headquarters.
92
 British officers, in particular, were convinced that General Staff officers 
were no good and would do everything in their power to retain their power, re-create the 
General Staff, go underground, plan new wars, etc. As late as March 1945, 21
st
 Army 
Group wanted them to be registered and placed under counter-intelligence supervision 
after their discharge.
93
   
The Disarmament School 
In early 1944, while the planning for Operation RANKIN ‘C’ was underway and 
in anticipation of the need to implement those plans, Colonel Grazebrook had drafted a 
memo outlining the need to train cadre for the disarmament mission as well as a draft syl-
labus for that training.
94
 Grazebrook’s suggestions were seen as a good idea by most, alt-
hough the question of who would ultimately be responsible for the training and where it 
would be given was left open at that time. Of the several suggestions regarding topics to 
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be in the syllabus, Colonel Grazebrook was reminded that there were still a number of 
officers around who had been involved in disarmament matters in the last war and that he 
would be well-served by having them give “a few informal talks to the cadres.”
95
  
A month later, on 9 May, the Civil Affairs section of the British War Office indi-
cated that given a directive by either SHAEF or CCMS, they would be prepared to run a 
disarmament course and could do it with three weeks’ notice.
96
 After much discussion 
with Headquarters ETOUSA and the British (to find a suitable location) the Disarmament 
School was established in London with a staff of twenty under the direction of Lieutenant 
Colonel Frank Kowalski, Jr.
97
 
Grazebrook’s memo, now SHAEF/21540/1/Ops,  on the “Training of Disarma-
ment Missions” proceeded on the assumption that trained disarmament cadres would be 
authorized before the cessation of hostilities.
98
  It suggested a four stage course of train-
ing that would include an introductory course in which students would obtain needed 
background information, a period of study covering both general and specific problems 
they would face, a discussion period in which to exchange ideas and formulate policies, 
and lastly a period in which the newly trained cadres would, in turn, train the remaining 
personnel of the Disarmament Missions and Detachments. The Memo further recom-
mended that SHAEF (G-3) be responsible for the training and that it commence as soon 
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as possible. An appendix to the memo contained a syllabus of introductory courses that 
contained eleven topics ranging from the background of the Terms of Surrender to the 
Plan for the Occupation and Control of Germany, German Evasion of Disarmament 
Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles,
99
 the various military, police, para-military and ar-
maments organizations, and Plans for the Control and Disposal of German Forces, Sur-
rendered War Materiel, and the Imposition of Sanctions and Reprisals.  
On 24 August, Grazebrook received information that Wickersham had received a 
reply to a letter Grazebrook had sent him in mid-July for forwarding to ETOUSA regard-
ing the provision and training of disarmament staffs required for the U.S. Zone. Accord-
ing to the information received, ETOUSA had assumed responsibility for training these 
staffs and a directive had been prepared directing the theater commanders to provide the 
necessary personnel and to proceed with training. Attached to the notice was a detailed 
list of the numbers, ranks and qualifications needed by U.S. officers for the various dis-
armament staffs.
100
 This directive was initially sent on 27 September 1944 and was ex-
panded on 29 October 1944.  
Thus, in early October 1944, the Commanding General, Communications Zone 
(ComZ) was directed to earmark U.S. personnel for cadres for Disarmament and Control 
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Staffs and to conduct a course of training for them.
101
 The first course was scheduled to 
start on 23 October but in actuality, the course started one week later on 30 October and 
lasted for three weeks. According to School Memorandum No. 3, the three weeks of in-
struction, comprising approximately 130 hours of instruction, was divided into five phas-
es covering six subject areas: Organization for Disarmament and Control in Germany, 
Policy and Plans, German Political Organization, Organization of the German Armed 
Forces, German Industrial Organization, and German Supply and communication.
102
 The 
planned student capacity was 160 but more could be accommodated if sent by the Army 
Groups. Upon successful completion of the course, those officers attending were to be 
earmarked for duty with Disarmament and Control Staffs upon cessation of hostilities. A 
second function of the School was to provide reference manuals to assist Disarmament 
and Control Staffs in accomplishing their mission. 
The first phase, entitled General Background Subjects, took approximately one-
third of the total class time, half of which was presented during the first week and the re-
mainder divided equally between the second and third weeks of the course. The second 
phase, approximately twenty hours in duration, provided technical training for the stu-
dents in accordance with their branch or duty assignment, e.g., engineer, etc., and special 
instruction for executives and logistics officers (G-4’s) of disarmament staffs. This train-
ing also took place during the last two weeks of instruction and included staff studies that 
each student had to solve on an individual basis. 
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Phase three consisted of lectures by British and American officers that were given 
throughout the course. Speakers were obtained from the Armed Forces Division, U.S. 
Group Control Commission (U.S. Group CC), U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, U.S. 
Naval Forces in Europe, and the British CCMS. During the first course given there were 
a total of 26 lectures while the second running of the course contained 65 lectures.
103
 
Phase four consisted of end-of-the-day “controlled” discussions in lieu of question 
and answer periods after each lecture/presentation. These discussions were led by a 
member of the school staff and the instructors of the previous day, and went over materi-
als presented the previous day. It was also used to underscore points made by the guest 
speakers. 
Phase five took approximately one-fourth of the instruction time and was devoted 
to the development of staff studies by groups of students according to their duty assign-
ments. It was believed that in this manner, the students would become familiar with 
sources of information and establish contacts with other groups with whom they eventu-
ally would need to establish working relationships.  
In mid-September, staff level discussions indicated that a second running of the 
disarmament course was needed. Initially the discussions concerned training G-3 and G-4 
officers but they eventually expanded to include a limited number of key officers in-
volved in the disarmament and demobilization process, some of whom would be retained 
and assigned to the U.S. Group CC.
104
 On 29 October, a letter was sent to the Command-
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ing General, European Theater of Operations by SHAEF’s Adjutant General, Brigadier 
General T.J. Davis, informing him of this necessity and requesting that action be taken to 
conduct a second course of instruction. Two weeks later, Lt Colonel Kowalski, the 
School’s Director, wrote Colonel Karl F. Hausauer, Chief, Logistics Plans Branch (G-4), 
Post Hostilities Section, that the subject of the second course would be “Demobilization 
of the German Armed Forces and Para-military Organizations.”  
This second, and last, running of the course, which began on 26 November 1944, 
also ran for three weeks and saw a major expansion of the syllabus and a realignment of 
the subject matter into five key topics: Organization for Disarmament and Demobiliza-
tion in Germany, General Policy and Plans, Disarmament and Demobilization, Germany 
under the Nazis, and German Armed Forces. Air Force and Navy requirements were sub-
sequently handled by their respective services resulting in the attendance of 15 naval and 
20 Air Force officers. 
In late December, Colonel William Whipple, Chief of the SHAEF Logistics Plans 
Branch wrote to the Assistant Chief of Staff, (G-4), SHAEF, informing him that the se-
cond running of the Disarmament School would end on 30 December and that present 
plans called for it to be disbanded. Whipple continued that a study undertaken by 
Hausauer’s section and the 12th Army Group’s G-3 and G-4 staffs saw a need for a third 
course. 12th Army Group wanted to permanently augment their staffs with officers 
trained in disarmament and disposal of enemy war materiel matters, possibly train French 
officers of the 6th Army Group, and provide an orientation course for 15th Army Group 
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Nonetheless, Brigadier General R.G. Moses, Assistant Chief of Staff, (G-4), 12th 
Army Group, wrote SHAEF that he could not at that time justify diverting additional of-
ficers for training. He recommended that the present school be discontinued but that 
when the tactical situation eased (U.S. forces were heavily engaged in the “Battle of the 





Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945 (VE Day) and less than a month later, on 5 
June, the Allied Control Council assumed responsibility for the control of Germany, re-
lieving Eisenhower of his disarmament responsibilities. At 0001 hours, 14 July, Head-
quarters SHAEF was dissolved, the U.S. elements becoming part of U.S. Forces Europe-
an Theater (USFET) under Eisenhower, who also became Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 




The plans laid out by SHAEF and contained in the ECLIPSE Memoranda to dis-
arm, disband, and demobilize German forces was put into operation following VE Day. 
By late June, just over six million German troops had surrendered and between 15 May 
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and 6 July, six disbandment directives were issued, giving the Army Groups authority to 
discharge both prisoners of war and “disarmed German troops”
108
 in groups according to 
age, sex, nationality, occupation, area of residence, etc. – except for those considered war 
criminals, security suspects or certain members/ranks of the SS.
109
  
Much however remained to be done, especially regarding the disposal of enemy 
war materiel and the destruction/demilitarization of German fortifications and war indus-
tries. For the most part, however, these issues were recognized early on as long-term 
problems to be handled by the ACC. In February 1945, for example, Brigadier W.E. van 
Cutsem addressed a meeting of the Standing Committee on War Materiel and suggested 
that one needed to differentiate between disarming Germany and preventing Germany 
from rearming. The disposal of Germany’s war industries addressed the rearming issue 
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 Disarming the German forces had been relatively easy; most simply dropped 
their weapons, raised their arms and surrendered. According to a trip report written by 
Lieutenant Colonel A.F.S. MacKenzie, Assistant G-1 in SHAEF’s German Affairs Divi-
sion, following his visit to the headquarters and units of the U.S. 3
rd
 Army, the disband-
ment process as directed by ECLIPSE Memo 17 was also working relatively well. Mac-
Kenzie concluded that “ECLIPSE Memo 17, as written is essentially sound, operational-
ly, and should be continued in effect ‘as is.’” He found, however, that although 3
rd
 Army 
was not complying with the spirit of ECLIPSE Memo 17 its operating units appeared to 
be and that Germans were being discharged at a rate of 25,000 to 30,000 per day. The 
report highlighted several administrative and procedural problems but stated that as of 8 
June, 3
rd
 Army had discharged approximately 550,000 Germans.
111
 
As van Cutsem had stated, the remainder of the demilitarization program, which 
primarily needed to be directed at preventing the remilitarization of Germany was more 
involved and took longer. However, Allied forces were given little to no guidance regard-
ing the destruction of enemy fortifications other than it was to be accomplished during 
the occupation period. It was not until the end of July 1945 that orders to destroy German 
fortifications and defensive works were issued by USFET with a completion date of 31 
January 1946.  
On 6 December 1945, the ACC issued Allied Control Council Directive 22: 
Clearance of Minefields and Destruction of Fortifications, Underground Installations 
and Military Installations in Germany. This directive began by stating that its purpose 
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was to forever prevent Germany from using these facilities and all those listed in the ap-
pendix, except those needed by the occupation forces or civil population, were to be de-
stroyed completely in accordance with a given timetable, e.g., Priority I, within 18 
months; Priority II, within a further four years, so that all these facilities would be de-
stroyed within five and one-half years from the date the directive was published. Military 
Zone commanders were given discretion to add to the list and to destroy any military 
structure not listed in the appendix.
112
 
Report to the Council of Foreign Ministers 
In February 1947, the ACC prepared a multi-part report to the Council of Foreign 
Ministers on demilitarization.
113
 The report covered six key areas of demilitarization for 
which the ACC had been made responsible upon its establishment. These areas and the 
corresponding report sections were:  
Part II - Dissolution of the German Armed Forces and para-military organ-
izations, and control over the activities of their personnel. 
Part III - Disarmament, destruction and disposal of German war materiel. 
Part IV - Clearance of minefields and destruction of fortifications, under-
ground installations and military installations in Germany. 
Part V - Control of Scientific Research. 
Part VI - Control of liquidation of industrial war potential and control of 
production and importation of war materiel. 
Part VII - Prevention of revival of militarism. 
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Each part of the report carried a “Summary” of the work done, a general “State-
ment of the Problem,” a discussion of the applicable “Laws and Directives,” enacted by 
the Allied Control Authority (ACA) and their implementation, agreed recommendations 
as well as disagreements between the powers. The report also contained two sets of four 
tables each showing each occupying power’s progress in the implementation of ACC Di-
rective 22, Clearance of Minefields and Destruction of Military Installations, and ACC 
Directive 28, Disposal of German War Materiel in Germany (See Appendix C). 
Part II on the dissolution of German forces and para-military organizations stated 
explicitly that all units and organizations of the German Armed Forces had been disband-
ed and dissolved and that nothing existed that would promote German military traditions 
alive.
114
 A table provided in the report showed that 8,106,046 prisoners of war had been 
released in Germany while 93,000 remained prisoners or ex-prisoners employed in the 
U.S., British or French Zones. 
Part III, dealt with the disarmament and disposal of war potential and measures 
being taken to complete the destruction of this materiel and disarm the German popula-
tion by the end of 1947. A table provided showed the type and amount of arms issued to 
the German police. Reference was also made to an appendix containing charts showing 
the progress made in each zone in implementing ACC Directive 28.
115
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Part IV indicated that progress on the clearance of minefields and the destructions 
of fortifications was moving along and would be completed before the target date of 
June, 1951. A table indicated that 78-percent of Priority I and 70-percent of Priority II 
minefields and military objects in the U.S. Zone had been cleared or destroyed. A second 
appendix gave details on the implementation of ACC Directive 22 for all four zones.
116
 
Part V proved to be a wide-ranging topic that fell under the provisions of ACC 
Law 25, Control of Scientific Research. The report stated that within the U.S. Zone, 28 
war-related research establishments had been located and that all specialized equipment 
had been destroyed, as had specialized buildings. The report then specified the number of 
research applications that had been authorized in the U.S. Zone and the number of re-
search projects licensed as of 1 January 1947, as well as a statement that the laws and 
methods adopted to enforce this law in the U.S. Zone were adequate. 
Part VI indicated that no report could be made regarding the liquidation of indus-
trial war potential because no agreement could be reached within the Allied Control Au-
thority machinery to conduct a quadripartite system of free and unfettered inspection and 
verification (See following section).  
The last part of the report, Part VII, dealt with actions taken to prevent a revival of 
militarism in Germany to include implementing the laws prohibiting the wearing of Ger-
man military uniforms, the existence of para-military educational or training institutions, 
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and monitoring the possibility of militarism being taught in the schools and the number of 
teachers who were former military officers. This section also dealt with the number of 
former military officers who were either students, in the police, the fire brigades, or in 
transport services. While some instances of military-like training still took place, e.g., 
fencing, the degree to which former Wehrmacht officers could be admitted to these pro-
fessions or activities was still under discussion. The three Western allies, however, felt 
that the current numbers posed no threat and were not dangerous. 
A General Conclusions and Recommendations section closed the report and that 
focused on doing what was necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Agree-
ment and to prevent violations of the Allied Control Authority’s decisions.
117
 
The Quadripartite Commission 
In the fall of 1947, a paper entitled Complete Review of Quadripartite Negotia-
tions on the Demilitarization Carried out After the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers 
Conference,  written for the Civil Affairs Division by the Armed Forces Division of U.S. 
Group CC, indicated that the question of limiting the  activities and the employment of 
former members of the German Armed Forces remained under Quadripartite discussion 
in the Allied Coordination Council, as were the terms of reference for inspection teams 
for the Quadripartite Commission for Examination of Disarmament, Demilitarization and 
Disbandment of Military Power in Germany.
 118
 The only proposal agreed was an 
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amendment to Control Council Law No. 8, Elimination and Prohibition of Military 
Training that would prohibit the possibility of Germans serving in the Armed Forces of 
any country. 
Issues concerning the liquidation of Germany’s industrial war potential were 
hampered by the growing Cold War environment which, by 1948, had left the ACC inca-
pable of action. Thus, following the intent of the decision made at Potsdam in 1945, 
which called for “All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facili-
ties for their production” to be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed” and to pre-
vent the maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and imple-
ments of wars,” General Clay, the U.S. representative on the Allied Control Authority’s 
Coordinating Committee (CORC) introduced a proposal in May, 1946 to create what be-
came known as the “Quadripartite Commission for Examination of Disarmament, Demil-
itarization and Disbandment of Military Power in Germany.”
 119
   
The Coordinating Committee approved the proposal, named the assistants to the 
members of the Coordinating Committee to the commission and directed them to draft 
the commission’s Terms of Reference for approval.
120
 The terms of Reference were 
drafted but ran into the immediate disagreement of the Soviet delegate regarding the 
scope of the Commission’s duties. The Soviet delegate refused to accept a need for the 
Commission to examine the “economic field” as was deemed necessary by the other three 
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 CORC/M/46/26, dated 17 May 1946. Entry A1/1790, Box 16, folder 2022, Examination of Disarma-
ment, Demilitarization and Disbandment, NARA. The members were Major General Erskine (UK), Briga-





members and also took exception, along with the U.S. member, to the manner in which 
the sub-commissions (inspection teams) would carry out their inspections in the four 




The basis of the Soviet objection to economic inspection teams lay in the alleged 
failure of the Control Commission to take any action to speed up the delivery, as repara-
tions, of German war plants, heavy industry and other facilities that represented German 
war potential. As a result of this failure, according to the Soviets, there would be nothing 
to inspect as German war industry remained intact. When the issue reached the Control 
Council in mid-June, Marshal Sokolovsky explained further that the USSR was not op-
posed to economic inspections but that they could take place once effective measures for 
the economic disarmament of German, i.e., reparations, had begun. Unable to resolve the 




At some point between that meeting of the Control Council and January 1947, the 
inclusion of an economic team was agreed and Terms of Reference, Method of Opera-
tion, Rules of Procedure, and Chairmanship were drafted.
123
 The new proposal met with 
several Soviet objections to the requirement for “free and unfettered access,” the Com-
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mission’s raison d’être, i.e., the need to inspect any aspect of the demilitarization, dis-
armament process, including industrial disarmament. The Soviet position was that free 




At the end of March, the Economics Directorate informed the Combined Services 
Directorate that a special economic sub-commission was unnecessary; that they would 
assume full responsibility for investigating progress in the liquidation of Germany’s in-
dustrial war potential and the control of restricted and prohibited production. It subse-




The independent position taken by the Economics Directorate initiated a whole 
new set of problems that included Soviet insistence that two Commissions be established; 
one for the military disarmament of Germany and a second for its economic disarma-
ment, a demand that was refused by the other three powers. By late April 1947, the ques-
tion of even having a Quadripartite Commission was discussed. While the Terms of Ref-
erence for certain inspection teams under Allied Control Council Directives 39,  Liquida-
tion of German War Potential and 47 Liquidation of German War Research Establish-
ments were agreed, those for the Quadripartite Commission and the Economic Commis-
sion were deferred until after the Council of Foreign Ministers met and provided its deci-
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sions on German disarmament. It was also agreed that the French delegation would sub-
mit a new proposal for a special, inclusive commission.
126
   
The French proposal was, in fact, similar to the proposal first put forward by Clay 
in May 1946 but the creation of this new commission, however, was again stymied by the 
continued refusal of the Soviet delegate to accept the principle of “free and unfettered 
access” to any and all facilities deemed by any member of the inspection teams to be a 
known or potential site capable of reviving German militarism. The Soviet delegate in-
stead insisted that the inspection teams be limited to a prioritized, prepared, and agreed 
upon list of sites representing the “greatest danger from the point of view of the rebirth of 




Thus, the negotiations over establishing a disarmament commission, which began 
in earnest in July 1946 and continued into February 1948, remained partially unre-
solved.
128
 Ironically, at the same time this thoroughly invasive inspection proposal to en-
sure that a German military potential could never be recreated was being pushed forward 
by the western Allies, the U.S. Army staff was beginning to draft its first studies on re-
arming that part of the soon-to-be-divided Germany under Allied control! 
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Chapter 3: The Diplomatic Path to September 12, 1950 
 
     
    
As Heinrich August Winkler wrote, the successful Allied invasions and aerial 
bombardments that took place during World War II brought Germany to its 
knees. The bombs, the expulsions, and the internal collapse changed German so-
ciety far more than the first ten years of the Reich had done.
1
 The existing schol-
arship, however, tells us that despite the advent of the Cold War and the increa s-
ing hostility of the Soviet Union, the U.S. State Department, in particular, was 
slow to recognize the significant transformation that had taken place among the 
war-weary Germans in the western zone and continued to view them with distrust. 
Nonetheless, U.S. policy toward Western Europe underwent a major alteration 
beginning in early 1949. It was a change that precluded the United States from returning 
to its pre-war isolationism and pushed it, by necessity, into a deep and lasting involve-
ment in Western Europe. It resulted, furthermore, in vigorous debates within the Depart-
ment of State and between them and the Department of Defense over the direction of 
U.S. - West European/West German policy. And it was a change that, in the middle of 
President Truman’s second term, saw several senior State Department officials including 
Secretary of State Acheson revise their long-held opposition to German rearmament, 
leading the United States reverse its European policy completely and formally demand on 
12 September 1950 that West Germany be armed. 
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Throughout this period, the “German problem” remained in the forefront of U.S. 
policy deliberations regarding Western Europe. The Department of State’s position re-
garding the possibility of German rearmament was contained in the answer to a question 
posed by the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee in June 1949. When asked 
“What will be the relationship of Germany…to the problem of increasing the defensive 
military strength of the Western European countries?” the State Department responded, in 
part, that “The United States Government does not envisage that Germany will be in a 
position to undertake cooperative military efforts with other Western European Govern-
ments, as we are fully committed to the complete and absolute disarmament and demilita-
rization of Germany. She will not have military forces of her own. She will not have in-
dustrial capacity for the production of armaments.”
2
 The question of German rearma-
ment, however, was on the table during the formation of the Brussels Treaty Organization 
and this issue influenced decisions regarding the duration of the occupation and the need 
to keep U.S. forces in Germany. Nonetheless, the focus of the Department of State was 
on political and economic integration and continued disarmament. The scholarly litera-
ture, however, contains little about considerations of German rearmament during this 
timeframe. 
The Cold War Begins 
 Beginning in 1946, relations with the Soviet Union began to deteriorate and the 
U.S. increasingly saw the Soviet Union as a real military threat to both European and 
U.S. security. These perceptions, fortified by Stalin’s “Election” speech of February 9, 
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1946 and by George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” two weeks later, as well as Soviet ac-
tions in Iran and toward Turkey led, in part, to the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, the 
merging of the U.S. and British Zones of Occupation in May, and the initiation of the Eu-
ropean Recovery Program (The Marshall Plan) in June of that year.
3
 This perception of 
the Soviet threat was voiced again in mid-February, 1947, for example, by John D. Hick-
erson, the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs. In a memo written to his 
boss, H. Freeman Matthews, Hickerson wrote that Soviet actions in foreign affairs “leave 
us no alternative other than to assume that the USSR has aggressive intentions.” Hicker-
son stated further that the U.S. must be determined to resist that aggression by force of 
arms if necessary because “there could be no deals or arrangements” with the USSR.
4
   
 By early 1948, the communist-led coup d’état in Czechoslovakia deepened the 
perception that the Soviet Union was bent on dominating Europe.
5
 Following discussions 
between Great Britain and the United States in which the British sought U.S. participa-
tion in an Atlantic defense pact, the British were given to understand that they and the 
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West European nations would first have to organize themselves. Britain’s Foreign Secre-
tary, Ernest Bevin, took the lead and on March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed 
by Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. While outwardly 
directed against a resurgent Germany, the possibility of German participation in the Pact 
was supported by all the signatories except France.
6
 Three days later, on 20 March, the 
Soviet military delegation to the ACC in Berlin walked out and on 1 April, the Soviets 
initiated restrictions on travel to Berlin followed in mid-June by a total blockade of the 
city that lasted until May 12, 1949.  
Nonetheless, in early 1949 Truman transferred responsibility for German policy 
from the U.S. Army to the Department of State.
7
 The United States departed from its age-
old policy of “non-entanglement” and became a major force behind the creation of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), joining with the five Brussels Treaty na-
tions, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Italy and Norway in a defensive alliance de-
signed to deter Soviet aggression but also to contain if necessary a possible resurgent and 
expansionist Germany.
8
 The major policy of keeping Germany disarmed and demilita-
rized still remained front and center, but the State Department’s focus shifted to ending 
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the occupation, returning some degree of sovereignty to Western Germany, and tying her 
closely to the other west European states in some form of federal entity or union.
9
 The 
unexpected outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula on 25 June 1950, however, resulted 
in a major reversal of U.S. policy, which would strain relations between the United States 
and its European allies, especially the French, and would lead to West German rearma-
ment. 
U.S. Thinking on Disarmament 
Memories of German troops marching home in formation and with flags flying 
following the 1918 Armistice ending World War I, and of watching the expansion of the 
Wehrmacht following Germany’s withdrawal from the Geneva Disarmament Conference 
in October 1933 led to a decision that the mistakes made in the Armistice agreement and 
Versailles would not be repeated.
10
 Even before World War II ended, it became the unal-
terable policy of the United States that Germany would be completely and totally dis-
armed and demilitarized following its surrender. This policy was made very clear on nu-
merous occasions following the war, the last of which ironically came only weeks before 
Acheson presented the U.S. demand that West Germany be armed to the Foreign Minis-
ters of Great Britain and France on 12 September 1950.
11
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Perhaps the first and most definitive enunciation of the U.S. policy toward the de-
feated Germany came at the 1946 Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris on 30 
April when Secretary of State James F. Byrnes presented the text of a draft Treaty on the 
Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany. The Preamble, which indirectly referred 
to the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany of 5 June 1945, stated that the four 
Allied Powers “declared their intention to effect the total disarmament and demobiliza-
tion of Germany….” and that this total disarmament and demilitarization “…will be en-
forced as long as the peace and security of the world may require.”
12
  
The body of the draft Treaty reflected and expanded upon that Declaration by 
stating that all German forces “shall be and shall remain completely disarmed, demobi-
lized and disbanded” and it specifically included the German General Staff. The final ar-
ticle, Article V, specified that this proposed treaty was to remain in force for a period of 
twenty-five years and be renewable, if deemed necessary. It was meant to be incorporated 
in a future peace treaty with Germany, thereby making it the “law of the land,” thus bind-
ing Germany to it.
13
 
Byrnes subsequently addressed keeping Germany disarmed and demilitarized for 
a generation in an address delivered in Stuttgart, Germany on 6 September and again in a 
speech he gave to the American Club in Paris in October.
14
 In that latter speech, he re-
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peatedly cited the proposed draft treaty and stressed that there should be no doubt as to 
American foreign policy toward Germany. He emphasized the U.S. government’s firm 
opposition to any revival of German militarism and proposed that the occupation of Ger-
many not end until a German government accepts the disarmament and demilitarization 
clauses of the Four Power Treaty. Even then, Byrnes underscored the need to maintain 
“limited but adequate Allied armed forces” to ensure compliance, and he suggested the 
use of Allied bombers “from France, Britain, the United States or the Soviet Union” to 
enforce immediate compliance should the German government fail to do so. While the 
United States initially proposed to continue the disarmament and demilitarization of 
Germany for 40 years after the peace settlement, Byrnes asked only that the Allies agree 
to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for at least a generation. This, he indicated, 




Byrnes’ replacement as Secretary of State, George Marshall also proposed the 
treaty in Moscow in 1947. Although it was rejected by the USSR on both occasions, U.S. 
policy remained unchanged. This continuity was evident in the Summary to the February-
March 1948 London Tripartite Conference which referred to several agreements made by 
the western Allies that the occupation of Germany would continue for a long time as 
would the prohibition on the German armed forces and General Staff. Further, it was 
agreed that the Military Governors should continue to exercise controls pertaining to dis-
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armament and demilitarization, and that a working party should be established to define 
the industries that should remain prohibited and establish production levels for those that 
were no longer prohibited. The Summary indicated further that a Military Security Board 
would be established in the Western Zones of Germany whose function would be to cov-
er the entire spectrum of disarmament and demilitarization. Lastly, the Summary con-
cluded that even after the occupation ended, Germany would not be allowed to become a 
military threat and that an inspection mechanism should be created to insure that it re-
mained disarmed and demilitarized.
16
  
By 1947, the United States had decided it had to move forward on Germany 
without Russia. The idea then developed in higher policymaking circles that Western 
Europe should develop a ‘political personality’ of its own and that Western Germany 
could be integrated into that Western European community, which might in time de-
velop into a ‘third force’ able to stand up to the Soviets without direct U.S. involve-
ment.
17
 In discussions regarding what became the Brussels Treaty Organization and 
its relation to Germany, Hickerson told Lord Inverchapel that the U.S. envisaged the 
creation of a “third force” - a real European organization capable of saying “No” to 
both the U.S. and USSR. It was further believed that so integrated, West German 
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freedom of action would be sufficiently constrained as to no longer pose a threat. 18 
The Search for Security - The Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties 
As the gulf between East and West became both wider and sharper, West Europe-
ans began to acquire a "European" consciousness.
19
 What was initially a political strug-
gle, however, increasingly came to be seen in military terms. The military situation in 
Europe by this time, however, was not what it had been at war's end.
20
 Several proposals 
and discussions between Europe's leading statesmen had taken place during the war con-
cerning Europe's future and the possibilities of some form of Western European Union.
21
 
One of the key topics was how to contain a resurgent Germany in the future and The 
Dunkirk Treaty was an attempt to do just that.  
Among the studies and proposals regarding Europe’s post-war future was a study 
by Sir Nigel Ronald, an undersecretary in the Foreign Office, written in 1945. Ronald had  
suggested that a Franco-British alliance, to include Belgium, the Netherlands, and Lux-
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embourg, Denmark, Norway, and Spain, would be the keystone of a European defense 
system. He believed this system would both contain Germany and protect the smaller al-
lies from falling under Soviet influence.
22
 The British Foreign Office, however, was 
skeptical because it felt that without U.S. assistance, defense against the Soviet Union 
was unrealistic. Alfred Duff Cooper, British Ambassador to France, however, contended 
that U.S. interference would prevent Great Britain from achieving a position of equality 
between the two new superpowers. A federation of states of western seaboard Europe 
plus the major Mediterranean powers would become "an alliance so mighty that no power 
on earth would ... dare to challenge it.
23
 
The Anglo-French alliance idea was not followed up, however. Churchill did not 
believe that France -- or any other West European country -- would be of value to British 
security. Current Franco-British relations, moreover, were less than ideal. French and 
British troops had narrowly avoided a clash in Syria, and DeGaulle, incensed over his 
wartime treatment by the Allies, was demanding the resolution of several Franco-German 
border disputes before discussions about an alliance could take place.
24
  
The 1946 election of a Socialist caretaker government in France under Leon Blum 
allowed much Franco-British hostility to be put aside and on New Year's Day 1946, 
Blum wrote Britain's Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin,  that he was willing to sign a Fran-
co-British treaty. The problems that exercised DeGaulle remained, but Blum assured 
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Bevin that they would not present a barrier. Accordingly, negotiations on a 50-year treaty 
began that month.
25
      
When this treaty, the Dunkirk Treaty, was signed on 4 March 1947, it became the 
first specifically European post-war security arrangement. Although designed specifically 
to prevent the reoccurrence of German aggression, it also became the first of several at-




The collapse of the London Foreign Ministers meeting in December 1947 gave 
Bevin the necessary incentive to launch his plans for a Western Union. The London Con-
ference had broken down over the question of reparations and the Allied refusal to acqui-
esce to Soviet demands. It was the last attempt to obtain a major East-West agreement on 
Germany.
27
 On 17 December, Bevin spoke in turn to French Foreign Minister Georges 
Bidault, Marshall, and Norman Robertson, the Canadian High Commissioner in London. 
The gist of these conversations was that the time had come to create "some sort of federa-
tion” in Western Europe.
28
  
The first step toward such an arrangement would involve Britain and France sign-
ing bilateral treaties -- modeled after the Dunkirk Treaty -- with Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. Bevin publicly outlined his plan in a speech to the House of Com-
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mons on 22 January 1948, saying that Britain could no longer stand outside Europe nor 
could it “…be diverted, by threats, propaganda, or fifth column methods, from our aim of 
uniting by trade, social, cultural and all other contacts those nations of Europe...who are 
ready and able to cooperate.”
29
 
Bevin was also clearly attempting to get the U.S. to commit itself to the defense 
of Europe. Without an American security guarantee, the British were not sure they could 
make the Western Union work. Until the union was successful, however, the U.S. would 
not discuss participation.
30
      
The Benelux countries also put pressure on Great Britain. They did not like the 
Dunkirk model because they believed it was directed solely against Germany and did not 
reflect current realities. This view was strongly advocated by Paul-Henri Spaak, the Bel-
gian Foreign Minister, who also urged that the collective arrangement be economic, cul-
tural, and social as well as military.
31
 Paris, however, held to the Dunkirk model because 
of French sensitivity concerning Germany. Any pact directed against the Soviets that did 
not deal with the possibility of a rearmed Germany was unacceptable to France, a view 
Britain also shared.
32
 France had previously approached the U.S. and asked, in light of 
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the fact that the treaty on German demilitarization was dead, whether the U.S. would be 
interested in entering a three-power treaty that contained similar stipulations.
33
 
On 24 February 1948, a Soviet-backed coup d'état toppled the Beneš government 
in Czechoslovakia. The effect of this event sent a shiver of fear throughout Western Eu-
ropean governments, which was magnified by the weakened state of the almost totally 
demobilized Allied forces. The coup prompted France to take a much broader view of 
European security and Britain now also accepted the need for a multilateral pact. Bevin 
was convinced the Soviet Union was preparing to extend its grip over the rest of Europe; 
there were fears of a coup in Italy, and the Soviets were pressuring Finland and Norway 
to sign treaties of friendship and mutual assistance.
34
 As a result, on 4 March, negotia-
tions between Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg began 




The Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) was more than a response to the appar-
ent Soviet threat. It contained a Consultative Council, a Permanent Commission and a 
Permanent Military Committee comprised of the five defense ministers, meeting as the 
Western Union Defense Committee and it was envisioned by Bevin as a basis for the or-
ganization of all of Western Europe, and as a vehicle to convince the U.S. that Europe 
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could stand on its own. The immediate U.S. response was a speech by President Truman 
supporting the new European organization as well as a request to Congress to complete 
its action on the Marshall Plan. Unknown to the Europeans, however, studies were initi-
ated both within the Department of Defense and the National Security Council to deter-




The French government, however, remained unsatisfied with the U.S. response to 
the Brussels Pact. In May, France’s Ambassador to the U.S., Henri Bonnet told Theodore 
Achilles of the State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs that Europe was disap-
pointed that the U.S. has not acted faster in support of the Brussels Treaty. Achilles said 
that the U.S. had made it abundantly clear that the Brussels Treaty countries needed to 
first formulate and carry out their own plans for an integrated defense before asking U.S. 
for help. Bonnet’s response was that United States needed to understand “French psycho-
logical difficulties” and need for reassurance on security in general. Achilles replied that 
France needed to understand U.S. psychology as well. According to Achilles, the U.S. 
response to the Europeans was: "You made a start, but it's still a small start. Put some 
military 'bones' on that Treaty, preferably some collective ones."
37
  
                                                     
36
 See also fn  35  supra and Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. 
2, New York: the New American Library (Signet pb), 1956, pp. 277-84. 
 
37
 Memorandum of Conversation, French Ambassador Bonet to Achilles, 21 May 1948, RG 59, Box 11, 
Lot 53D444, NARA and transcript of Oral History Interview with Theodore Achilles, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/achilles.htm. See also the TS Memorandum of Conversation, Lovett-
Baydur, 25 May 1948, RG 59, Box 11, Lot 53D444, NARA, in which Lovett told Turkish Ambassador 





The existence of the Brussels Treaty Organization as a viable, independent entity 
was short-lived, however.
38
 Concerned by events in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin 
Blockade, which followed in June 1948, the five Brussels Treaty members joined the 
United States, Canada, and five other West European nations (Norway, Denmark, Ice-
land, Portugal and Italy) to sign the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, creating NATO. 
Two defense organizations -- one of which spanned the Atlantic and the other, which 
contained the germ of a future integrated Europe -- now existed in Western Europe where 
but a little more than a year earlier there had been none. 
Beginning with Truman’s second term as President, U.S. foreign policy fell 
into the hands of a small group of individuals, later known collectively as the ‘wise 
men,’ all of who had a hand in the formulation of policy toward Germany.
39
 Two of 
them, Acheson and John J. McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 
played extremely important roles. A third, lesser-known individual, Henry A. By-
roade, a U.S. Army colonel on loan to the Department of State as Director, Office of 
German Affairs, was at least as important -- if not instrumental -- in helping to de-
velop the State Department’s German policy during this very vola tile period. The 
fact that Byroade, as an Army officer, could discuss key German issues informally 
with Pentagon staff officers during a period when Secretary of Defense Johnson, a 
foe of Acheson’s, forbade JCS staffers to speak to the State Department without his 
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express permission, proved to be of crucial importance.
40
 
Published State Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS) papers shed little ad-
ditional light on State Department thinking about German rearmament and those that 
do appear to duplicate thoughts mentioned below in documents of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS).
41
 For example, in March 1948, the PPS recommended that the Western 
Union should be encouraged to “include eventually…Germany…and to deepen its 
cooperation in all aspects foreseen in its charter…as well as military.” Both George 
F. Kennan, then head of the PPS, and Hickerson opposed the focus on Germany, 
conceding, however, that it must eventually “have its place” in that Union. Both felt 
that the Union should be more than just a defensive entity, at which point there 
would be no question of U.S. support
42
 
In June of that year, another PPS paper concluded that the United States 
should undertake the Washington Conversations (prelude to the NATO Treaty) as 
requested by Bevin and Bidault (now French Premier). It was also noted that the De-
partment of State should explore with the Western Union the problem of increasing 
the security of several European countries through integration or some form of asso-
ciation with the Brussels Treaty Organization, to include a recommendation that 
“when circumstances permitted,” the adherence of Germany, (or the Western Zones) 
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be explored. France’s Minister in Washington, Armand Berard, had cautioned earlier 
in February, however, that his government believed that any German participation 
European security measures meant the reestablishment of a German army, which his 
government would not favor unless the British were full participants.43 
During this same period, Bevin had conveyed his thoughts to the State De-
partment on an Atlantic defense system and the future inclusion of Germany “with-
out whom no Western system can be complete.” In State Department discussions 
with or about the Western Union, the issue of Western Germany often arose, but the 
State Department’s position remained constant, i.e., that Germany’s participation in 
Europe’s defense was premature. In addition, the U.S. remained adamant that it 
could not and would not offer any security guarantees.44 
Rumors of Remilitarization 
U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-West European diplomatic encounters in this period, 
however, raised press speculation about German rearmament. For example, on 21 
February1948, a New York Times article reported that the French Foreign Ministry 
learned the U.S. had dropped the Byrnes treaty objective of keeping Germany dis-
armed for forty years. The article stated further that an assumption being “freely dis-
cussed in some quarters” indicated that the Soviets would “enlist German rearma-
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ment in its service” sufficed to let the U.S. not commit itself “to keeping  Germany 
down in the matter of armaments.”
45
 Although rumors continued, the topic of Ger-
man rearmament dropped out of view for the most part until late 1949 when it picked 
up again following the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
Thus, throughout 1948, the Department of State and its ambassadors in Western 
Europe reiterated that the fundamental U.S. policy objective toward Germany was “to 
insure that Germany does not again menace the peace of the world and makes a vital con-
tribution to the economic rehabilitation and political security of Europe.” Specifically, 
“disarmament, demilitarization and reduction and lasting control over Germany’s capaci-
ty to make war, including security against renewed German or other aggression…” was 
one of several major U.S. policies that would be sought by a closer U.S.-West European 
association.
46
 On 31 December 1948, an article in the New York Herald Tribune, by 
Marguerite Higgens stated that the United States, Great Britain and France had ap-
pointed a “three-man Military Security Board which will send inspection teams 
throughout West Germany to insure continued disarmament….” The three appointees 
were Major General James P. Hodges (U.S.), Major General Victor J.E. Westropp 
(UK), and General Etienne Paskiewicz (FR) .47  
Toward the end of 1948, the Consulates in Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Bremen 
were reporting on additional rumors and active discussions among West Germans 
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regarding plans to remilitarize Germany. In November, a report from the Consulate 
in Bremen told of rumors pertaining to the building of a strong police force as the 
nucleus of a future Germany army had begun to circulate.
48
 In December, the Consu-
lates in Frankfurt and Stuttgart were reporting on statements made by Lieutenant 
General Franz Halder, until 1942 Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, Dr. 
Rudolph Vogel, a member of the Land Executive Committee of the Christian Demo-
cratic Union (CDU), and Eugen Kogon, publisher of the Frankfurter Heft, and a 
prominent German in Württemberg-Baden [sic], calling for the rearmament of West-
ern Germany. Dr. Vogel’s articles, several of which had appeared in the Schwäbische 
Post, were allegedly inspired by a 24 October article written by Walter Lippman in 
the New York Herald Tribune.49   
In essence, the German discussions were in favor of a voluntary German contribu-
tion to an allied force in the event of an East German or Russian attack. These rumors and 
discussions were abetted by rumors stemming from Moscow and East Berlin that the 
British were not only recruiting Germans and putting them in British uniforms, but that 
they were forming German artillery, cavalry and engineer units as well as establishing 
special flying and armored schools. While the discussions appeared to have run their 
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course by January 1949, one effect was to force the West German political parties to take 
positions on this issue, which they did by rejecting it.
50
   
As 1949 unfolded, the unsettling issue of arming West Germany remained, par-
ticularly in France. On 3 January, for example, Berard was given instructions from Paris 
to query the State Department about information the French had received that the U.S. 
was contemplating the establishment of a German Army. The French government, he was 
told to say, would view such a step with “extreme seriousness.” Samuel Reber of the Eu-
ropean Division replied that the position of the U.S. government as regards the demilita-
rization and disarmament of Germany, which had been set forth repeatedly, had not 
changed nor was there any intention to change that policy.
51
  
Then, in mid-January, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall wrote President 
Truman strongly recommending that all non-military functions of the occupation be 
taken over by the Department of State and that a High Commissioner for Germany be 
appointed. This shift had originally been proposed in early 1948 but the Berlin 
Blockade and fears what it might lead to found everyone in agreement that the Army 
should continue its total control of Western Germany. Royall went on to say that the 
problems now being confronted in the administration of Germany were primarily po-
litical and economic and, as a result, problems that arose between the Army and the 
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Department of State were often difficult to reconcile.
52
 Subsequent inter-
departmental correspondence within the State Department covering the role of the 
High Commissioner recommended that its responsibilities be taken on simultaneous-
ly with the establishment of the new West German government. It  was in this corre-
spondence that the name of John J. McCloy was first suggested to be the High Com-
missioner and the suggestion made that the office of High Commissioner be occupied 
not earlier than 1 July.53  
Two months later, in March 1949, the Department of State undertook a review 
of its Germany policy and again established that the primary interest of the United 
States with respect to Germany was to guard against any renewal of German aggres-
sion. Regardless in what form Germany would take in the foreseeable future -- divid-
ed or whole -- an essential element of U.S. policy had to be security. It was therefore 
in the interest of the U.S. “to prevent the Germans, or any part of them, from deve l-
oping military forces until any security threat inherent in them is obviated by Euro-
pean union or other collective safeguards against aggression.” The review stated fur-
ther that the U.S. would look with favor upon the creation of such a union but that it 
could only assist in whatever initiative the Europeans themselves took. This latter 
statement was significant because it reflected the core of what would become Chan-
cellor Konrad Adenauer’s key policy issue, i.e., that the inclusion of West Germany 
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in such an undertaking must be as an equal.
54
 
A major problem, at that time however, was that despite the desire to “inte-
grate” Germany into Europe, there was no body -- no European union -- within 
which Germany could be integrated. As one State Department official put it, “Plain-
ly, Germany cannot be fitted into the European community in a satisfactory manner 
until there is an adequate framework of general European union into which Germany 
can be absorbed. The other countries cannot be expected to cope with the problem of 
Germany until there is a closer relationship among them than the existing one. 55  
That same month, however, a policy paper written by Kennan indicated that 
there was still considerable belief among U.S. policy elites that even the advent of a 
West German government would not solve the “problem of Germany.” The new 
West German government, the paper stated, would become “the spokesman of a re-
sentful and defiant nationalism….” And that the “…dominant force in Germany will 
become one not oriented to the integration of Germany into Europe but the re-
emergence of that unilateral German strength which has proven so impossible for 
Western Europe to digest in the past…. A Western German government…will thus 
be neither friendly nor frank nor trustworthy from the standpoint of the western oc-
cupiers.” For his part, Kennan only wanted a provisional German administration , 
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leaving the ultimate authority over security, etc., to remain in the hands of the three 
High Commissioners. The U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, Lewis Douglas ap-
peared to believe, like Kennan, that once a West German government was estab-
lished, U.S. freedom of action would be gone.
56
  
Thus by 1949, the United States was forced to recognize that until a decision 
was made on Germany it would be necessary, both for its own and Germany’s secur i-
ty, to maintain occupation forces in the Western German Zones until the peace of Eu-
rope was secured. The Department of State, however, also recognized that as the 
“German people, or a large part of them,” might become part of a structure of free 
European nations, their contribution to the “armed security” would be a rational ex-
pectation. This was further emphasized on the eve of the signing of the NATO treaty 
during a meeting between Truman, the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as 
the Foreign Ministers of the NATO nations.   
The purpose of the meeting was to outline a policy toward both Germany and 
the USSR that would focus on orienting Germany to the West by encouraging eco-
nomic revival, accelerating the development of democratic institutions, and combat-
ing Soviet subversion. The U.S. had long come to the belief that the earlier proposals 
for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, such as those first enunciated 
by former Secretary of State Burns and then by his successor Marshall, no longer 
corresponded to the current situation. It was clear, however, that other means to pro-
vide security against a revival of German aggression had to be found. Thus this poli-
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cy did not envisage the abandonment of security controls, e.g., prohibition of key in-
dustries, or the prohibition of any armed forces. The overall goal was to make Ger-
many a full-fledged partner in an increasingly unified Western Europe [and] by 
“combining any future German armed forces into a unified Western defense….”
57
 
Rearmament Rumors Persist 
1949 saw two momentous events take place that changed the face of European 
security. The first took place on 4 April when the United States ended one hundred 
sixty-two years of steering clear “…of permanent alliances with any portion of the 
foreign world,” and signed the North Atlantic Treaty along with eleven other West 
European and North American nations, thereby committing itself to participating in 
the security of Western Europe.
58
 The second event took place on 23 May when the 
three merged zones of occupied Western Germany became the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG), albeit with limited sovereignty. Although military government end-
ed and the military governors were replaced by civilian High Commissioners, the oc-
cupation status remained and certain powers were reserved by the Allies . Chief 
among them was to guarantee security against a revival of German military power 
and to insure that all agreed disarmament and demilitarization measures remained in 
                                                     
57
 “Memorandum for the President,” March 31, 1949, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF: Subject File, Box 
178 and “Memorandum for the President,” February 11, 1948, PSF, Subject File 1940-1953, Foreign Af-
fairs File, Box 155, HSTL. See also Memorandum of Conversation, 3 March 1949, RG 59, Memos of Con-
versation, Folder March-Apr 1949, Lot 53D444, Box 12, NARA, Emphasis  added. 
 
58
 The original signatories of the NATO treaty were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and  the United States, NATO 
Handbook , Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995, pp. 20-21. The partial quote is from 





force. To this end, the Military Security Board was created.
59
  
These events, particularly the U.S. entry into NATO, caused the State De-
partment to again reiterate its position on Germany and to dissemble somewhat re-
garding the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe. During Senate hearings on the 
NATO Treaty, Acheson was asked by Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa whether 
Article 3 of the NATO Treaty meant that the U.S. would be expected to send “sub-
stantial numbers of troops” to Europe as a “more or less permanent contribution.” 
Acheson replied by saying that the answer was “a clear and absolute ‘No.’” While 
Acheson had not intended to deceive - he subsequently recognized his answer was 
“deplorably wrong.” It was clear that the U.S. had, in fact, committed itself to a per-
manent presence in Europe and although the troop numbers at the time were relative-
ly small, they were to increase rapidly over the next several years.
60
  
According to a Department of State and Department of Army Memorandum to 
the President on German policy, the United States, France and Great Britain were 
involved in a process of enabling Western Germany to participate in the West Euro-
pean economic program and to become self-supporting. Germany’s economic and 
industrial potential, however, led the U.S. to recognize that were Germany to be tak-
en over by a hostile power for purposes of aggression, it would pose a danger to the 
security of the U.S. and German‘s neighbors.  
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 Session, Hearings on the North Atlantic Trea-




The memorandum concluded, however, that economic and industrial recovery 
by West Germany and its neighbors, to include a “satisfactory military posture” by 
those nations would diminish the possibility of aggression throughout all of Europe, 
including Germany. Nonetheless, security considerations had to be taken into ac-
count and for that reason, the U.S. recommitted itself not to withdraw its occupation 
forces until the peace of Europe was established.
61
 
In this same memorandum, the U.S. further recognized that as Germany be-
came firmly embedded in a free European structure, a German military contribution 
to the security of that structure would be possible, but only if the other free nations 
of Europe deemed it necessary. That said, in talking points prepared for Acheson, 
dated 17 May 1949, just six days before West Germany became the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Acheson was advised to reply to questions regarding German entry into 
NATO by saying that 
[n]o consideration has been given to the inclusion 
of Western Germany for a number of reasons. These in-
clude the fact that Western Germany is under the mili-
tary occupation of several North Atlantic countries, that 
it has no government, that all Germany will presumably 
one day be reunited, and that the German people have 
yet to prove their attachment to the principles of the 
North Atlantic Treaty.62 
 
One month later, on 21 June, the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee 
was told that although U.S. policy was fully committed to the complete and absolute 
disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, “Germany is and can to an increasing 
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extent contribute to the general economic strength of the Western European Coun-
tries, which is the essential foundation of military strength.” This answer allowed for 
the possibility of Germany exporting materiels that could be used by other countries 
for the production of armaments.
63
 
The birth of NATO and the Federal Republic inevitably led to discussions 
about the role West Germany would play in the defense of Western Europe. For ex-
ample, in July, the U.S. Embassy in The Hague reported on the contents of a memo 
presented to the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers at Luxembourg 
by Netherlands Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker. The memo essentially stated that West 
Germany should be integrated as closely as possible but such integration carried a 
risk. If allowed to remain independent, the FRG could turn to the East and upset the 
existing balance, therefore the memo concluded that the occupation needed to con-
tinue until Western Europe was stronger than at present, both politically and militar i-
ly; that the FRG was not to have an armed force; and that she would not be allowed 
to manufacture war materiels. Many Council members believed that West Germany 
should be at least an associate member (due lack of full sovereignty) but in the end, 
no action was taken.
64
 
  On 10 October, an Office Memorandum was sent to Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs, George W. Perkins, stating that the author, Wayne G. 
Jackson, a State Department officer, had learned from an unnamed individual who 
would be speaking with the President on 11 October that U.S. military authorities in 
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Germany were in favor of the “prompt rearmament of Germany,” and that 25 div i-
sions was the goal. This individual understood further that the Department of De-
fense, specifically Army Chief of Staff, J. Lawton Collins, was also in favor.  
Perkins subsequently wrote Acheson a memorandum the following day that 
these rumors of German rearmament were “much exaggerated and substantially 
without foundation.” Perkins went on to write that “it is true that Pentagon thinking 
envisages use of German manpower in the defense of Western Europe at some time 
in the future….” It was not true, however, that the prompt rearmament of Germany, 
the raising of 25 divisions or the inclusion of Germany in either the MAP program or 
NATO was being considered or favored. Perkins concluded by saying “We have no 
reason whatever to believe, and compelling reasons not to believe, that the military 
are Acting in anyway [sic] in this field without our knowledge….”
65
  
Many newspaper articles and editorials, both in the United States and Europe 
dealt with this issue throughout the remainder of the year. The gist of these articles 
was simply that even with NATO, there was a significant force imbalance between 
the military forces of the Allies and those of the Soviet Union. Further, as the French 
were fighting in Indochina and the belief that U.S. occupation forces would be una-
ble to hold off a Soviet attack until additional forces from the West were able to join 
the battle, the rearming of Western Germany would be inevitable.
66
 Adenauer had 
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also expressed growing concern about the creation of paramilitary “police” forces in 
the Soviet zone, the so-called kasernierte Bereitschaftspolizei or “barracked” riot po-
lice.
67
 Nonetheless, high ranking military officers were, in fact, making statements 
that led many to believe that the U.S. favored German rearmament of some type.
68
  
Despite Perkins’ denial of any interest in rearming Germany and similar deni-
als by Schuman and Acheson, a cable from Paris indicated that French deputies con-
tinued to speculate about German rearmament and felt that is was coming “nearer 
and nearer.” Schuman’s denial came in the form of a statement made by him before 
the French National Assembly on 24 November in which he said that it was a “a 
strange paradox” that despite confirmation by the Allies that the demilitarization of 
Germany would be completed, the idea of a rearmed Germany “has been able to 
spring up and persist in spite of the denials and in spite of all that is being done to 
the contrary.” Schuman concluded with a pledge, apparently given to him by Aden-
auer that read: 
The Federal Government asserts its firm determi-
nation to maintain the demilitarization of the federal ter-
ritory and to endeavor, by all means in its power, to pre-
vent the reconstitution of armed forces of any nature 
whatsoever. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
67
 “Paraphrase of Telegram From U.K. High Commissioner to Foreign Office, London. Dated 9
th
 Decem-
ber,” RG 59, Central Decimal File, File 740.00119 Control (Germany), Box 3787. See also Konrad Aden-
auer, Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-53, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965, pp.271 ff. 
 
68
 Press speculation was further fueled by remarks made by Generals Omar Bradley and Lucius Clay. Brad-
ley, speaking at an Overseas Press luncheon, stated that not only was a “strong ally needed on the conti-
nent,” but also that as the Russians had put East Germans in uniform as police, the West Germans might 
also need “some uniforms” if only to maintain security. Clay’s remarks, made at a fundraiser for The Ar-
thritic and Rheumatism Foundation and not carried in the domestic press, spoke of the need for a “compo-
site military force of Western European nations to which Germany could contribute limited forces of a spe-
cial type.” Clay also stated that he hoped such a force could be created if the West European nations inte-
grated but that it was a European and not American problem. FRUS 1949, Vol. III, pp. 317-19 (Bradley), 




To this effect the Federal Government will coop-
erate fully with the High commission and in the activity 




Even the British press reported that the United States wanted a “small German 
Army.” The U.S. position was further muddled somewhat by Secretary of Defense 
Johnson and JCS Chairman Bradley who, arriving in France for a NATO Defense 
Ministers meeting, and despite initially emphasizing that the U.S. had no intention of 
rearming Germany and that there was no hedging or dodging about the American po-




In November, Acheson went to Europe himself and met with Adenauer, now 
the new West German Chancellor. During his discussions with Adenauer on 13 No-
vember, Acheson told Adenauer that from his talks in Paris, he felt that French pub-
lic opinion was ready for cooperation with West Germany and that France’s premier, 
Robert Schuman, had the full backing of his cabinet regarding policy on Germany. 
As the discussion moved to that of the legal problems involved in ending the State of 
War with Germany, Adenauer stated that “[the German Government] had no interest 
in the rearmament of the German nation…it was just too dangerous to provide Ger-
                                                     
69
 “Statement Concerning Germany Made by M. Robert Schuman Before the National Assembly,” attach-
ment to Memorandum of Conversation, Acheson-Bonnet, December 1, 1949, RG 59, Records of the Execu-
tive Secretariat (Dean Acheson) , Box 13, Lot 53D444, NARA. See also Harold Callender, “Schuman De-
fends Policy on Germany,” New York Times, Nov 25, 1949, p. 5. 
 
70
“Bradley Expresses Confidence,” and “The Defense of Europe,” New York Times, Nov 28, 1949, pp. 7, 
26. See also Harold Callender, “French Skeptical on Bonn Rearming,” New York Times, Nov 29, 1949, p. 





many with arms at this stage.”
71
 
Several days later, Acheson was asked whether Adenauer had addressed the 
establishment of a small German army of 5 divisions as reported in the New York 
Times and the President was asked the same question at a press conference the fol-
lowing day. Both Acheson and President Truman emphatically denied that report, 
calling it one of several rumors on this issue.”
72
  
Some members of Congress, however, initially appeared to feel differently. 
While in Berlin in late November, a four-man Congressional study mission of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, led by Representatives Joseph Pfeiffer (D-NY)  
and which included Representatives Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), Thomas S. Gordon (D-
IL) and Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI), stated that they would recommend including 
West Germany in the Western European Union. The group also advised against the 
early withdrawal of occupation forces, and Pfeiffer said that he was in favor of even-
tual German rearmament but within the context of a United States of Europe. Of the 
four representatives, only Javits stated his opposition to German rearmament “under 
any circumstances. On their return, Javits said the mission’s report would “condemn 
rearmament whether of German soldiers to be used under German or Allied com-
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Nonetheless, speculation continued and on 1 December, Henri Bonnet, the 
French Ambassador met with Acheson to state that the “persistent rumors” of Ge r-
man rearmament were upsetting public opinion in Europe and particularly in France. 
They were, he continued, interfering with the main task of integrating Germany into 
the European scene, as rearmament was not part of this integration. Acheson replied 
that the State Department would continue to do everything it could to stop the ru-
mors. Several days later, the State Department transmitted a cable to “certain” Ame r-
ican diplomatic officers telling them to respond to any possible queries regarding the 
November Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris that there were “no rpt no agreements, 
discussions or conversations of any kind re: authorization Ger armed forces or any 
modification existing disarmament and demilitarization agreements and regs pertain-
ing to GER. “[sic]
74
 
Two days later, on 3 December, Adenauer gave an interview to John P. Lea-
cacos of the Cleveland Plain Dealer which, according to Adenauer’s autobiography, 
was garbled when it appeared in the U.S. and caused “great excitement in the world 
press.” In the interview, Adenauer reiterated his opposition to rearmament and stated 
that the presence of the occupying powers put the Federal Republic under the protec-
tion of NATO; “Since the western powers have disarmed Germany, it is their duty by 
morals and under international law to care for the security of Germany.” When asked 
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about a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe, Adenauer responded 
first that the government would not allow the recruitment of Germans into other mili-
tary services as that would be the same as “buying a people to have mercenaries.” He 
then opened Pandora’s box when he told Leacacos that “Germany should contribute 
to the defense of Europe in a European Army under command of higher European 
headquarters at which time it will not only be urgent but necessary for the United 
States military aid program to be extended to Germany.”
75
 
Even more interesting is what Adenauer told Leacocos off the record. Accord-
ing to Leacacos, Adenauer said: “The Germans are the only people who can stop the 
Russians. However, with the passage of time, the trained soldiers from general to 
private are forgetting their military skills. Therefore, if the Allies wait too long be-
fore they begin training a German army, it may be too late to be of immediate use to 
defend Germany against Russia.”
76
 
On 8 December, Adenauer had a discussion with the three High Commissioners 
in which he stated that his recent statements regarding German rearmament were made to 
allay fears in Germany that were caused by a number of issues. The recent NATO meet-
ing in Paris, he said, had given no indication as to how Germany might be defended in 
the case of Russian aggression. Press rumors indicated that two alternatives had been dis-
cussed: a European defense on the Rhine and, respectively, a defense on the Elbe. In ad-
dition, Adenauer stated he had information that an army was being created in Eastern 
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Germany and that it was no longer possible to believe that these troops were mere police 
formations.  
The Allies, he said, were “duty bound to maintain the security of the Federal Re-
public” and that he believed that to speak of a defense on the Rhine was “a hollow 
phrase.” Germany was living under a serious permanent threat and unless the Russians 
were stopped where they were, Western Europe would be “finished.” Adenauer then 
asked that the Western Allies make a declaration to the effect that West German territory 
would be defended against an attack and that his views be reported to their governments, 
which was agreed. It was further agreed that all should refrain from public statements on 
this issue…it was a matter for “no comment.” 
77
 
Adenauer agreed but stated that these remarks might be directed to the press as 
they were the “chief cause of the trouble.” Nonetheless, two days later, on 10 December, 
the Washington Post reported that in his fourth statement in a week, Adenauer “virtually 
demanded” that German armed forces be included in any West European army. The Post 
article went on to say that while mindful of the memories of those countries invaded by 
Germany twice in the past 25 years, Adenauer asked “Which is the greater danger - the 
Russian threat to the Western world or a German military contingent to operate with 
forces of the other Western nations?” Adenauer stated further that “The Germans should 
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be represented in a European striking force with rights similar to those granted other Eu-




As 1949 came to a close the issue of German rearmament was becoming what 
Hansen Baldwin called “one of the ‘hottest issues’ in a world-wide catalog of hot is-
sues.”
79
 The State Department was well aware that NATO’s military leaders had de-
cided that a realistic defense of Europe needed a significant increase in the number 
of available forces, i.e., the addition of West German troops. It was not that the De-
partment of State was unequivocally against arming the Germans, but rather the case 
that the Department believed that arming the West Germans then would have signif i-
cant domestic and foreign political repercussions that could undermine the entire 
structure of Western defense and the reconciliation process that was U.S. policy. 
There was also the fear that by arming Western Germany, any hopes of reuniting the 
two Germanys would end. To this must be added the fact that Acheson seriously be-
lieved that the key to progress toward integration was in French hands…that “France 
and France alone can take decisive leadership in integrating Western Germany into 
Western Europe.”  
It thus became U.S. policy that France would play the key role in European 
integration, that France needed to first be built up and stabilized, and that she be a l-
lowed to determine the speed of Germany’s integration into the West. This policy set 
the stage for what I argue as the U.S.’s abdication of leadership. It relegated the U.S. 
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to the sidelines and into the role of onlooker when arming the Federal Republic be-
came a reality. The French government, however, remained “absolutely” opposed to 
German participation in NATO.
80
 To the Department of State, these factors out-
weighed any military advantage that might accrue as the result of remilitarization, 
thus they continued to deflect and even disinform somewhat on this issue.
81
  
In what would appear to seal the Department of State’s position on German 
rearmament, the three High Commissioners sitting in Council on 15 and 16 Decem-
ber approved and signed a law on the elimination of militarism which replaced the 
obsolete provisions of the ACC and the Military Government. The new law provided 
a single text which prohibited “[the] teaching of principles and theory of war and re-
lated activities; manufacture possession and distribution of articles and devices 
which may be used for militaristic activities, unless authorized by the Council.” It 
also prohibited “organizations of a military or Nazi character.”
82
 
1950 - Year of Crisis, Year of Decision 
 
1950 was the year that the State and Defense Departments finally agreed in 
principle on the basic issue of arming the Federal Republic of Germany.
83
 It was also 
the year in which the United States was confronted with the unexpected invasion of 
South Korea by North Korea. Seen in many quarters as the prelude to war in Europe, 
                                                     
80
 DEPTEL 4013, October 19, 1949, RG 59, Central Decimal File, File 711.40, NARA and Synopsis C, 
Aug-Dec 1949, Dean G. Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminars File, Box 78, HSTL. 
 
81
 See, for example, New York Times, 16 November 1949, p. 1; 22 November 1949, p. 11; and 30 Novem-
ber 1949, p.13. See also Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to Secretary of 
State, 11 October 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. III, p. 285. 
 
82









the Korean conflict left the Europeans fearful that the U.S. would overreact to the 
communist provocation. Yet despite the attack in Korea, State Department policy-
makers maintained their focus on Western Europe but fought a losing battle against 
the question of German rearmament. 
Perhaps in part, due to Adenauer’s Cleveland New Dealer interview and con-
tinued controversial press statements, rumors and press reports about possible Ger-
man rearmament continued into the New Year. For example, in mid-January, Drew 
Middleton reported in the New York Times that Adenauer was being advised by a 
group of German generals that in the event of rearmament, Germany needed one 




On 20 January, Deputy U.S. High Commissioner, General George P. Hays, 
sent a cable to Acheson containing a statement released by High Commissioner 
McCloy regarding a story in the New York Herald Tribune. The Tribune story, at-
tributed to a spokesman for the West German Chancellor, alleged that former Ger-
man generals had been asked by the Allies for their recommendations regarding the 
defense of West Germany. The story, according to McCloy was without foundation 
and distorts facts “all out of proportion.” Neither had there been requests from any 
American authorities to former Wehrmacht generals nor had there been any change 
in the oft repeated government policy that Germany would not be allowed to recreate 
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armed forces or to rearm.
85
 
The following month, Averell Harriman wrote Acheson following a luncheon 
with Winston Churchill, then in opposition, of Churchill’s stated belief that “we are 
neither agreeing to protect [Germany] nor are we permitting them to defend them-
selves.” Churchill felt that German manpower and industrial production should be 
used at “the appropriate time” to strengthen an integrated Western European defense 
force….a new sort of SHAEF, to which the Germans could contribute as part of the 
whole but without a rounded military force of their own.” He indicated, however, 
that none of these things could be done without U.S. participation.
86
 On 16 March, 
Churchill addressed the House of Commons telling them that the “long western Eu-
ropean front against the Soviet Union…could not be successfully defended without 
the ‘active aid’ of Western Germany.” The Foreign Office quickly distanced itself 




In early April, Drew Middleton reported that the West Germans would be ask-
ing the Allied Foreign Ministers for some declaration of their intent to defend Ger-
many when they meet in London in May. While Middleton’s German sources said 
they were not asking for immediate rearmament, they did want to know when and at 
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what strength they would be allowed to rearm. Their main concern was the growth of 
the East German Volkspolizei, which they felt posed a grave political danger to West 
Germany. There was, they said, no German force in the Federal Republic capable of 
dealing with the Volkspolizei and they wanted to have some form of constabulary to 
maintain internal security. The occupation powers should not be the ones to police 
Western Germany, the sources said further, as it would allow the Communists to  




This view was echoed later in the month by Kennan. In voicing his disagree-
ment to a paper on German defense, Kennan stated that it was “unrealistic to expect  a 
demilitarized West German state to have stability unless there is an efficient federal 
constabulary…to balance off the East German police forces.” Kennan went even fu r-
ther indicating his belief that the para-military units being developed in East Germa-
ny should be approximately matched “man for man and weapon for weapon.” It did 
make a difference who defended western Germany as there was “nothing the Rus-
sians want more than to see our forces become engaged in fighting Germans, while 
they sit on the sidelines and make political capital out of it.”  
At the same time, Kennan was unequivocal in his opposition to German re-
armament or assurances of defense, believing that as long as West Germany was oc-
cupied, an attack against it would be an attack on the Western occupation forces. 
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There was time, Kennan said, to talk about West Germany’s future security when the 
end of the occupation became imminent. Lastly, he was also opposed to German en-
try into NATO. Using Iceland, Italy and Denmark as examples, Kennan felt  it “un-
sound” to ask “substantially demilitarized” countries to enter into arrangements that 




Cracks in the State Department Wall 
One day after Kennan’s delivered his paper, Mc Cloy sent a cable to Byroade 
informing him that he, McCloy, had decided that the U.S. approach to Germany was 
unrealistic. “We have attempted to improve on Versailles,” he wrote, “by absolutely 
forbidding Germany to rearm….” McCloy felt that the restriction, which had made 
sense in the context of post-war cooperation, no longer held in the now divided 
world. Real security for Western Europe, he continued, would only occur by adding 
Germany as a full partner. Although he also felt that pressing for German rearma-
ment now was premature and that it might be a while before it became urgent, the 




At approximately the same time, according to a New York Times article by 
Drew Middleton, a directive was circulated to all European Command force head-
quarters to draft plans for a “logistical development based on a further five-year oc-
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cupation” of West Germany. Middleton saw this as an answer to Germany’s need for 
a security guarantee and indicated that while there would be no troop increase, one 
could assume that the progressive takeover by German civilians of the Army’s ad-
ministrative duties would allow a “corresponding increase in the ratio of combat to 
non-combat soldiers in the theater.” Without knowing that McCloy was slowing 
changing his mind as regards German rearmament and defense needs, Middleton 
stated that the extended occupation “explained” McCloy’s recent, unequivocal state-
ments rejecting German rearmament.
91
  
Despite the increased discussion regarding German rearmament - even former 
German generals were producing papers on German participation in a European-
Atlantic Armed Force complete with active and passive air defense - the Military Se-
curity Board promulgated a law, to remain in effect for two years, designed to pre-
vent German rearmament and insure its industrial demilitarization.
92
 This law, an-
nounced on 8 May, the fifth anniversary of Germany’s defeat, limited German indus-
try in four ways: it prohibited and limited certain types or quantities of products; 
prohibited bulk increases on the capacity of certain types of industrial production; 
required Military Security Board approval for certain industrial activities; and pro-
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In early June, NSC 71was issued containing extracts of three statements by 
the JCS regarding German remilitarization. While the second of the three advocated 
the “appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany,” the last dealt specifically 
with a Federal police force in Germany. It stated: 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been informed by 
their representative in London that the three High Com-
missioners to West Germany have agreed to recommend 
to the Council of Foreign Ministers that Germany be au-
thorized to have 5,000 Federal police to be termed “Re-
publican Guard.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly urge 
that the Foreign Ministers approve this recommenda-
tion, since such a force could well be the initial step in 




NSC 71 drew the immediate attention of the President who sent a memo to 
Acheson telling him that he had read NSC 71 and that it was “decidedly militaristic” 
and in his opinion, not realistic with present conditions. He told Acheson that he de-
sired to discuss it with him on Monday, June 19. Byroade then prepared and coordi-
nated within the European Division a long, impassioned paper for Acheson to use at 
the NSC in which he addressed both the rearming and police issue. In his cover letter 
to Acheson, Byroade said that McCloy told him that he now had direct evidence that 
the British representative in Germany had instigated the letter Adenauer had sent to 
the High Commission requesting 25,000 federal police. Byroade recommended that a 
message be sent to Ambassador Douglas in London to speak “quite frankly” with 
Bevin, as these tactics could rapidly destroy the effectiveness of the High Commis-
sion. Byroade then suggested that the U.S. adopt an earlier French proposal to 
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strengthen the police situation by creating additional units within the Länder (states) 
with more effective weapons and greater mobility and to define a procedure whereby 
the Chancellor could call upon those units.
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The paper Byroade wrote stated both the meeting in London of the three For-
eign Ministers and meetings in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) made it clear that 
the rearmament of Germany and its inclusion in NATO were premature “to the point 
where profitable discussion cannot yet be held on this subject.” The paper continued 
that the next 18 months would be crucial in shaping Germany’s development and that 
neither the German people nor their elected leaders wanted to see a German armed 
force. World conditions, Byroade wrote, could cause this position to change but the 
advantages of not adding German forces to those of the West far outweighed the 
risks. An abrupt reversal of this policy, he continued, could undermine Allied unity 
and without unity, there is no strength. 
Additionally, Byroade’s paper continued, Germany could not continue to pay 
its share of occupation costs, currently 22-percent of its budget, and contribute to the 
military defense. Thus, it would be necessary to look at other, non-military ways that 
Germany could contribute to the strength of the West and the reconstruction of Eu-
rope. Byroade then looked at the possibility of the use of German manpower in a 
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balanced North Atlantic force, a concept that if successful, could provide a frame-
work within which limited German rearmament might be possible. That framework, 
however, had not been worked out sufficiently to solve the existing obstacles.  
Byroade also added a note of caution, saying that although Germany was pre-
dominantly anti-communist and outraged by past Soviet behavior, the outrage was 
not such that they might not be tempted to make a deal with the East. Thus, it would 
not add true strength to the West by creating a strong Germany military force whose 
loyalty could not be counted on with “reasonable certainty.”   
The paper concluded by agreeing that the current German police force needed 
strengthening but questioned whether, given Germany’s history with a centralized 
police force, additional and specially trained forces should be created in the German 
states that could be called upon by the Federal Government. He indicated that this 
question, which had not yet been decided, was really of no interest to the Department 
of Defense and that a Federal force would require a constitutional change. This ques-
tion was before the High Commissioners and, he added, was not considered a step in 
the initial phase of the rearmament of Western Germany. 
A few days earlier, on 13 June, the issue of a West German Federal Police 
force took yet another turn. McCloy cabled Acheson telling him that German Gen-
eral Graf Gerhard von Schwerin had gone to England on a trip to discuss German 
remilitarization with certain British officials and Ministers of Parliament, to include 
Sir Ivone Kirpatrick, the British High Commissioner for Germany, among others. 
Schwerin, according to the cable, was told that the majority opinion in Great Britain, 




present no great problem and could ‘be brought into line quickly’” McCloy s tated 
that, based on Schwerin’s admissions regarding his England trip and other info r-
mation, “it is becoming increasingly evident that the UK is utilizing pressure for the 
creation of a German police force as a first step toward the remilitarization of Ger-
many.”
 
 McCloy further surmised that Adenauer may have concurred although both 
the U.S. and the French view Adenauer’s request for a Federal police force at face 
value and not as a Trojan horse for a future German army. McCloy concluded that it 
was his impression the U.S. was not prepared to agree to remilitarization and that it 
was his opinion that it would be premature until a stronger democratic Germany 
emerged. He then requested the Department’s views on the police question.
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On the same day that he read NSC-71, President Truman wrote Acheson that 
he had received a telegram from McCloy on the rearming of Germany. Truman ven-
tured that it seemed to him that “the British were doing everything to break up wes t-
ern European unity [by advocating] the rearmament of Germany. Truman cautioned 
against making the same mistake as was made after World War I when Germany was 
allowed to maintain one hundred thousand soldiers that became the foundation for 
“the greatest war machine that ever came forth in European history.” He then told 
Acheson that McCloy should be called home and that he, Acheson, McCloy, and the 
Secretary of Defense should discuss the proper approach to a police force in Germa-
ny, one that could maintain order locally but not be allowed to develop into “a train-
ing ground for a military machine that can combine with Russia and ruin the rest of 
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Toward the end of June, Acheson responded to McCloy’s earlier cable with a 
cable of his own condemning the British ploy and the instigation of Adenauer’s letter 
requesting a 25,000-man federal police force. He agreed with McCloy’s position and 
conclusions and included for McCloy a copy of Byroade’s paper. Acheson concluded 
by stating that in regard to Adenauer’s request, the U.S. was not prepared to see the 
creation of a large, centralized barracks police. A small force of 500-2000 men under 
federal control for the Bonn enclave was acceptable but beyond that, Acheson said, 
“widespread disorders” could be dealt with by adequately built-up and strengthened 
Land police. This should suffice to meet Adenauer’s plea without creating a danger 
to democracy inherent in a centralized German police force.
98
 
McCloy’s response urged Acheson to seek a common understanding among 
the three allied governments regarding German remilitarization and to make a com-
prehensive pronouncement that should be more than a “mere reaffirmation that we do 
not intend to rearm Germany….” Acheson agreed but wanted to wait until the NSC 
had an opportunity to discuss the issue. McCloy also told Acheson that Adenauer 
told him about Schwerin’s trip to the UK and a that a source close to departing Depu-
ty UK High Commissioner General Robertson told McCloy that Robertson had urged 
Adenauer to request 25,000 police and that the UK would support that request.
99 
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Korea Forces the Debate 
Five days before Acheson’s cable to McCloy was sent, North Korean forces 
crossed the 38
th
 parallel separating North and South Korea, attacking both South Ko-
rean and U.S. forces. Although U.S. policy focus would remain on Europe, the situa-
tion and the tenor of discussions regarding German rearmament would change. For 
many Germans, in particular, the parallel between Germany and Korea was unmis-
takable: both were divided into western-oriented and communist-oriented states. 
Added to this was the nature of the military buildup in East Germany, specifically 
the Kassernierte Volkspolizei/Bereitshaftspolizei, which was more like an army and 
made the possibility of aggression from the east more likely.
100
  
With the outbreak of the Korean War, McCloy began to change his mind re-
garding German rearmament and on 14 July sent an “Eyes Only” cable to Acheson 
and Byroade describing a talk Sir Ivone had with Adenauer, which he reported to 
McCloy and French High Commissioner André François-Poncet. Adenauer, accord-
ing to Sir Ivone, had again expressed his concerns over the question of security for 
the Federal Republic in light of Korea and the lack of concrete preparations by the 
Allies in Europe. Adenauer acknowledged that the creation of a German army was 
out of the question but that some means had to be made in the event of an attack by 
the Volkspolizei. 
Sir Ivone felt that the Germans needed to know that the Allies were doing all they 
could to protect them and said that, at a minimum, an ”effective German auxiliary,” was 
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needed - whether it be federal or Land police was immaterial - to control refugees and to 
keep order while Allied forces prepare for an attack. McCloy indicated he was skeptical 
of Sir Ivone’s concern, thinking that it might have been a way for him to again press the 
British interest in creating a federal German police force using Korea as a “gambit.” 
McCloy did feel, however, that continued bad news from Korea could disturb the general 
equanimity of the population. 
In separate inserts in his cable, McCloy added that Poncet subsequently told him 
that German service troops with our armies should be trained and in an emergency be a 
“means for Germans to fight with us,” and also that he had seen Adenauer and was told 
much of what Adenauer had told Sir Ivone. McCloy concluded that he believed there was 
a lack of sufficient emergency planning regarding the use of Germans and that in his 
judgment, “it is necessary to advise the Germans that at some point we would permit 
them to fight shoulder to shoulder with us when the need should arise.” He then stated his 
belief that those Germans who wished to, should be permitted to enlist in the U.S. Army 
and that he had already told General Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, United 
States European Command (CINCEUCOM), of this and that he understood that Handy 
was about to request permission to do just that. McCloy concluded that “…it would be to 
our advantage to start planning for the use of German manpower along the line suggested 




Ironically, as many of the senior State Department officers were slowly 
changing their minds and favoring the rearmament of Germany, Averell Harriman 
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among them, an office memorandum written by John Hay of Public Affairs to Geof-
frey W. Lewis, Deputy Director of the Office of German Affairs, stated that the U.S. 
Government’s consistent policy has been that Germany should not be rearmed. It re-
ferred to the 23 May formal note by the American, British and French governments 
to the Soviet Government regarding the remilitarization of the East German police by 
citing that in every agreement, the U.S. had been “committed unequivocally to the 
principle that Germany will be demilitarized, that her military forces will be com-
pletely and finally abolished, and that no revival of German military activities will be 
allowed.” The memo referred to press statements made by the Secretary on 7 and 16  
June that referred to this protest note and ended by stating that there had been no 
change to the State Department’s position on that subject.”
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In mid-July, McCloy again cabled Byroade stating that if the United States 
did not find the means to allow Germany to fight in an emergency, the U.S. would 
lose her politically and militarily without hope of getting her back. If there was a real 
war, McCloy continued, the U.S. would lose a most valuable reserve of manpower – 
a reserve the Russians would certainly use against the U.S. McCloy’s conclusion was 
that given the situation regarding Korea, it was time to consider the radical changes 
needed for German participation in Europe’s defense.
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Acheson, benefiting from his own and the State Department’s “great deal of 
thinking” on this subject met with the President at the end of July. This meeting marks 
what many have called Acheson’s ‘conversion.’ Acheson argued that the NSC was ask-
ing the President to first decide if West Germany should be rearmed and then, only after 
he approved, would methods for executing the decision be looked into. Acheson felt this 
was the wrong approach. The question, Acheson said, was no longer one of whether 
Germany should be rearmed but “how this could be done without disrupting anything 
else we were doing and without putting Germany into a position to act as a balance of 
power in Europe.”  
Acheson then suggested the idea of a European or Atlantic Defense Force as a 
mechanism by which a Western German military contribution could be integrated into the 
defense of Europe without the creation of a German national army, Ministry of Defense 
or General Staff. Truman gave his approval and directed Acheson to proceed along those 
lines. Acheson said himself that his conversion to German participation in European de-
fense was quick; “If there was to be any defense at all,” he had said, “ it had to be based 
on a forward strategy. Germany’s role must [be] primary.
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Acheson’s “conversion” may not have been a sudden as it appears. Beisner relates 
that as early as 1949, Acheson had decided that U.S. policy had to be one of “situations 
of strength.” He later states, although no time frame is given, that Acheson had been 
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thinking about rearming Germany privately but disavowing it in public, and again, that 
Acheson realized that the need for a “forward strategy” -  a defense line as far east as 
possible - made it imperative that Germany be involved militarily.
105
 
The idea of a European Defense Force had been germinating in the minds of 
McCloy and Byroade and had been discussed in a State position paper prepared for 
the London Tripartite Conference in May. But it was during the first week in August 
that these ideas began to jell and come to fruition. On 3 August, McCloy sent By-
roade a cable in which he offered a number of conclusions, namely, that the basic 
solution to the problem of the defense of Western Europe cannot be solved merely by 
strengthening Western Europe’s national armies and that France lacked both the ca-
pacity and will to build an army capable of bearing the brunt of West European de-
fense. He was, McCloy continued, opposed to the recreating of a German national 
army “now or in the foreseeable future,” but he recognized that an effective defense 
of Western Europe would require a real contribution of German resources and men. 
He concluded that the time was ripe for the creation of a genuine European army that 




Byroade responded the following day, telling McCloy that his cable had 
“filled in the missing portions” of a paper he, Byroade, had formulated the day be-
fore on the formation of a European army. According to Marc Trachtenberg, Byroad-
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e's plan described a highly integrated European army with as much an international 
character as possible,. It was an attempt to apply the Schuman Plan concept to the 
military field, allowing for a German contribution without a German national army. 
It was, as someone had said, an effort to “arm the Germans sufficiently to deter the 
Russians but not scare the Belgians.” Byroade’s paper became the State Depart-
ment’s official position and it was forwarded to the Defense Department for concur-
rence and to satisfy the President’s directive that the two Departments reach a com-
mon position. The most politically significant portion of the paper was the statement 
that if United States participation was forthcoming, conditions appeared favorable 
for creating a really effective European Defense Force which could assimilate a d i-
rect contribution by Germany, but that “This involves…the voluntary surrender of a 




Yet again, the Department’s official pronunciations, as well as some of its in-
ternal communications continued to blur the issue. Just the day before Byroade’s re-
sponse to McCloy, a Summary of Telegrams pertaining to Germany informed the 
Secretary that Charles Spofford, the U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Coun-
cil of Deputies had been told that when speaking to other NATO representatives, he 
should indicate that given the current world situation, the U.S. felt that the required 
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defense effort could not be met without the contribution of Germany’s productive 
capacity to turn out non-combat equipment. Spofford was further instructed to make 




Just over a week later at the 11 August Council of Europe meeting, Churchill 
called for the creation of a European Army, to include German participation,. Antici-
pating questions on the U.S. reaction to this resolution, both Byroade and James 
Webb recommended diplomatic responses for the Secretary of State and the Pres i-
dent, respectively, neither of which however mentioned the official U.S. position of 
no German rearmament. Instead, it was recommended that both men disavow any 
detailed knowledge of the scope of German participation in Churchill’s proposal and 
that the U.S. Government could not usefully comment on it.
109
 
As will be seen in Chapter 4, the Department of Defense had been working 
since early 1948 on arming western Germany and had been in constant contact with 
the Department of State, especially since early August, regarding the question of 
when and how to arm the Federal Republic. Although the positions of the two de-
partments were not that far apart, there were several significant differences that 
needed to be ironed out and clarified, specifically the JCS position that the German 
contribution be a national army in NATO. Thus, on 26 August, and in light of the 
upcoming meeting between Acheson and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and 
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France on 12 September that was to be followed by a meeting of the NAC, President 
Truman sent each Secretary an identical letter that contained eight key questions for 
which he requested that both departments work together in developing recommenda-
tions for his decision by September 1: 
The most significant questions asked essentially whether the U.S. was pre-
pared to: 
 commit additional forces to the defense of Europe; 
 support the concept of a European defense force, including Germans, 
on other than a national basis; 
  look forward to the eventuality of a Supreme commander for that 
force; 
 support creation of a combined staff for that Supreme Commander; 
and 
 consider full U.S. participation in a European defense force; i.e., to ac-
cept responsibility for having an American Supreme Commander, and 





On August 30, Acheson, Byroade, Paul Nitze and Perkins met with General 
Bradley to discuss the JCS response to Truman’s questions, and according to a mem-




As an aside, it is of interest to note that on 29 August, Adenauer sent a memo-
randum to McCloy in which he pointed out that events in the Far East and belief in 
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the ability of the West to counter Soviet moves in Western Europe had been badly 
shaken to “an alarming extent and had led to a dangerous lethargy among Germans.” 
Adenauer again pointed out the weakness of the Federal Republic police vis-à-vis the 
East German Volkspolizei and wrote that he had repeatedly requested that Allied oc-
cupation forces be reinforced as the defense of the FRG was in their hands. Lastly, 
and perhaps most importantly, Adenauer stated that the FRG was prepared to con-
tribute a German contingent should an international European army be formed. “This 
shows unambiguously,” he wrote, “that the Federal Chancellor rejects the remilitari-
zation of Germany by a separate national military force.”
112
  
Adenauer sent a second, undated Aide Memoir to Allen Dulles, who forward-
ed it on 8 September to his brother, John Foster Dulles who forwarded it further to 
Byroade on 11 September. The Aide Memoir reiterated Adenauer’s position that the 
events in Korea had caused a serious loss of confidence in the FRG and that to save 
the psychological situation there, the occupying forces needed to be significantly re-
inforced with at least two to four armored divisions. To fully thwart a Soviet attack, 
however, at least twelve armored divisions sent to Germany’s eastern border would 
be required. “Only when this is done,” wrote Adenauer, “will it be possible to recruit 
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12 September 1950 - The “Single Package” is Presented. 
Acheson relates in his memoirs that both the State and Defense Departments 
debated the issue for two weeks before a compromise was reached, which he then 
carried to the Tripartite Meeting in New York. The compromise, also known as the 
‘single package,’ contained several key elements and was intended to be offered to 
the Allies on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis. The “package,” approved by Truman just a 
few days earlier, offered to increase U.S. forces in Europe by approximately 6 divi-
sions, 8 tactical air groups and appropriate naval forces, and participation, along with 
the United Kingdom and all the other NATO armies in a combined European defense 
force, with an international staff and a ‘supreme commander.’ However, this was to 
be contingent on the Allies boosting the capabilities (and size) of their forces and ac-
cepting the inclusion of German contingents that would be added at division level 
but without a German General Staff.
114
 
Acheson later called the ‘single package’ a “mistake” and claimed he was forced 
into accepting it from the military, a claim that is accepted by many historians. Of partic-
ular interest in this respect is David S. McLellan’s comment that Acheson may have 
wanted to avoid a conflict with Bradley and that the JCS insisted that the “recommenda-
tions must be submitted and accepted as a whole.”
 
This claim and other similar state-
ments, however, are not supported by the available documentation and Acheson was nei-
ther a person to be easily cowed nor one who would subscribe to a position he did not 
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approve, as both Trachtenberg and McMahon so eloquently describe.
115
 Referring again 
to Trachtenberg, if the package as presented to Bevin and Schuman was a mistake, it was 
not that it mandated the arming of the Federal Republic but that it was presented as a vir-
tual all or nothing demand.
116
 Thus the stage was set for the long, drawn-out four and 
one-half year battle to put Germans back in uniform. 
It is obvious from the above that the determination of the United States to keep 
Germany disarmed and demilitarized came face to face with political reality. Some offi-
cials within the State Department began to see the situation in a different light, some be-
fore the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, others afterward. Of interest, and 
not developed to any great extent in the scholarly literature, is the fact that it was McCloy 
and Byroade, two State Department officers, who first developed a definitive plan to arm 
West Germany within a European Defense Force and not the French. As will be seen in 
the following chapters, aside from a not too favorable review by the JCS, this plan was 
never put forward. This begs the question of whether the following four years, during 
which the Pleven Plan/European Defense Community was offered as the solution to the 
German question, would have ended differently had Acheson made it a part of the “Sin-
gle Package” and not ceded the initiative to France. 
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   Chapter 4: The Military Path to September 12, 1950 
 
Official histories of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and even the individual military services address this period. They are, howev-
er, by design brief, highlighting only the major issues or major points of an issue or 
strategy debate. Similarly, non-military historians have addressed this period and the 
military problems that confronted the United States during the early Cold War peri-
od. While together they address the issue of German rearmament, they do not go into 
either depth or detail sufficient to understand the decision-making process. They fail, 
therefore, to explain the specific motives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the 
manner in which it dealt with the Department of State. By bringing the contents of 
plans, memos, cables and other correspondence of the Joint Staff, the Joint Strategic 
Planning Committee, and other involved military agencies found in the archives  to 
light, this chapter presents a much more complete and nuanced picture of the period. 
It will also delineate clearly the unchanging position the Department of Defense on 
the question of German rearmament and the variance with the policy being followed 
at the time.  
Simply put, the Department of Defense wanted a national West German army to 
be formed while the State Department, as seen in Chapter 3 above, wanted to have Ger-
man armed units in an integrated European army. The difference was a question that 




unified federal (national) army or separate armies of an alliance is more effective. For 
Clauswitz, as for the Department of Defense, the answer was the national army.1 
Defend or not Defend, 1946-1949 
When the war in Europe ended in May, 1945, there were 61 U.S. divisions, ap-
proximately 915,000 men) in the Allied force under Eisenhower.
2
 Less than one year lat-
er, on 1 January 1946, after a much faster than expected demobilization, a rate of demobi-
lization that forced Eisenhower to complain to Congress, there were only 622,000 U.S. 
troops assigned to the European Theater, a number that was estimated to be reduced to 
307,000 by 1 July 1946.
3
  
By 1947, just one year later, only 12 under-strength divisions, primarily 
trained and equipped for occupation duties, remained of the total U.S. Army ground 
divisions (97) active at the end of the war, and only two were in Germany.
4
 At the 
same time, however, according to intelligence estimates used by the Joint War Plan-
ning Committee (JWPC), the USSR had retained 50 divisions in their zones of Ger-
many and Austria, 20 divisions in Poland, 20 divisions in Hungary and Yugoslavia, 
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and a further 152 divisions as reserve in the Soviet Union along with a number of 
frontline aircraft. JWPC also estimated that an additional 61 divisions belonging to 
Soviet satellite countries in Europe would also be available. Freely admitting Soviet 
superiority, the JWPC concluded that the USSR could, in the event of war, overrun 
Europe and reach the English Channel in its initial drive. Under those circumstances, 




There was little if any thought within the U.S. military establishment in the im-
mediate years following the end of World War II about rearming Germany. The U.S. 
Army of Occupation was deeply involved in carrying out the disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and demilitarization directives of the Allied Control Authority. The War Depart-
ment, however, which was soon to become the Department of Defense following the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, was slowly recognizing a growing military threat from its 
erstwhile World War II ally, the Soviet Union. This threat took on greater urgency fol-
lowing the 1948 Czech Coup and the Berlin Blockade later that year, forcing the JCS to 
think seriously about the defense of Western Europe. Outnumbered in manpower, and 
associated with relatively weak allies, themselves still recovering from the ravages of the 
war, the Pentagon sought a solution that would utilize the manpower and fighting experi-
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ence that the recently defeated Germany could provide. Therefore, to better understand 
why the U.S. military turned so quickly consider rearming the recently disarmed Ger-
mans, it is imperative to gain an understanding of the military situation as seen by the 
newly organized JCS in the early post-war years.  
Strategic Planning for War with the USSR Begins 
Prior to 1947, strategic planning consisted primarily of studies of specific ar-
eas or problems. For example, Soviet actions in 1946 - in Iran and subsequently to-
ward Turkey - combined with Stalin’s speech of 9 February and George Kennan’s 
analysis of it, led the JCS to fear the loss of the Mediterranean and to contend that 
the Soviet Union constituted “the greatest threat to the United States in the foreseea-
ble future.” By mid-April, a Joint Staff analysis concluded that the Soviets could 
conquer most, if not all, of Western Europe.
6
 
Following passage of the National Security Act in July 1947, the newly reor-
ganized JCS was made responsible for war planning. The earliest plans, which were 
prepared without political guidance as none was given, assumed the United States 
would use nuclear weapons.
7
 As Lawrence Freedman writes, however, the Joint Staff 
had concluded as early as 1946 that the use of nuclear weapons might not be deci-
sive. ‘Victory’ would require the “actual capture and occupation of the enemy home-
land….” Furthermore, U.S. demobilization had been such that the few atomic bombs 
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possessed by the U.S. would do little if anything to compensate for the lack of troops 
on the ground. Nonetheless, for a number of technical and strategic reasons, e.g., the 
development of the B-36 long-range strategic bomber, which lessened dependence on 
overseas bases, the U.S. military came to believe that strategic bombing with nuclear 
weapons could be decisive.  
These ideas were embodied in the first plan, code-named BROILER, which 
was approved in December 1947. BROILER was a plan for the initial stages of war 
beginning anytime within the next three years. Its aim was to secure the United 
Kingdom and the Cairo-Suez area by launching a strategic air attack against the 
USSR. That said, the force disparity between the U.S. and the USSR forced planners 
to accept the loss of both Western Europe and the Middle East. Given the require-
ments and time it would take to mobilize, it was believed that an offensive to retake 
the continent would not be possible for at least 10 months after D-Day.
8
 
BROILER, however, elicited doubts among members of the JCS regarding its 
reliance on atomic weapons. Both Admiral William D. Leahy, Chairman of the Joint 
Staff, but especially Admiral Louis Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations, saw 
BROILER as a complete surrender to the Soviets of all of Western Europe’s man-
power, resources and industrial capacity – resources that could then be used against 
the U.S. Denfeld believed a more realistic strategy would have the U.S. align itself 
with the West European powers to defend along the Rhine. In addition, he felt that 
together with the Western Union, the military arm of the then newly created Brussels 
Treaty Organization, and additional U.S. forces, it would be possible to hold part of 
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In April 1948, U.S., British and Canadian planning officers developed and 
approved an outline Emergency War Plan (EWP) – an abbreviated version of 
BROILER – code-named HALFMOON, which included a larger list of nations allied 
against the USSR  that was to be the basis for each nation to develop “unilateral but 
accordant” plans. As a global war plan, however, HALFMOON, approved in May 
1948, was focused on securing and/or regaining Middle East oil. Its major flaw, 
which was recognized as such, was its failure to provide assistance to Western Eu-
rope. Again, the shortage of forces left the planners no alternative. Only the United 
Kingdom, which was to act as a platform for U.S. strategic air forces, was to be de-
fended. No serious effort would be made to hold Western Europe and Allied occupa-
tion forces were to withdraw to the Rhine, hold as long as possible, then withdraw to 
French and Italian ports for evacuation. Sufficient mobilization to retake the lost te r-
ritories was expected to take approximately 12 months.
10
 
To facilitate future planning, Eisenhower, who had been recalled from retire-
ment by President Truman to be the acting Chief of the Joint Staff and Special Advi-
sor to the President, issued a policy memorandum on 25 February 1949 setting forth 
wartime objectives for Europe. A portion of the guidance stated: “The security of the 
United States requires…the holding of a line containing the West European complex 
preferably no father west than the Rhine.” Eisenhower, however, recognized that the 
forces available, including those from members of the Western Union, were insuffi-
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cient to hold the Rhine, so he called for plans to hold a “substantial bridgehead” in 
Western Europe and to provide for a “return” at the earliest possible moment.
11
 
This new plan, designated OFFTACKLE, was approved on 8 December 1949. 
It was the first plan based on political guidance as well as the first that directed the 
defense of Western Europe. Both HALFMOON and OFFTACKLE reflected the 
doubts of both the Army and the Navy as to the efficacy of an “atomic blitz,” and 
their belief that slowing a Soviet advance in Europe had to be an objective as well.
 
OFFTACKLE also eliminated the Middle East as a U.S. priority.
12
 Nonetheless, and 
despite the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. and al-
lied forces remained numerically insufficient to hold the Rhine or maintain a bridge-
head north of the Pyrenees. Withdrawal and return, possibly only 24 months after D-
Day, most likely from North Africa, remained the only possible alternative.
13
 
Marc Trachtenberg writes that even before the Soviets acquired the atomic 
bomb in August 1949, it had become clear that a build-up of conventional capability 
was of importance. General Omar Bradley, then Army Chief of Staff, stated that a 
strategy of first abandoning then liberating Western Europe would produce impotent 
and disillusioned allies who, in the event of war, could not be counted on: “…we 
cannot count on friends in Western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates 
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that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a promise of later liberation.”
14
  
Although what lay behind these thoughts was only voiced loud and clear sev-
eral years later, it was becoming evident to some that if war was to fought on Ger-
man soil, Germany had to be defended as an ally as it was obvious that she would 
contribute to her own defense. A German contribution, however, required a signif i-
cant change in West Germany’s status. The rationale was that Germany’s willingness 
to provide troops in her own defense would be a test of her commitment to the West. 
As early as 1947, Clay had remarked that “in the event of another war, the Germans 
probably would be the only continental people upon whom we could rely.”
15
 
Predating these thoughts was a Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Commit-
tee (JSSC) of 29 April 1947 and a staff study drafted for the Joint Strategic Planning 
Committee (JSPC) in March 1948, which addressed the issue of West German re-
sources. Paragraph six of the Enclosure to the Appendix of the JSSC Report stated 
that: “Potentially, the strongest military power in this area [Western Europe] is Ger-
many. Without German aid the remaining countries of Western Europe could scarce-
ly be expected to withstand the armies of our ideological opponents until the United 
States could mobilize and place in the field sufficient armed forces to achieve their 
defeat. With a revived Germany fighting on the side of the Western Allies this would 
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The JSPC study stated that “[German] resources in manpower should be put 
to building forces to fill the military vacuum in Western Europe.” It further recom-
mended that staff conversations be undertaken with European Allies to determine the 
military uses to which West Germans might be put. Finally, the study concluded that 
the current EWP had to be changed to indicate a preparedness to fight and contain a 
Soviet attack on a line east of Denmark, West Germany and Italy, and to put German 
resources to use militarily to fill the military vacuum after consultations with the 
West Europeans and in light of their recommendations.
17
 Ironically, this recommen-
dation unknowingly supported the Western Union’s 1948 objective to fight as far 
east as possible in Germany, an objective the JSSC found unrealistic.   
Knowing that the U.S. could not assist the West Europeans, the JSSC simply 
did not believe that even after years of intensive preparation the “potential of the 
democracies to be increased enough to do other than simply delay Soviet encroach-
ment.” The U.S., it stated further, would use offensive air and naval operations with 
ground support, to include atomic warfare, “designed to secure the offensive initia-
tive and bring about, at the earliest possible date, the capitulation of the enemy.”
18
 
Even so, a ‘return’ to Western Europe was not expected to be feasible for 24 months 
when the necessary forces, totaling 41 U.S. divisions and 63 tactical air groups 
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would invade, World War II style, from England and North Africa.  
In a December 1947 study looking to develop military and security implica-
tions of a possible Soviet proposal for the early withdrawal of occupation forces, the 
Army Chief of Staff recommended a change to the wording of a paragraph so that it 
would read: “The German people have the potential of ultimately providing effective 
resistance to forceful expansion into Western Europe. If they should be permitted to 
develop their military potential by the Western Allies, they are the people most likely 
to provide such resistance unless the United States abandons them to Soviet domina-




The study was based on the already accepted assessment that the Soviets 
would occupy Western Europe to the English Channel in the west and to the Pyre-
nees in the south before the U.S. could act effectively. The basic thrust of the Army 
Chief’s memo was that Germany’s potential could only be realized by a radical 
change in the Allied position regarding the disarming and demilitarization of Germa-
ny. Thus, by the end of 1947, thoughts regarding Germany and its relation to Euro-
pean defense were advancing slowly but surely in American military circles.  
During the April – May 1948 period, a series of papers from the Joint Strate-
gic Planning Committee (JSPC) concerning the U.S.’s involvement in Western Eu-
rope were sent to the Joint Chiefs. One such report, like the previously mentioned 
staff study, recommended the EWP be revised to provide that U.S. forces would 
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“fight and delay” as cleverly as possible and not deliberately evacuate.
20
 It further 
assumed that if there were no war by 1953, U.S. and Allied forces would be able to 
stop the Soviets from advancing west of the Rhine. In accepting the ability of the 
Soviets to “conquer and substantially occupy” the whole of Western Europe within 
six months, the report concluded that in order not to lose Western Europe to Com-
munism, the U.S. had to show the Allies a determination to fight shoulder to shoul-
der with them, but still, only to ensure the integrity of Western Europe west of the 
Rhine. A British report of conversations with the JCS stated that while the UK, 
planned no withdrawal from the Rhine, the U.S. envisaged ultimate withdrawal to the 
Pyrenees where they planned to retain a foothold on the continent.
21
 
This report also addressed the use of West German resources, including man-
power, contingent on their political reliability, the degree to which their use in prepa-
ration might provoke the USSR, but most importantly, the attitude of other West Eu-
ropean countries (notably the French) toward a possible resurgence of German mili-
tary power. This report was followed immediately by another document cautioning 
that as the EWP did not envision the introduction of additional U.S. forces on the Eu-
ropean continent for the defense of France or the Benelux nations, these plans were 
not to be discussed with them. The document went on to say in so many words that 
this policy would avoid lowering the morale of those nations and that they could best 
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help by vigorously defending their own territory.
22
 
A third document stemming from a planners conference in May 1948 found 
the British contingent to the conference proposing that Clay be authorized to partic i-
pate in planning discussions for the evacuation of Allied forces from Germany, Aus-
tria, Trieste and other locations. One of the more important assumptions in the doc-
ument, one that had direct consequences on U.S. military thinking later on, was that 
in a conventional war, the Western Powers could not put up any great resistance to a 
Soviet advance, and first by excluding nuclear weapons, a protracted war would en-
sue that would “so destroy Western Europe that recovery might be impossible.”
23
 
This posed an almost insolvable dilemma. To withdraw, after pledging to remain, 
would be to give Western Europe to the Soviets. To use nuclear weapons in an attempt to 
forestall an invasion would destroy Germany at the very least, while not to use them, giv-
en the weak conventional forces available, would most likely also result in both the de-
struction and the loss of Western Europe.24 
Cooperation with the Western Union 
On 19 March 1948, two days after the Brussels Treaty Organization was 
formed, a staff study initiated by General Albert C. Wedemeyer, then the Army’s D i-
rector of Plans and Operations, was sent to the JCS and Bradley. The study suggested 
overall political and military means to be employed by the United States vis-à-vis 
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Western Europe to check and ultimately reverse the expansion of Soviet com-
munism. Written after the Czech coup, it highlighted several risks to be avoided and 
strongly urged the creation of a military European Recovery Program, i.e., a “mili-
tary Marshall Plan” to coordinate efforts.
25
 
Wedemeyer’s paper emphasized a need to change the strategic concept that 
was based on re-conquering Europe after Soviet occupation. As translated in the JCS 
paper derived from Wedemeyer’s study, the U.S. could no longer proceed on the 
strategic concept basis that Europe must first be conquered and occupied by the So-
viets, denuding the U.S. of allies before there was any prospect of adopting a policy 
for victory. The current EWP, HALFMOON, which called for the “immediate and 
frantic” evacuation of U.S. occupation troops, had to be changed. The United States, 
it continued, must be prepared to fight with its allies in Europe against any odds.  
Paragraph 15 of the JCS version of Wedemeyer’s paper, which cited his study 
verbatim and mirrored the above cited March 1948 JSPC study read: “Any use to which 
German resources, including resources in manpower, should be put militarily in building 
forces to fill the military vacuum in Western Europe.” It added his caveat that this 
“should be determined only after consultation with other peoples of Western Europe and 
then in light of their recommendations.” The JCS draft was entitled “Coordination of U.S. 
West European Military Resources to Counter Soviet Communism” and concluded that 
no choice existed “but to provide Western Europe, within our capabilities, every assis-
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In April 1948, a National Security Council paper, NSC 9, proposed that the 
U.S. associate itself with the recently formed Brussels Treaty Organization and until 
such a time as a defense agreement was signed, declare that an armed attack agains t 
any of the BTO signatories to be an armed attack against the U.S. The JCS, however, 
was not too happy with NSC-9. They felt that military commitments should only be 
taken after commensurate increases in appropriations and military potential had been 
made, as well as authorization for necessary civilian and industrial readiness. There 
was yet a further mention of a German contribution in April when Denfeld recom-
mended a change to the draft of NSC-9/1, which would add a new paragraph that 
would allow “when circumstances permitted,” other countries such as Germany to be 
invited to “adhere to the Five-Power Treaty and the Defense Agreement.” NSC-9/1 
was withdrawn and replaced by NSC 9/2 with a somewhat different thrust.
27
 The 
JCS, however, reinserted Denfeld’s words and the newer version was approved and 
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 19 May 1948. NSC-9/2 concluded that the 
President was prepared to authorize U.S. participation in the London Five-Power 
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military talks on a non-member basis.
28
  
A few weeks later, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall told the NSC, most 
likely in reference to NSC 9/1, that any agreement with the Western Union regarding 
European defense should leave the possibility of German accession open. The NSC, 
however, in line with President Truman’s thoughts, found the question of German 
participation in Europe’s defense premature.
29
 Nonetheless, on 23 June, Undersecre-
tary of State, Robert A. Lovett, wrote Secretary of Defense  James Forrestal that the 
provision of NSC-9/2 for the U.S. to associate itself with the BTO should be carried 
out and requested the he be informed who was being sent and how soon.  
A further revision to NSC 9/2, NSC 9/3 acknowledged the Vandenberg Reso-
lution but was otherwise identical to its predecessor. It was approved by the Presi-
dent on 2 July 1948 and one week later, on 8 July, Major General Lyman L. Lem-
nitzer was selected to lead the U.S. delegation to the military arm of the BTO, the 
Western Union Military Committee. The small group led by Lemnitzer was to partic-
ipate on a non-membership basis to discuss military plans and draw up a tentative, 
coordinated supply plan.
30
 That said, it was not until 15 July that the U.S. received a 
formal invitation from the Chairman of the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission, 
Gladwyn Jebb, to send American military experts to participate in the work of the 
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Western Union’s military committee.
31
  
It was the French, however, who took credit for initiating the invitation. Ac-
cording to Jefferson Caffery, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, he had been shown in 
strict confidence the draft of a document on French views concerning the security 
problems of the Western democracies that was to be sent to Foreign Minister George 
Bidault once it had been cleared by Prime Minister Robert Schuman and Minister of 
National Defense Pierre Henri Tietgen. The key elements of the draft were that 
France saw Germany as an eventual threat but saw the Soviet Union as an actual 
threat but one whose intentions were unclear and difficult to define. It was this threat 
and Western Europe’s current weakness that led France to believe that cooperation 
with the United States was imperative, hence the invitation to participate in the 
Western Union’s Military Committee as observers. In return, however, France wan t-
ed to be admitted to the U.S.-UK military commission.
32
 
At about the same time, Wedemeyer, now Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans & 
Combat Operations, travelled to Europe to appraise the situation created by the Ber-
lin Blockade. He sent a cable to Undersecretary of the Army Kenneth Draper telling 
him of a meeting with Tietgen, Armed Forces Inspector General, General de Lattre 
de Tassigny, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, Generals Revers 
and Lecheres. Most significant from that meeting was Tietgen’s  acknowledgment 
that France recognized that there was “No purely German danger” at the time and 
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that France was ready to accept the American view that the only real present danger 
was the Soviet Union.
33
  
Tietgen went on to say that the defense of Europe, which would be fought in 
Germany as far east as possible, required 60 divisions of which France was prepared 
to provide 25-30 in two years, but would need heavy materiel from outside. In addi-
tion, Tietgen warned that unless the U.S. guaranteed assistance, the French people, 
sensing defeat, would turn to communism and the “internal battle” would be lost. As 
the French government had ordered a stand on the Rhine until the last man, he asked 
“What will the U.S. do?” Bidault explained that because France was governed by 
Roman law, written and signed guarantees were of extreme importance. 
A few weeks later, Wedemeyer cabled Bradley and Major General Ray Mad-
docks, Director of the Army’s Plans & Operations Division , with an appraisal of Eu-
ropean personnel and their thoughts. Wedemeyer repeated that French had definitely 
decided to fight as far east of the Rhine as possible and that Field Marshall Mont-
gomery had told him the French planned on raising 45 divisions if appropriate 
equipment could be made available. 
Wedemeyer also reported that Montgomery had told him the British had been 
ordered to fight east of the Rhine or to use the Rhine as an obstacle; no retreat was 
allowed nor could there be a retreat to a peripheral strategy - the Rhine had to be 
held and as the Allies grew stronger, the defensive line would move further to the 
east. Montgomery also felt that the five-nation Western Union should immediately 
appoint a British officer as Supreme Commander but that should war occur, the Su-
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preme Commander should be an American.
34
 The JCS agreed that a defense of the 
Rhine required a Supreme Commander and if the Western Union wanted an Ameri-
can officer for that position, it would be given to Clay.
35
 A few days later, Lemnitzer 
recommended that the U.S. delegation to the Western Union remain as the associa-
tion was both necessary and highly desirable. The U.S. presence, he said, had had a 
notably good effect and a great ability to influence planning.
36
 
In mid-August, the U.S. and the UK Chiefs of Staff reached an agreement that 
due to the plethora of additional duties imposed on Clay as the U.S. Military Gover-
nor in West Germany, he could not serve as the Supreme Commander for Western 
Europe. It was therefore suggested that the Supreme Commander be a French officer 
who was to be supplied with an integrated staff. The two Chiefs of Staff also agreed 
to appoint an Allied Commander-in-Chief for Western Europe and suggested either 
Field Marshalls Montgomery or Alexander or French General Juin.
37
 
During the last few days of August, a meeting of senior officers from the De-
partment of Defense - the Secretary of Defense, the JCS and senior civilian officials - 
met in Newport Rhode Island. While the discussions ranged wide over a number of 
issues pertaining to the services, it focused at one point on the appointment of a Su-
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preme Allied Commander for Europe. Secretary of Defense Forrestall felt that the 
appointment of Eisenhower would be a clear indication to the USSR of the conse-
quences of going to war and probably the only way to avoid war. Wedemeyer, how-
ever, countered that Eisenhower’s appointment would compel the United States to 
send additional forces to Europe and mentioned that the current U.S. war plan fo-
cused on the Middle East. Wedemeyer also volunteered that under conditions at that 
time, the U.S. would be unable to fight a successful war in Europe for a period of 
one year to eighteen months.
38
  
Toward the end of September, Lovett sent an Aide Memoire to the French ad-
vising them that on 16 July, the JCS had authorized Clay to participate in the for-
mation of a joint planning staff for the purpose of planning coordinated operations 
for the withdrawal to and defense of the Rhine. The three allied Commanders-in-
Chief, howver, were already engaged in that planning process in Wiesbaden, Germa-
ny.
39
 At about the same time, the JCS advised the Western Union Combined Chiefs 
of Staff that the Western Union would not have any control over U.S. strategic air 
forces, as they would report directly to the JCS.
40
 Actually, from the tenor of the traf-
fic between the JCS and the U.S. delegation to the Western Union, it appears that the 
U.S. had no real problem in giving operational control of U.S. forces to the Western 
Union in the event of war. What the JCS wanted, however, was evidence of complet-
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ed operational plans so that a timely decision could be made at government level.
41
 
At the first meeting of the newly established Western Union Chiefs of Staff 
Committee in early October, Air Marshall Arthur Tedder, the Western Union’s Chief 
of Staff, privately told General A. Franklin Kibler, who had replaced Lemnitzer as 
head of the U.S. delegation, that contrary to previous assertions, under the then exis t-
ing conditions all available British army forces would be sent to the Middle East at 
the outbreak of war and not to Europe! Kibler apparently responded by telling Ted-
der that before the U.S. could make any commitment to the defense of Western Eu-
rope, it needed to be assured that the Western Union had a sound defense plan and 




In November, the U.S. was also invited to participate in the Western Union’s 
Committee on Equipment and Armament. Both invitations - to participate in the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Equipment and Armament Committee - were ap-
proved and Kibler was named to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Nonetheless, the 
U.S. remained adamant that participation in all these committees would be on a non-
member basis as the U.S. would not join the Western Union.
43
 Kibler, however, rec-
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ommended to the JCS that when important U.S. policy decisions or announcements 
affecting the Western Union were made, a high-ranking JCS officer should be pre-
sent at the Western Union Chiefs of Staff meetings.
44
 
Also in the fall of 1948, an Army initiated study set out a number of basic and ad-
ditional assumptions, most of which were almost utopian, but nonetheless were used to 
determine whether or not the defense of Western Europe could be successful undertaking. 
The basic assumptions put forth were: (a) it was cheaper and more effective for the secu-
rity of the United States to give the West Europeans the capability to defend themselves; 
(b) if attacked, the West European nations will defend themselves to the utmost, and (c) 




The additional assumptions put forth were that (a) the defense of Western Europe 
was possible if a strong rearmament program was initiated by the West European nations 
with U.S. aid; (b) that the West European nations included the United Kingdom, France 
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, West Ger-
many and Austria (Denmark, Norway and Sweden were considered “possible” but for the 
most part, viewed in a separate category); (c) West European nations would develop an 
organization that would be able to coordinate and utilize their combined strengths; (d) the 
European Recovery (Marshall) Plan would continue to a successful conclusion; and (e) 
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that the combined productive efforts of Western Europe and the United States would be 
sufficient to provide enough armament to make defense practical and effective. 
The study assumed that the Soviet Union and its allies would attack without warn-
ing; that they would have sufficient stockpiles of materiel to conduct operations for nine 
months, and that military operations would be conducted primarily on land and with con-
ventional weapons, at least until 1955. Lastly, the study’s allied assumptions began by 
assuming that the allies would use the atomic bomb; that the Western Union would have 
already agreed on weapons and equipment standardization; that each nation would have 
pooled its existing production capability and would contribute its fair share. It also as-
sumed that U.S. equipment requirements would be based on a force of 25 divisions plus 
reserves, and lastly, that equipping and rearming would not have prohibitively affected 
the civilian economies of either the West European nations or the United States. The 
study stated that it was purely an Army study but nevertheless, made the assumption that 
sufficient air support would exist to ensure at least tactical air equality. 
West Europe’s Defense Needs Appraised 
To defend Western Europe, it was determined the most practical and advanta-
geous defense line, which would run from the North Sea to the Adriatic would be to the 
west and south of the line Rhine River-Lake Constance-high Alps-Piave River - a total 
distance of 887 miles. To defend this line against an enemy force that was determined to 
be 50 divisions strong on D-Day, increasing to approximately 100 divisions by D-Day 




the Alps Group of Armies - would be needed.
46
 To achieve this force, the study looked at 
available manpower both under arms and total manpower (15-49 years of age) available. 
The numbers provided in the study indicated that as of 1 August 1948 there were 2.4 mil-
lion men already under arms, excluding West Germany, or the equivalent of 61½ divi-
sions but that they lacked mobility, signal communications, anti-aircraft artillery and 
ammunition. When total available manpower was addressed, it was found that there were 
59.7 million men between 15 and 49 available of which 19.8 million were already trained 
reserves (9.6 million men and 4.0 million reserves were German).  
From the above, the study concluded that there was no shortage of manpower or 
trained reserves and that the defense of Western Europe along the Rhine-Alps line could 
be effective. It also concluded that, given the initial assumptions, the Allies could field 60 
divisions by 1 October 1948 and build up to a grand total of 96 divisions by 1 January 
1953. The cost of this build-up to the U.S. in surplus military stocks, to include pro-
cessing, handling, and transport was estimated to total $14 billion.
47
 
The dreary outlook for the defense of Western Europe continued to be the main 
theme in November as well when the JSPC sent a memo to General Gruenther confirm-
ing the findings of an earlier Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee report indicating 
that as West Germany would not be in any position to assist in checking a Soviet advance 
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for many years, there was no question of holding West Germany with the forces availa-
ble. Allied forces would have to withdraw to assist in the defense of the Rhine. The de-
fense of Italy and Trieste was not contemplated. The line to be held was the Ijssel-Rhine-
Franco-Italian border on the Mediterranean.  
The JSPC memo essentially agreed with the Western Union report but felt that the 
ability to hold the Rhine for any length of time was questionable and that the key aim 
should be the deployment of forces in such a manner as to delay the Soviets for as long as 
possible. A few days later, a joint U.S.-British intelligence report on Soviet Intentions 
and Capabilities stated that the West Germans could be nether relied upon not expected to 
provide military support as they continued to harbor some hostility against the West. 
Maps accompanying the report showed Soviet forces on the English Channel in the vicin-
ity of Amsterdam in D+10 and at the Franco-Spanish border at D+60.
48
 
As 1948 drew to a close, the Secretary of the Army travelled to Germany, Austria 
and Trieste. In a paper entitled “Things to do on Trip,” a series of notes indicated that he 
was to discuss with Clay the rearming of Germans in the West Zone, a centralized West 
German police force, Kennan’s study on the withdrawal to the perimeters of the Occupa-
tion Zones, and the moving of U.S. supply depots to ports in France.
49
  
Distrust of Germany was again made manifest when, stemming from the May 
1948 London Conference that reaffirmed the disarmament of Germany, a Military Securi-
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ty Board was appointed on 10 December to “ensure observance of clearly-worded laws 
regarding disarmament and demilitarization.” Its task was to further ensure that “the de-
velopment of general activity in Germany, the purpose of which is economic and political 
recovery, is not deflected from its peaceful aims, and does not create significant war po-
tentials.” The board was composed of a Commission of three general officers, one from 
each of the allied occupying powers (France, UK and U.S.), representing the respective 
Military Governors, a Committee of Deputies, and three divisions: Military, Industrial, 
and Scientific Research. Within each division, national elements of each of the three 
powers were represented and tasked with working in a coordinated manner to ensure 
compliance, make recommendations, and report any violations.
50
 
At the same time, and as indicated in Chapter 3 above, rumors of German rearm-
ament began circulating in the German and foreign press. Also, as a result of earlier dis-
cussions between Secretary of the Army Royall, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, and 
General Clay, a staff study was initiated in the Army’s Plans and Operations Divi-
sion/Policy Branch on the subject of a German Police Force for the Western Zones that 
recommended the establishment of a centralized police force. Undersecretary of the Ar-
my Draper wrote Clay asking for his thoughts. Assistant Secretary of the Army, Tracy 
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Voorhees cautioned that any indication that “we are forming the nucleus of a German 
army” had to be avoided. Secretary Royall, however, overruled the conclusions.
51
 
NATO and the Growing German Question
 
1949 was a watershed year for the United States and the U.S. military establish-
ment. As mentioned in chapter 3 above, on 4 April 1949, after a long series of negotia-
tions with the Western Union member-nations, Canada, and five other West European 
governments, the United States became one of 12 signatories to the North Atlantic Trea-
ty. Five months later, in September, the Federal Republic of Germany came into being 
and the question of Germany’s military potential now became an explicit Cold War issue. 
Le Monde, the French newspaper commented that “the rearming of Germany is contained 
in the Atlantic Pact like the yolk in an egg.”
52
 
NATO was, in its formative year, according to Paul Nitze, “a North American 
political commitment to the defense of Europe rather than a framework for a military 
organization.” Although functional, the initial NATO organization was cumbersome 
and diffuse. Each member nations’ forces were assigned tasks for which they ap-




Furthermore, Allied response to Soviet military strength was hesitant and re-
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strained. The West European allies refused to divert funds from rebuilding and eco-
nomic programs to build up their militaries. In February, for example, General Clar-
ence Huebner, CINCEUCOM, discussed the need for a defense organization inside 
the upcoming NATO organization. He pointed out that in the ten months since the 
Brussels Treaty Organization had been in existence, it had been impossible for the 
members to reach any agreement on the contribution of forces for the defense of 
Western Europe. Not only that, they refused to guarantee that they would even pro-
vide forces on any particular date in the future. Huebner stated that as a result, U.S. 
occupation forces, which represented an insignificant number of the total forces 
needed and available, took on an exaggerated place in the planning process and 
thinking of the Western Union. The British, for example, refused to give an estimate 
of their force contribution until they were assured that the continental countries 
would put up sufficient forces to make a defense of the Rhine possible.
54
 
Even the U.S. Congress was slow to appropriate monies to assist the Allies. 
As of April 1950, for example, only $42 Million out of a promised $1.3 Billion Mil i-
tary Development Assistance Plan (MDAP) had been spent. U.S. strategy, which also 
became NATO strategy, continued to be one of ‘liberation’ following a Soviet attack, 
and evacuation to a line behind the Pyrenees remained the ground forces’ only op-
tion. It was hoped, however, that with the presence of even the few U.S. troops 
available acting as a ‘trip wire,’ U.S. nuclear capability would deter the Soviets from 
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 As of 1 July 1949, those ‘few’ occupation troops in Germany 
amounted to one and two-thirds divisions and 175 aircraft.
56
 
During discussions between the JCS and the British Chief of Staff in August 
1949, for example, the JCS reiterated that the U.S. could either support the Cairo-Suez 
area or keep a toe-hold in Europe on the Rhine. Once NATO became effective, however, 
the JCS indicated that holding further east might be a possibility. If that was not possible, 
however, the U.S. would be prepared to return to Europe as soon as possible.
57
 It should 
be remembered that OFFTACKLE, the then operable EWP, conceded most of West Eu-
rope to the Soviets, and focused on securing the United Kingdom and protecting the 
Mediterranean littoral while looking to French Morocco to serve as the initial assembly 
point for U.S. forces. Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, told Air Marshal 
Lord Tedder that it would take three months for the U.S. to get forces to the Rhine, but 
only if it was evident the Rhine could be held. Otherwise, U.S. forces would go else-
where and hold the enemy at the Pyrenees. It was still believed that it would take 24 
months after the beginning of the war to be able to make an attempt to defeat Soviet forc-
es on the European continent. 
58
 
All in all, there was little talk of defending Western Europe, much less West 
Germany until late 1949. In fact, and as will be seen below, it was only after the out-
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break of the Korean War in 1950 plans for the defense of Western Europe were de-
veloped by NATO. Furthermore, as West Germany was not considered part of the 
North Atlantic Treaty area, there was no obligation on the part of either NATO or the 
Western Union to defend her.
59
 
1950 - Year of Decision 
In mid-January 1950, a lengthy background study entitled “U.S. Policy Re-
specting the Disarmament and Demilitarization of the Federal German Republic” 
was used by the Army’s G-3/Plans Division/International Branch to answer a broad 
spectrum of questions.
60
 The questions covered German participation in the defense 
of Western Europe, Soviet use of armed forces being created in East Germany, West 
German political reliability, the psychological effects on other West European coun-
tries as a result of German rearmament, and the ability of the Allies to control Ger-
man rearmament. 
The answers provided indicated that the provision of German troops in a war 
against the USSR offered several advantages, not least among which was their singu-
lar experience in being the only West Europeans to have fought against the Soviets. 
Combined with fact they would be fighting to protect their own soil and as “com-
rades-in-arms” with the Western powers and not as a defeated nation, it was believed 
that their fighting qualities would not be exceeded by any other West European 
force. It was further determined that unless industrial restrictions were lifted, Ger-
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many would not be in a position to contribute what would be necessary to a reconst i-
tuted armed force. 
The study went on to indicate that over seven million German men were con-
sidered fit for military service and that given the training many underwent in the 
Wehrmacht, they would be fit for military service after a relatively short period of 
refresher training. In addition, the study found the German male to be “temperamen-
tally well-suited for military service” with a fighting ability “judged to be among the 
highest in the world,” making him without equal in Western Europe.   
The disadvantages were, first and foremost, the belief that a remilitarized 
Germany would be a provocation to the Soviet Union and that it would end any pos-
sible Franco-German rapprochement. The study also underscored a belief that, con-
sidering Germany’s past history, any permission to rearm would see the Germans re-
arming as rapidly (either secretly or overtly) to the fullest extent the international 
community would allow. The study concluded, however, that once the armed 
strength of the West European powers was rebuilt, then and only then could some 
form of German defense participation be considered. 
There was also a favorable consensus in the study regarding German reliabil-
ity, with respect to both the armed forces and the State.
61
 The study indicated that 
with the establishment of a German armed force, the government would insist that its 
status as a defeated enemy nation end and that there would most likely be demands 
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for a peace treaty and full sovereignty. It also indicated that the government could 
possibly threaten to align itself with the USSR if its demands were not met, but it 
doubted that these threats would be carried out given that West German’s leaders 
were considered traitors by the Soviets, and that West Germans, according to the 
study, were strongly opposed to communism and hated and feared the Soviets.   
The study concluded that a) given the expected political repercussions in the 
European countries, France in particular, it was not yet time to consider rearming 
Germany; b) long-range strategic plans should, however, consider a part for German 
armed forces in the defense of Western Europe; and c) accordingly,  “careful political 
and psychological preparations should be put into motion to make the execution of 
this program palatable to the peoples [of Western Europe].”  
The JCS Speaks Out 
It appears that by this time, the State Department was becoming well aware of 
the Pentagon’s interest in rearming West Germany. In early April, a Lieutenant 
Colonel Daley, G-3/Plans Division/International Branch wrote a staff study on “Pos-
sible Contributions by Germany to her own Security” for informal distribution to the 
JSSC, the Office of the Secretary of the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Office of Military Affairs, Operations Division/Joint War Plans Branch and to Colo-
nel Byroade at the State Department. 
The study cited all the limitations posed by the U.S. and Allies on the creation 
of a German armed force and a centralized Police Force/Gendarmerie. It cited Senate 
Bill, SB-2269, which, if passed, would have authorized up to 10,000 aliens (Ger-




tribution to support the occupying powers, which was in the region of $600 - $700 
million, more than the total defense budget of some of the West European nations. 




In  mid-April 1950, in preparation for Tripartite meeting in London the fol-
lowing month, the Department of State had, as part of the normal coordination pro-
cess between departments, given the JCS a number of papers for review. It was noted 
by the JSSC in a memo to the Director of the Joint Staff that there was no mention in 
those papers of German rearmament as an element of U.S. policy.
63
 A few days later, 
Army G-2 (Intelligence) commented on an Army General Staff staff study with the 
recommendation that a paragraph in the General Summary be re-written to remove 
an implicit tone of criticism. The suggested rewrite was:  
It is well to reexamine the political basis for 
United States policy of disarmament. The present United 
States Policy Directive for Mr. McCloy is to insure that 
“the country (Germany) will not be a threat to the inde-
pendence of other nations or the peace of the world.” 
The basis for this policy would appear to be invalid. In 
order to attempt to avert a possible (but unproven) long-
term threat to the peace of the world (a rearmed Germa-
ny) the Western Powers are denying themselves material 
help in off-setting a definite known present threat -- So-
viet Russia. Recognizing the political difficulties which 
must be overcome in order to profit by a German contri-
bution to the security of Western Europe, the goal would 
appear to be an armed Germany. With such a decision, 
steps should be taken toward the objective of a major 
German contribution to the Security of Western Eu-
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On 2 May, the Joint Staff made their first, unequivocal statement regarding 
their position on German rearmament. In a memo to the Secretary of Defense, re-
garding the draft of a Department of State paper entitled “The Problem of Germany,” 
the JCS stated that they are: 
…firmly of the opinion that, from a military point 
of view, the appropriate and early rearming of Western 
Germany is of fundamental importance to the defense of 
Western Europe against the USSR. In order to insure 
that the energy and resources of the German people be-
come a source of constructive strength to the free world 
rather than again becoming a menace, either inde-
pendently or with the USSR primarily, the present dis-
armament and demilitarization policy with respect to 
Western Germany should be changed. The Western 
Germans should, as soon as possible, be given real and 
substantial opportunity to participate in Western Euro-




This paper, originally State FM D A-2/3b (McCloy’s paper), had been forwarded 
to the JCS for comment/concurrence in preparation for the May Foreign Ministers Con-
ference in London. JCS concurred but recommended the addition of “previously ex-
pressed JCS views on German rearmament and export controls.” As mentioned above, 
State had refused to incorporate those views in an earlier paper (Protest to Soviet Union 
Concerning East German Militarized Police), because State felt these views should have 
first been discussed in the NSC. The JCS felt that even though a reiteration of its views 
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would not alter State’s position, it was necessary and appropriate to repeat them for the 
record, which they did in JCS 2124/2 (see quotation above).
66
 
On 8 June, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, the views of the Joint Staff 
on the subject of “United States Policy toward Germany” were made know in NSC-71. In 
this document, the JCS repeated comments made in late April 1950 in which they under-
scored their belief that U.S. disarmament policy prevented Germany from contributing to 
the strength of the North Atlantic community. While the JCS comments focused on Ger-
many’s economic strength, pointing out its value to the West and the importance of deny-
ing it to the USSR, it stressed that before further progress could be made toward develop-
ing Western Germany into a valuable asset to the Western European and North Atlantic 
communities, France needed to be prevailed upon to agree to modify the overly restric-
tive controls on German industry.   
The NSC document repeated the 2 May JCS statement regarding the early rearm-
ing of Western Germany and concluded with the following recommendation “that the 
United States adopt the following policy: 
Bring about recognition by the Western European 
nations, particularly France, of the necessity of changing 
the present disarmament and demilitarization policy with 
respect to Western Germany so that Western Germany can 
contribute effectively to the security of Western Europe. 
It is recognized that the political and psychological 
in Western Europe will have to be overcome if the present 
Allied policy is changed. Pressure should be brought on 
France to insure that unilateral action by France, such as 
that recently taken by France regarding the Saar Basin, is 
not repeated but that France be persuaded to recognize that 
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the USSR is a greater menace to the independence of 




The document concluded with the JCS again strongly urging the Foreign Minis-
ters of the three Allied powers to approve the recommendation of the three High Com-
missioners and authorize Western Germany to have a 5,000-man Federal Police Force.  
The Korean War Begins 
At the end of June, most likely in reaction to the North Korean attack on South 
Korea that had taken place five days earlier, Bradley wrote a memorandum to Rear Ad-
miral Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Joint Staff. In this document, Bradley stated that he 
had been thinking for some time about making a study on the rearming of Western Ger-
many. “If our Chiefs feel that steps should be taken toward the rearming of Western 
Germany, I believe we should make a specific recommendation to the President to this 
effect.” Bradley felt it unrealistic to continue talking about building up the defense of 




The Department of State responded to the JCS’s comments in NSC-71 in the 
first week of July. Their lengthy response appeared to reflect the anti-German biases 
of George Kennan and others in the State Department at the time and ignored the De-
fense Department’s oft repeated statement of 2 May that they believed “…the appro-
priate and early rearming of Western Germany is of fundamental importance to the 
defense of Western Europe….” The State Department’s response significantly down-
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played the JCS’s statement stating that “It is understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
are not pressing for the immediate rearmament of Western Germany, but rather rec-
ognizing the political conditions, are urging that steps be taken to create conditions 




The State Department’s response went on to say that all were agreed, i.e., the 
U.S., French and British governments, that Germany had to be quickly brought into a 
close and firm association with the West, but it had to be done in such a way as to 
ensure her commitment to the West. The response continued that the London Tripar-
tite and recent North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings concluded that Germany’s 
rearmament and inclusion in NATO was “premature to the point where profitable 
discussion cannot yet be held….” It also stated that the majority of Germans did not 
want an armed force and that they did not feel their government was truly representa-
tive. More time was needed, it continued, to “develop democratic tendencies on the 
part of the German people and a more responsive form of government.” It cautioned 
that arming the Germans would reverse the progress made by France and that the 
Germans, already contributing 22-percent of their budget to cover occupation costs 
could hardly contribute more. 
It briefly addressed the possibility of the production of “non-ordnance” items 
in Germany for NATO forces and alluded to the possibility that a rearmed Germany 
“could not yet be counted on with reasonable certainty.” Lastly, the response stated 
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that after building up strength in the West, and before seeking to rearm Germany, 
“we shall probably wish to make a further effort to reunify Germany.”  
Three days later, after reviewing both NSC-71 and 71/1, the Secretary of the 
Army wrote the Secretary of Defense that in view of the possible world-wide impli-
cations of the Korean situation, the United States “should avail itself of at least a part 
of the industrial and military manpower potential of Western Germany…through 
controlled rearmament.” He recommended that the Secretary of Defense should take 
that position in NSC discussions and that the NSC staff prepare papers to that, to in-
clude dissenting views. His proposal also included the controlled rearmament of Ja-




Later that month, General Thomas Handy, who had replaced Huebner as 
CINCEUCOM, wrote a letter to General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, describing 
a conversation he had had with McCloy a few days earlier in which the subject of 
German rearmament had come up. McCloy told Handy that in a conversation with 
Chancellor Adenauer, Adenauer stated that in case of war, the West Germans should 
have some form of organization that could assist in the defense of their country. He 
spoke in terms of a defensive force of approximately 250,000 men in 10 divisions 
and indicated that the East Germans did not have that problem as they in fact have an 
army in the form of their Bereitschaftspolizei. 
Handy continued that he told McCloy he had given much thought to the sub-
ject as the “successful defense of Western Europe was extremely difficult, if not im-
                                                     
70
 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Germany (NSC 71, NSC 71/1), 




possible, without German assistance.” His studies, Handy continued, brought him to 
the same goal as the Chancellor. Handy pointed out the JCS position had been made 
in a number of papers but that it had not been accepted by the NSC. While McCloy 
stated he could not support the rearmament of Germany at this time, he suggested a 
three-phased approach that would gradually bring us to the same point. McCloy then 
suggested the following: 
a. Phase one, an additional 10,000 German Industrial Police be recruited;  
b. Phase two, institute military training in all Industrial Police units to include 
training as a cadre for Germany military organizations;  
c. Phase three, the eventual organization of a West German Armed Force.  
 
Handy then wrote that he had taken steps to increase the German Industrial 
Police by 10,000, with funds coming from the German Mark budget to which the 
Chancellor had agreed. Plans for the organizing, training, housing, etc., of the addi-
tion Industrial Police were progressing rapidly while some steps were being taken 
covertly. Handy included as an attachment to the letter a brief description of the EU-




In a follow-up letter that same day, Handy told Collins he had received a se-
ries of telegrams between McCloy and Byroade which emphasized McC loy’s belief 
that Germans should be allowed to enlist in the U.S. armed forces. McCloy also 
wrote that once the 10,000 Industrial Police were absorbed, a further increase should 
be sought. Handy said it appeared that McCloy’s thinking regarding German rearm-
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ament was changing in that he wrote “While my view is that we should make no 
plans to permit Germans to fight with us if an emergency arose, we should make no 
commitment in this regard unless we have the equipment and the means to enable 
them to effectively do so.”
72
  
Ironically, Byroade also sent the three cables to Collins on 20 July, asking 
him in the accompanying letter if he would designate an appropriate person in the 
Pentagon with whom he could talk about these cables. Byroade indicated that he was 
somewhat confused by them and felt, on the one hand, that McCloy did not yet have 
a clear concept. On the other hand, he stated that McCloy appeared to have very def-
inite views about enlisting Germans in the U.S. armed forces and that if that were 




A few weeks later, in early August, Handy again wrote Collins, telling him that 
plans “for the organization, housing, employment, and training of the 10,000 additional 
industrial police are well along.” 1,000 had already been recruited and when he was que-
ried regarding the issuance of arms to industrial police units, he answered only that the 
industrial police were being reorganized and issued small arms to make them more effi-
cient. He wrote further that discussions with McCloy on this matter continued but that he 
disagreed with parts of a paper prepared in office of the High Commissioner that was dis-
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cussed at a conference in Frankfurt. Specifically, General Handy stated that he questioned 
the accuracy of statements regarding German unwillingness to support a German army 
and he disagreed with statements that it was undesirable or politically unfeasible to create 
national German armed forces “at this time.” Handy did not disagree with McCloy’s or 
the State Department’s approach that German rearmament was only possible within the 
context of a European army or any other approach that would make it politically feasible. 
However, he wrote, “I do feel that the use of German manpower, resources, and produc-
tive capacity is a prime necessity for the successful defense of Western Europe.”
74
  
On the same July day that Byroade wrote Collins, the JSSC sent a lengthy re-
port on the rearmament of Germany to the JCS for passage to the Secretary of De-
fense. The report went to great lengths to counter the State Department’s response in 
NSC-71/1 and put the case for the necessity of rearming West Germany. The report 
indicated that despite the military aid the U.S. had already provided and continued to 
provide Western Europe, the lack of the West European nations’ military strength 
invited both subversion and attack by the USSR. The report argued that a certain 
amount of military strength must be available at the outset of any conflict and that 
this strength must relate to the defensive position to be held. Current forces in Wes t-
ern Europe were too small and neither the U.S. nor the UK were in a position to do 
more in the beginning stages of a war. Nor were the mobilization plans of the o ther 
West European countries such that they could mobilize in time to prevent being over-
run by the USSR. 
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The report continued indicating that even by 1954, when war might occur ac-
cording to NATO plans, the planned strength of Alliance forces would still be insuf-
ficient without the addition of German forces. It pointed out that the agreed upon line 
of defense - the Ijssel-Rhine River - afforded no defense to Denmark or to one-third 
of the Netherlands, and that it sacrifices the industrial complex of the Ruhr while  
permitting the physical unification of Germany under the Soviets. The promise that 
occupation forces could protect West Germany was illusory without “substantial 
German military participation.” 
It accepted that a risk could be incurred if the rearmament of Western Germany 
was not controlled and indicated that there would be no threat to West European unity as 
had been alleged in NSC-71/1, because “all of the military leaders of the Western Euro-
pean nations have expressed themselves privately in favor of controlled rearmament of 
Western Germany.” Although there was much more, the report concluded by recom-
mending that with respect to the rearming of Germany, the President be advised that: 
a. A successful defense of Western Europe against Soviet attack is not now 
possible nor is it likely to be possible by 1954 unless a rearmed Germany partic i-
pates; 
b. The United States Government should immediately press for a controlled 
rearmament of Western Germany and for the organization of an adequate federal po-
lice force for Western Germany as the initial phase of its rearmament program; and  
c. If Western Germany is not to be rearmed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must re-
vise their war plans and consider that the United States must rely on political 





The last week of July saw additional action regarding attempts to obtain a 
positive decision on German rearmament. General Charles Bolte, Assistant Chief of 
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Staff/Operation (G-3) wrote General Alfred M. Gruenther, Eisenhower’s Chief of 
Staff, about a discussion between General Cortland Schuyler, Chief of Plans and Pol-
icy Group, Army General Staff, and Byroade. Bolte told Gruenther that Byroade in-
dicated that a number of State Department officers, particularly W. Averell Harri-
man, believed a decision to rearm Western Germany should be made and that Secre-
tary of State Acheson was undecided but could conceivably be convinced to make 
this decision in the near future. Bolte went on to say that Byroade felt that those op-
posed to German rearmament, including himself, would be forced to accept it if the 
international situation continued to deteriorate. Byroade said that the State Depar t-
ment does not want to decide because “it means a resurgence of the military clique in 
Germany and the virtual abandonment of the hope for eventual development of a tru-
ly democratic government for West Germany.” 
Byroade also confirmed that the Department of State had given full approval 
to Handy’s proposal to increase the Industrial Police by 10,000 and that they would 
attempt to obtain French and British concurrence. Bolte concluded from the above 
that it would be best to give Acheson more time to make up his mind before pushing 
too hard in the NSC for a decision on the German issue. If Acheson could get NSC 
support, Bolte surmised, it would be much easier to get Presidential approval.
76
 
Based on some of the objections and comments made by the Army Chief of 
Staff, but without changing the thrust of the argument, JCS 2124/9 was revised and 
the last paragraph, recommending the President be advised, read as follows:  
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a. The early rearmament of Western Germany, seen in the light of the new 
United States program of increased military assistance for the countries of Western 
Europe, could contribute decisively to a successful defense of Western Europe. 
Without Western German forces, it will not be possible to hold the Ruhr which is v i-
tal to Western Europe; 
b. The United States Government should immediately press for a controlled 
rearmament of Western Germany and for the organization of an adequate federal po-
lice force for Western Germany as the initial phase of its rearmament program; and  
c. The question at this time is not none of whether we should risk the success 
of our political objectives vis-à-vis Western Germany, but rather whether or not we 
can afford to jeopardize the security of the United States by not utilizing all of the 




On 1 August, Bolte sent a letter with an attached Staff Study to Gruenther in-
forming him the Army G-3 staff had given the matter of a controlled rearmament of 
Western Germany a great deal of study and concluded that “the only practical 
way…would be to provide for the entrance of Western Germany into the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization…to permit her to furnish her pro rata share of ground forces 
as her contribution to the collective security…of Western Europe.” The Memoran-
dum continued by stating that the objective was to establish an approved position 
within the NSC in order to conduct talks with the French and British. It further rec-
ommended that the attached staff study become the official Department of the Army 
position, that Gruenther discuss this matter with Averill Harriman and others at State 
and even provide them with a copy of the staff study, and that G-3 should be pre-
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pared to use the staff study to make the necessary changes to JCS 2124/11.
78
 
What is of interest is that the staff study assumed, for its purposes, that the 
Departments of State and Defense were both in “entire agreement” that Western 
Germany had to be rearmed. It then concluded that various recommendations, i.e., 
enlistment of German aliens in the U.S. Army or the utilization of German “service 
troops” as a first step toward German rearmament should not be accepted. Nor 
should any other alternative method, such as the establishment of a European Army 
outside NATO or the Western Union defense organization or the absorption of Ger-
man units into British, French or any other West European army be concurred with. 
It further concluded that the Department of Defense should no longer press for the 
establishment of a federal West German police force. It was unpalatable to the De-
partment of State and no longer necessary since agreement had been reach on rearm-
ament. The Department of Defense should instead exert all its efforts toward obtain-
ing authorization for a controlled rearmament of Western Germany.  
The study also concluded that the Department of Defense should immediately 
press for West Germany’s entrance into NATO and only after consultation with the 
Governments of Great Britain and France should there be a decision on the number 
of divisions to be furnished by West Germany and the exact nature of the controls to 
be placed on its rearmament. It suggested, however, that for planning purposes, 15 or 
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20 divisions should be provided.
79
 
Several days later, on 5 August, a conference was held at the State Depart-
ment with Byroade representing the Office of German Affairs, and Lieutenant Colo-
nel V.P. Mock and Major J. G. K. Miller representing the Department of the Army’s 
G-3 Division.
80
 Byroade, who had read the 1 August staff study, indicated that the 
Army misunderstood the Department of State’s position regarding German rearma-
ment. He stated that the Department of State was opposed to it unless there was a 
“proper political formula and organizational framework” that would be acceptable to 
the European powers, particularly France, and which would not jeopardize German 
internal political objectives. He stated further that public opinion polls taken in West 
Germany showed that the Germans were opposed to a German army but would ac-
cept service in a European army. He argued that the Army proposal appeared to be 
for the rearmament of a German national army, thus indicating that the views of the 
Department of State and the Army were far apart. 
Byroade then presented the outline of an idea he was working on regarding a 
European Army.
81
 Both Lt. Colonel Mock and Major Miller replied that Byroade’s 
plan was nothing more than the present Western Union organization expanded to in-
clude the U.S. and Western Germany. They also indicated that it was unrealistic to 
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continue both NATO and the Western Union with their complicated structures and 
the great amounts of equipment being provided to both by the U.S. under MDAP, 
and then add yet a third and separate European Army, also in need of equipment 
from the United States. 
Both sides however agreed that something had to be done to provide a com-
bined command structure and that the division was the largest German unit that 
would be permitted under a rearmament program. The conference concluded with 
Byroade speaking about the security problem and the psychological nature of the 
problem. If it were leaked that the U.S. was contemplating the use of German man-
power, he stated, it would confirm to the Germans that the U.S. considered them as 
“cannon fodder.” Additionally, a leak of plans to supply Germany might discourage 
French participation in NATO. Lastly, he believed that the first step of his plan re-
quired foreign minister level talks on the political aspects and if agreement was 
reached, he felt the French should take the lead. 
After the two G-3 representatives reported to Bolte on their meeting with By-
roade, Bolte drafted a memo to Gruenther on 10 August briefly summarizing the 
meeting and the State Department’s insistence on Germany’s integration in a Euro-
pean Army. Bolte wrote that Byroade had informed the G-3 representatives that this 
position had been endorsed by Ambassadors Bruce (in Paris), Douglas (in London), 
and of course, High Commissioner McCloy. Bolte stated that, in his opinion, the De-
partment of State’s proposal would “reduce the military sovereignty status of the Eu-
ropean countries to the level of Germany,” while it was G-3’s intention to “raise 




into NATO and Western Union arrangements.” Nationalism, which the Department 
of State appeared to fear, was the foundation of the defense efforts of the Western 
Union and NATO. Bolte’s memo then recommended that the JCS forward its views 
on German rearmament to the Secretary of Defense, indicating that revisions to JCS 
2124/11 were being forwarded separately, and that Gruenther brief the JCS on the 
elements of Byroade’s proposal, which was attached to the memo.
82
 
That same day, Schuyler met with Byroade and his assistant, Colonel Ger-
hardt to discuss German rearmament and the differences between the positions of the 
Departments of State and Defense.
83
 According to the memo written of this meeting, 
Schuyler explained to Byroade how NATO worked and planned, and that Byroade’s 
idea of having one American commander in charge of both field forces and economic 
issues was inappropriate. Schuyler explained a number of other issues that, ultimate-
ly, caused Byroade to change his mind and even to agree that German forces could, 
in fact, be integrated into NATO providing an American was made commander of 
these NATO forces. 
Byroade then showed Schuyler a memorandum for record from the Secretary 
of Defense indicating that the President had given his general approval to the idea  of 
German military units in some form of Army for the defense of Western Europe and 
that the Secretary of State would be presenting a paper to the NSC on that subject. 
Byroade finished by saying that he would be drafting that paper but that he would 
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coordinate fully with G-3. Nonetheless, he specifically stated that the paper would 
stipulate that any German units created would be integrated into a European force 
which would have an American commander.  
It appears that the above mentioned staff study, the JCS’s repeated position 
given in NSC 71, and continued Army insistence that West Germany had to be armed 
and integrated into NATO through a program of controlled armament supervised by 
NATO, convinced Secretary of Defense Johnson. On 14 August, he concluded that 
due to “present developments in the international situation” the rearming of Germany 
was necessary to the defense of Western Europe.
84
 Johnson’s position undoubtedly 
led to the revisions to JCS 2124/11 and the wording inextricably linking the security 
of the United States with that of Western Europe that became the Defense Depart-
ment’s response to the Department of State’s 16 August paper on es tablishing a Eu-
ropean Defense Force 
This paper on the establishment of a European Defense Force, sent by Under-
secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews to the Secretary of Defense, stated that it 
was the desire of the Department of State to reach an early agreement on the subject 
of the paper in order to present it to the President by the beginning of the following 
week due to the upcoming September meeting between Acheson and the Foreign 
Ministers of Great Britain and France.
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The Department of State paper began with a long “Estimate of the Situation,” 
which described the inability of Western Europe to defend itself and the failure of 
United Nations forces, including U.S. forces, to staunch the North Korean aggres-
sion. This had caused the West Europeans to “contemplate their own fate” and, de-
spite trust in an eventually mobilized America, fall hopeless and despondent at the 
thought of another occupation. It then recognized that the need for some form of 
German contribution to the defense of Western Europe was apparent but that the De-
partment of State still strongly opposed the creation of German national forces, a 
view supported by the U.S. Ambassadors in Western Europe and by France “who is 
assuming more and more the position of leadership on the Continent.”  
The paper continued that if the U.S. was willing “to accept the responsibility 
of full participation in the European defense effort….[that the U.S.] believed cond i-
tions may now be favorable …for creating a really effective European Defense Force 
which could assimilate a direct contribution by Germany in a manner acceptable to 
all concerned.” It then stated what Bolte had earlier stated to Gruenther, i.e., “This 
involves in practice the voluntary surrender of a degree of sovereignty in the most 
vital elements of sovereignty, i.e., the security field.” The State Department paper 
then made the assumption that given an international commander with “real authori-
ty,” the European nations would accept this and that this surrender of sovereignty 
would be a further driving force toward further European unification. 
The Department of State’s paper went on to describe the basic elements in-
volved in forming a European Defense Force, i.e., Government direction, Command 




and supply, individual national security organizations, except that Germany would 
have no General Staff but there would be a federal ministry to organize the recrui t-
ment of German national units and act as a service and procurement agency.   
The paper concluded that the U.S. should accept this force, that a Chief of 
Staff for Western Europe should be appointed to prepare for the advent of an eventu-
al Supreme Commander, much like the COSSAC organization of World War II. It 
further recommended the centralized direction of procurement and production, that 
the Supreme Commander be an American, and that this matter should be discussed as 
a matter of urgency with the European nations concerned. 
JCS’s response was to recommend that its memo, previously included in JCS 
2124/11, but with some minor revisions be submitted to the Secretary of Defense. 
The key revision, one that clearly stated the Defense Department’s position was the 
change to paragraph 8, which now read: 
It is realized that the Western Allies have taken 
and are taking steps toward the re-admission of Germa-
ny as a member of Western society. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff would urge, however, that the United States insist 
upon participation of Western Germany in the North At-
lantic Treaty arrangements. This participation is a logi-
cal and necessary step in the implementation of German 
rearmament and the establishment of German forces as a 
factor in NATO planning. The integration of German 
forces into NATO would contribute materially to the ul-
timate success of the political and economic measures 
being undertaken to join Western Germany firmly with 
the West. Furthermore, this indication that Western 
Germany was being accepted as an integral and coequal 
member of the Western community should generate in 
the German people an instinctive will to fight in the de-
fense of that community.
86
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It should be noted that in recommending the early rearmament of Germany in 
JCS 2124/11, the JCS was unequivocal in stating that “[t]he question at this time is 
not one of whether we should risk the success of our political objectives vis-à-vis 
Western Germany, but rather whether or not we can afford to jeopardize the security 
of the United States and of Western Europe by not utilizing all of the forces that can 
be made available to us.”
87
 
JCS Response to President Truman’s Letter 
 
As related in Chapter 3, on 26 August, President Truman sent each Secretary a 
letter that contained eight key questions for which he requested that both departments 
work together in developing recommendations for his decision regarding German rearm-
ament. On 28 August, G-3 responded to the Army Chief of Staff with general answers to 
be used as a basis for discussion. G-3, however, suggested that final answers be deferred 
until the JSSC had completed its study of the questions. Briefly, a synopsis of G-3’s gen-
eral answers were to:  
1. Agree to the principal of committing additional U.S. forces to the de-
fense of Europe but no valid capability existed to do so until June 
1951. 
2. Strongly recommend German participation in the defense of Europe 
but the State Department’s concept of a unified European Defense 
Force is unrealistic. The only practical method to defend Western Eu-
rope is to strengthen NATO and integrate Germany therein.  
3. Favor a Supreme Commander, but only in time of war. A COSSAC 
type headquarters is all that is needed now. 
4. Favor a Combined Chief of Staff organization. See answer 3.  
5. Not comment on supporting a European War Production Board. It is a 
question for the Munitions Board to answer. 
6. Favor full U.S. participation in European defense organs with and 
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American as head of COSSAC and an eventual U.S. Supreme Com-
mander in time of war. 
7. Favor transforming the Standing Group into a Combined Chiefs of 
Staff organization. 
8. Invigorate NATO, in favor of the immediate integration of Germany 




On 1 September, the JSPC drafted a memo for the Secretary of Defense in 
which it acknowledged that the initial response to the President’s questions was only 
an outline position for the Defense Department to adopt.
89
 It then offered comments 
to the “Conclusions” of the Department of State’s paper to “fill out the outline.” In 
addition to the general answers provided to the President’s questions, which were 
expanded, the memo stated emphatically that the U.S. should not accept the Europe-
an Defense Force concept and repeated that this concept reduced the military sover-
eignty of the European nations to Germany’s level while JCS proposed to raise Ger-
many’s status to that of the other West European countries. It further reiterated that 
the Department of Defense believed, contrary to the Department of State, that the 
controlled rearmament of Germany under NATO would not bring about the creation 
of a German Defense Ministry, a General Staff+0, or a war industry that would ter-
rorize Europe. 
In an Appendix to the memo, the JSPC laid out a plan for the development of 
what it termed German Security Forces. It opened by stating that “[t]he active and 
effective integration of the people of Western Germany into the defense of Western 
                                                     
88
 Memorandum for the chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Identical Letters from the President to the Sec-
retaries of State and Defense, on the U.S. Position with Respect to the Defense of Europe and the Nature of 
the Contribution by Germany to this Defense. (SM 2012-50), 28 August 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, 
General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 22, 091-Germany, NARA. 
 
89
 JCS 2124/18, 1 September 1950, RG 319, Army - Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 21, 





Europe would add materially to the assurance that Europe can be held against a So-
viet invasion.” It repeated again the U.S. could not afford to jeopardize its security 
and that of Western Europe by not utilizing all of the forces that could be made 
available. Furthermore, it reiterated the U.S. position that NATO was “the appropr i-
ate framework for promoting the integrated defense of the North Atlantic Treaty a r-
ea,” and that the U.S. should participate fully in all of NATO’s defense agencies. 
The Appendix continued that at the appropriate time, there should be a NATO Su-
preme Commander; that the Military Production and Supply Board should be 
strengthened; and that the U.S. was prepared to accept responsibility for its chair-
manship. Most prophetically, it also stated that a strengthened NATO made a sepa-
rate Western Union organization superfluous and that it should be absorbed into 
NATO at an appropriate time. 
On 2 September, a page was added to the Appendix that outlined the program 
for West German Security Forces. In it, it recommended that U.S. and Allied policy 
regarding Western Germany be changed, stating that it would provide the following: 
“(a) The immediate provision of adequate security forces for Western Germany, in-
cluding police forces adequate to counter the threat from the East German indigenous 
forces; and, (b) The initial steps toward entry of Germany into NATO at the earliest 
practicable time.” It then allowed for the creation of a German training command 
under a German officer, possibly titled “Inspector General, German Security Forces,” 
and recommended the initial organization of two to four infantry divisions, subse-
quently growing to a total of ten to fifteen. It specified that weapons and supplies 




equipment would come from the U.S. Military Assistance Program. 
Lastly, the addendum outlined controls to be placed on the German forces, to 
wit: no Air Force or Navy; German forces in being in Germany would be proportion-
ally smaller than French forces in being in France; the largest German unit would be 
the division which, following training, would be allocated to each of the Allied forc-
es in Germany; German industry would produce only light transportation and equip-
ment; heavy equipment, such as tanks and heavy weapons would come from other 
sources; the highest rank for German commanders would be at the division level; and 
lastly, there would be no German General Staff. 
Following discussions in the Joint Staff and the individual service staffs, the 
Chief of Naval Operations recommended that two significant changes be made to the 
Appendix. Both changes dealt with the force size and composition, the first allowing 
West Germany to have a tactical Air Force and limited naval forces such as those re-
quired for harbor defense and coastal patrol activities. The second recommended that 
once trained, German divisions would be deployed as directed by the NATO Stand-
ing Group and that advanced training would be accomplished under appropriate Al-
lied Force Commanders.
90
 As will be seen in chapter 5, these recommendations were 
approved. 
Thus from the earliest days of the Cold War, the Department of Defense, 
mindful of U.S. policies that were meant to keep Germany disarmed, recognized ear-
ly the need to join forces with the U.S.’s West European allies to establish a line of 
defense in western Europe but also the impossibility of doing so without West Ger-
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man participation. In particular, it recognized and valued the additional combat pow-
er German troops and combat experience would bring to the defense of Western Eu-
rope. To that end, the various Department of Defense organs spent a great deal of 
time and effort in their attempts to provide the President with the best military advice 
possible within the constraints imposed upon them. In doing so, they never wavered 
in their belief that a national German army in NATO was the best solution to the 







Chapter 5: From EDF to EDC to NATO: The Fight to Arm 





Acheson’s presentation of the “Single Package” on 12 September 1950 initiated a 
chain of events that led to the French-inspired Pleven Plan/European Defense Communi-
ty (EDC) concept ostensibly designed to integrate West Germany into a European de-
fense force. But by allowing the French to take the lead, the U.S. became an onlooker, 
unable to direct the course of the initiative it had created. Over the next four years, the 
EDC concept became U.S. policy. The Department of Defense attempted to support it but 
never abandoned its advocacy of West Germany in NATO. The Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations, however, clung to EDC as the only way to integrate a West German 
military contribution to the defense of Europe. 
The final joint response to President Truman’s eight questions was not signed by 
Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson until 8 September. It was forwarded to the 
President that same day.
1
 As part of the answer to the first question, whether the U.S. was 
prepared to send additional forces to Europe, Johnson recommended that additional 
troops should be committed at the earliest possible date and indicated that the overall 
strength of U.S. forces in Europe should be “about 4 infantry divisions and the equivalent 
of 1½ armored divisions, 8 tactical air groups, and appropriate naval forces….”
2
 The an-
swer continued, however, that “The U.S. should make it clear that it is now squarely up to 
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the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty to provide the balance of the forces required 
for the initial defense.” The following day, President Truman made public his decision to 
reinforce Europe based on the “degree to which our friends match our actions.” Our 
plans,” the President continued, “are based on the sincere expectation that our efforts will 
be met with similar action on their part.”
3
 
Acheson relates in his memoirs that the Departments of State and Defense debat-
ed the rearmament issue for two weeks before the compromise was reached, which he 
then carried to the Tripartite Meeting in New York. This compromise, also known as the 
‘Single Package,’ was intended to be offered to the Allies on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis 
and contained several key elements. In addition to the increase in U.S. forces in Europe, 
it offered U.S. participation along with the United Kingdom and all the other NATO ar-
mies in a combined European defense force, an international staff, and a ‘Supreme 
Commander.’ The offer was contingent on the Allies boosting the capabilities (and size) 
of their forces and accepting the inclusion of German contingents that would be added at 
division level but without a German General Staff.
4
 
The September Tripartite meeting of the “big three,” Acheson, Schuman, and 
Bevin, in which the U.S. position on the rearmament of West Germany was presented, 
and the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting that followed have been examined by a num-
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ber of scholars. So too have the negotiations over the French alternative, the Pleven Plan, 
and its successor, the European Defense Community.
5
 Thus, while it is not my intent to 
repeat what has already been so well covered, I will argue that the “Single Package,” 
dubbed “the bomb at the Waldorf” by the French, was no “bomb” at all, neither was it a 
surprise as Schuman claimed. If anything, it was most likely a misunderstanding by both 
Schuman and Bevin as the issue of arming West Germany was not on the Meeting Agen-
da. While this may have added to the misunderstanding, both Foreign Ministers had been 
informed beforehand of Acheson’s thoughts.
6
  
Ten days earlier, on 2 September, Acheson had sent Ambassadors Bruce in Paris 
and Douglas in London an ‘Eyes Only’ cable instructing them to “call urgently on” the 
French and British Foreign Ministers and tell them that the U.S. Government had been 
closely following European suggestions to create a unified European Defense Force and 
that if created, there would have to be a provision to establish a Supreme Commander. 
“In this  event,” Acheson wrote, “ it should be necessary to integrate into such a force 
German units in a controlled status without thereby creating a German National Army.” 
Acheson wrote further that the U.S. Government felt that for this to be effective, addi-
tional U.S. troops might be required. He added that the U.S. Government felt these sug-
gestions were important and that he proposed to raise them at the September Tripartite. 
Furthermore, he specifically asked that Schuman and Bevin be told that U.S. participation 
in the defense of Europe would involve greater commitments than the U.S. has previous-
                                                     
5
 Among those who have covered these meetings and the proceedings of the Pleven Plan and EDC are: 
Lord Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years,1949-1954, publisher and date unknown, McGeehan, Op. cit., 
Large, Op. cit., Schwartz, Op. cit., McAllister, Op. cit., Birtle,  Op. cit., Christopher Gehrz, Op. cit., to 
name just a few.  
 
6




ly been willing to consider and that such commitments would be dependent on Europeans 
willingness to make greater efforts to increase their forces in being.
7
 
 In addition, on 6 September, Bevin sent Acheson a personal message, the sub-
stance of which was also communicated to French Prime Minster René Pleven, in which 
the British Chiefs of Staff concluded that “…we cannot build up the necessary strength to 
assure the defence of the territories of N.A.T. [North Atlantic Treaty] Powers without the 
participation of Germany.”
8
 Bevin wrote further that His Majesty’s Government was not 
prepared to agree to the re-creation of a German Army although the incorporation of 
German contingents in the Western defense forces, should the U.S. or France wish to dis-
cuss it, would not be excluded. He believed, however, that the German government 
would find it impossible to remilitarize on the scale recommended by the Chiefs of Staff 
and thus felt it most important to  first create the Federal Police Force that Chancellor 
Adenauer had asked for on 17 August, i.e., 150,000 men. 
Bevin’s message also included a number of pro’s and con’s, including the state-
ment that the Germans would have “a regrettable, if understandable, malicious satisfac-
tion that the western Allies who have so effectively disarmed Germany should now stand 
in need of German assistance.” He summed up his thoughts by stating that the Alliance is 
caught up in a vicious circle. “The French,” he wrote, “will not agree to any form of 
German rearmament until France is strong. But France will not make the effort to be 
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strong unless there is a real prospect of assuring Western defence, which in turn cannot 
be done without a measure of German rearmament.” 
There is also evidence that Acheson believed in advance that his proposal would 
be taken positively because on 8 September, four days before the Foreign Ministers met, 
the State Department drafted the following optimistic communiqué: 
…the Ministers are fully aware of the natural desire 
of the German people to participate in the defense of their 
homeland in case of necessity. The Ministers have accord-
ingly discussed the association of Germany in an improved 
organization for European defense, in which the United 
States would play a full role. This matter will continue to 
be studied and will be the subject of discussions with the 
Governments of the German Federal Republic … as well as 
the other free European governments. The German people 
can be assured that they will be permitted to join in the de-
fense of Germany as part of the common defense of the 




The September 1950 Tripartite Meeting 
 
The minutes of the opening meeting on 12 September indicate only that Acheson 
stated it was unreasonable to defend all of Germany without getting assistance from the 
Germans; that the U.S. preferred to see German units serve in a European defense force 
rather than create a German police force. No concept of what that European defense force 
should look like, as so painfully worked out by both McCloy and Byroade, was presented 
- only the U.S. preference that there be one. Of interest also is the fact that Schuman ap-
peared to agree, stating that it would be illogical to defend Western Europe, including 
Germany, without contributions from Germany. His opposition, however, initially 
stemmed from his belief that due to the scarce resources available for defense, they need-
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ed to first be distributed to the NATO countries and that when a “minimum level” was  
reached, when the combined staff and Supreme Commander had been created, only then 
might France be in a position to consider the German matter. While it was expected that 
France would be difficult, it was not expected that France would refuse to even consider 
German rearmament “in principle,” which it did. This setback and subsequent attempts 
by the new Secretary of Defense, George Marshall to “relax” the U.S. proposal did not sit 
well with the JCS.
10
 
Bevin’s response was to voice concern that such a plan would put the Germans in 
a “bargaining position,” which would make the situation very difficult. He believed the 
Germans would not go along and thought it better to give the Germans what they asked 
rather than asking them for something. Bevin again voiced his fear of a German resur-
gence but allowed that the UK would examine the matter with the best people available.
11
 
Acheson sent cables to the President on a daily basis during the Tripartite meet-
ing. Following the first day’s afternoon session he met both privately and separately with 
both Bevin and Schuman but each discussion was primarily about the President’s state-
ment that the U.S. would participate in creating forces in Europe for its defense, unity of 
command, and financial and supply matters. Both Bevin and Schuman agreed to 
strengthen West Germany’s police, but Schuman insisted that the police could not be al-
lowed to become a German Army. The result of that meeting was to agree to ask the High 
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 Minutes of the Tripartite Meeting, September 12, 1950,  (Dean Acheson), Memos of Conversation (Sept. 





Commissioners to formulate views on the integration of German contingents in a Europe-
an force and to instruct the NATO Defense Ministers to submit an agreed medium term 




On the morning of 14 September, Acheson confessed to President Truman that he 
felt that Bevin and Schuman “do not seem to have yet grasped [the proposal’s] full signif-
icance and implications.” He mentioned that while Bevin did not support the U.S. posi-
tion on using German forces, he did not oppose it. Schuman on the other hand, “ex-
pressed the very strong and firm opposition of his government which would provide for 
the recreation of purely German units.” Acheson indicated the three would again meet 
privately in an attempt to find some formula that the French could accept.
13
 
The minutes of the 14
th
, however, repeat much of earlier meetings, i.e., the need 
for German forces to enable Western Europe to be defended as far east as possible, Bev-
in’s response that he could not yet give an answer and Schuman’s reply that is was a 
question of manpower versus materiel, and that adding German manpower would give 
the Russians cause to go to war. Acheson countered that it would take time to increase 
production and even longer for Germany to even begin to draft soldiers. He stated further 
that Russia was currently deterred by the U.S. atomic arsenal but that would not always 
be the case…and that was where the danger lay, not by the creation of German forces. 
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Acheson then asked Schuman and Bevin for a decision on German participation but the 
decision, he stated, would not have to be put into effect for some time.  
Bevin again responded that he wanted to give an answer but could not and even 
though McCloy stated that Adenauer had asked that German forces participate, Schuman 
again replied that the French public opinion would not accept a rearmed Germany until 
France was armed. He did say, however, that he had asked his government for a “condi-
tional decision” and expected an answer by 18 September.
14
  
On 15 September, Acheson wrote that the previous two days had “persistently 
failed to come to grips with the central problem of the defense of Europe.” Acheson 
wrote that he had pointed out in a private meeting with Bevin and Schuman and the three 
High Commissioners, that the President had brought about “a complete revolution in 
American foreign policy” and the steps to put substantial U.S. forces in Europe and place 
them in an integrated force, to agree to a command structure, etc., were “unprecedented 
steps in U.S. history.” He subsequently stated that it was clear that the British and French 
were prepared to accept what the U.S. offered but not prepared to accept what the U.S. 
asked - they “flatly refused in any way the question of German participation.”
15
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That same day, Acheson addressed the fifth session of the NATO Foreign Minis-
ters meeting and spoke quite eloquently and specifically about what the U.S. desired. He 
immediately put aside the question of German police, saying that while necessary in 
whatever form it might take, it was an internal security issue and not the kind of force 
that would oppose the Bereitschaften from East Germany or a Soviet invasion. He then 
addressed the German military issue stating, again quite unequivocally, that he did not 
mean a German national army. German units, he said, would be incorporated in and un-
der the command of the force for the defense of Europe. He said that he hoped the unit 
size would be kept quite low so that they could be combined with English, French or Ca-
nadian units, and the ordnance should be produced outside Germany to preclude any ca-
pacity for independent action. Furthermore, he explained, German unit would be 
equipped in such a manner that its equipment would be of little use unless it remained 
part of the European defense force. 
Acheson then addressed the time factor, emphasizing the fact that Germany had 
no governmental structure or legal basis at the present to deal with the military question. 
By the time necessary changes to ,West Germany’s constitution the Basic Law, were 
made, a list of men of military age created, train them, etc., at least two years would have 
passed. In order to develop Western European strength in time, it would be necessary to 
act soon. He also countered arguments that creating German units would interfere with 
equipping members of NATO, indicating that it would take 18 months to two years to 
produce that equipment in volume and that there would be no diversion of equipment. 
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Lastly, he indicated that NATO should not fear provoking Russia as a reason not to gain 
strength because staying weak is what might bring on an attack.
16
 
The following day, 16 September, a member of the Army staff wrote Admiral 
Robbins, the U.S. military advisor to Acheson, that General Schuyler believed the Joint 
Staff felt quite strongly that “we,” i.e., the Army, should stand for acceptance of the full 
U.S. concept, particularly the acceptance of German participation. The Army felt a lim-
ited delay of a week, should an impasse among the Foreign Ministers be reached, was 
acceptable before they reconsidered the issue. They also saw a month’s delay acceptable 
but then desired a showdown at the Defense Ministers meeting in October. The Army 
was willing to accept an even greater delay but insistent that German integration take 
place and that it not be deferred too long.
17
 
While the three foreign ministers and the remainder of the NATO foreign and de-
fense ministers discussed the pros and cons of arming West Germany, the Defense De-
partment continued to move forward in the expectation that West Germany would, in 
fact, be armed. On 19 September, for example, General Bolte cabled General Handy that 
“in view of the imminence of possible decision by Foreign Ministers and North Atlantic 
Council authorizing creation of a West German security force, believe we should acceler-
ate planning for such forces.”
18
 Two days later, on 21 September, General Bradley sent 
two memos to Marshall. The first indicated that the JCSs recognized it would take time 
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before German divisions could be formed but that the ultimate objective should be kept in 
mind during negotiations. Bradley also recommended that a program leading to some se-
curity forces in Germany be started immediately. The second memo stated in part that 
“our eventual objective must be, without creating a German national army, to obtain a 
German contribution to a European defense force equivalent to about 10-15 divisions, 
with certain safeguards, to including no aviation, limitations on armament production, 
and no national German General Staff.”
19
  
The following day, Byroade sent a memo to Spofford at NATO, telling him that 
the U.S. should take the position that the U.S. plan already contained safeguards to pre-
vent the creation of an independent German force that could be misused by the German 
Government. However, within those safeguards, Byroade continued, Germany had to be 
incorporated in a way that gave it substantial equality.
20
  
Byroade’s memo contained additional safeguards that he stated had not been pre-
viously discussed, e.g., a limit on the number of German divisions. U.S. thinking, he said, 
was that the German contribution should not exceed one-fifth the total force or about 12-
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15 divisions, which is less than the numbers of French divisions in being. Additionally, to 
facilitate additional safeguards, Byroade suggested that Germany should: 
a. be restricted to a ground force role without either air or naval forces, or 
offensive equipment, even in “the long distant future;” 
b. utilize only the best of the present German senior officers and begin train-
ing a new officer corps over which the Allies could retain significant in-
fluence as soon as possible; 
c. allow a required Federal Ministry to perform necessary administrative and 
logistical functions, normally performed by G-1 (personnel) and G-4 (lo-
gistics - less major items) staffs, but very little G-2 (intelligence) and no 
G-3 (operations) functions; and 
d.  continue to prohibit and restrict industries in Germany and use the Mili-
tary Security Board to enforce certain demilitarization controls, thus 
maintaining those fundamental controls that would prevent future German 
aggression. 
 
On 23 September, Ambassador Bruce in Paris, sent a cable to Acheson suggesting 
that Acheson approach both Schuman and French Defense Minister Jules Moch and sug-
gest that Schuman should offer a French suggestion as to how to best utilize German 
troops similar to the French plan regarding the pooling of European coal and steel. Bruce 
wrote further that Acheson should tell both French ministers that leadership in this mat-
ter should come from France.
21
 This suggestion, I believe, led to the Pleven Plan, 
France’s plan for a European Defense Force, named after Prime Minster Plevin and argu-
ably designed to limit severely the manner and degree of Germany’s contribution. 
On 26 September, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) issued the final communiqué 
of the September meeting, which was intentionally vague and reflected the impasse 
brought about by French fear and intransigence. The communiqué read: 
 The utilization of German manpower and resources 
was discussed in the light of views recently expressed by 
democratic leaders in Germany and elsewhere. The Council 
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was in agreement that Germany should be enabled to con-
tribute to the build-up of the defense of Western Europe 
and, noting that the occupying powers were studying the 
matter, requested the Defense Committee to make recom-
mendations at the earliest possible date as to the methods 





Two days later, in a separate and unrelated twist, Bolte received a memo from his 
G-3 Plans Division informing him that none of the available Fiscal Year 1951 Mutual 
Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) funds allocated for equipment could be used to 
fund a possible rearming of Germany.
23
 
As a result of the impasse in the NAC, Marshall decided to have the Defense De-
partment immediately begin drafting a unilateral U.S. proposal on Germany, using the 
joint State-Defense position of 8 September, to present to the NATO Defense Committee 
during its October meeting.
24
 One week later, Byroade wrote Acheson that he had heard 
from Paul Nitze that Marshall was not happy with the joint paper. Marshall, according to 
Byroade, felt the paper should “deal with a series of steps which would automatically 
lead to the desired end result instead of defining the end result as an objective to be 
agreed.” Byroade believed that the approach taken in the paper was correct and that Mar-
shall’s objections indicated he wanted a different approach. 
In the view of the Bureau of German Affairs, according to Byroade, the key issue 
before the NATO Defense Ministers as regards Germany, was “to record and reach 
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agreement to the principles on which the French failed to agree to in New York,” i.e., to 
include German units in a European Defense Force. In other words, it was of little value 
to move slowly on Germany, as Marshall wanted, i.e., moving through the steps to first 
get approval for German companies, then battalions, then regiments, and finally divi-
sions, if there was no agreement in principle on allowing Germany participation to begin 
with. Byroade concluded that all that was needed from the NATO Defense Ministers was 
agreement on a list of safeguards they considered appropriate.
25
 As a possible result of 
this letter, Acheson spoke with Robert A. Lovett, now Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 
following day and noted that “Lovett agreed that the U.S. should not back off its position 
but keep the heat on France. If France refuses, it should be up to them to come up with a 
new proposal. The U.S. should insist on a solution to the German participation question 
as it is essential to the whole plan.”
26
  
At about the same time, several U.S. Senators were also voicing their thoughts re-
garding German participation in the defense of Europe. On 4 October, Senator Willis 
Smith (D-NC) visited Major General Kohler, Director, Joint American Military Advising 
Group, Europe, and told him that he considered arming Germany essential.
27
 A few 
weeks earlier, on 22 September, Senator Tom Connally (D-TX), Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, spoke in the Senate regarding Germany and said: 
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We must acknowledge the right and indeed the duty 
of the Germans to contribute not only to their own defense 
but to the defense of Western Europe as well. It is time that 
provision is made for the inclusion of German units in the 
integrated European army toward which we are working. 
Now I understand fully and sympathize thoroughly 
with the natural reaction of the French people to anything 
that looks like German rearmament. The sound of Nazi 
hobnails goose stepping down the boulevards of Paris is too 
fresh in their memory for them to have any other reaction. 
But they must be convinced that what is sought does not 
involve the creation of a German army. What is sought is 
the creation of a European army. What is sought is the use 
of German troop units in an integrated European force un-
der a supreme allied commander. With this sort of ar-
rangement French people will have an iron-clad guaranty 
that a German army, under a German general staff, will 




On 11 October, a high-level meeting between State and Defense officials was 
held that included Acheson, Marshall, Lovett, Ambassador Bruce, as well as members of 
the Office of European Affairs and the JCS. During this meeting, Acheson provided Mar-
shall with a copy of a cable sent by McCloy that contained a number of recommendations 
on how to proceed vis-à-vis the French on the issue of German rearmament. Acheson 
then stated that there was merit to allowing the French to take the leadership in Europe-
an unity, which included military unity. He also suggested that Marshall stand firm and 
make no concessions to the French regarding German units in the European Defense 
Force. He also gave Marshall a copy of a message Bevin had sent to Schuman that sup-
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Over the next several days, both Handy and the Joint Staff drafted papers that 
contained recommendations and proposals regarding the organization, training and 
equipping of German forces. In a three part cable to General Collins, Handy underscored 
the inability of his command to support logistically any police, civil defense or labor ser-
vice programs with his resources. He then referred to a September 1950 EUCOM study 
on the organization of the West German army and outlined his command’s position on it. 
Essentially, he felt that responsibility for the creation of the army should be given to the 
Bonn government and that its training and operational control be the responsibility of the 
Supreme Command. He further recommended that equipment for German units be fur-
nished and maintained by the German Government, augmented as necessary from other 
sources. Lastly, he recommended the German contingent be initially composed of 
250,000 men organized into 10 divisions, including supporting troops and tactical avia-
tion. Of these 10 divisions, 3 Infantry Divisions should be placed in the British Zone, 3 
Infantry Divisions in the French Zone, and 2 Infantry and 2 Armored Divisions in the 
American Zone. These units would be organized similar to U.S. divisions, have the nec-
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essary lines of communication support to give them sustained combat capability, and be 
provided with major equipment items by Allied nations.
30
 
The EUCOM study was followed by a report from the JSPC for use by the Secre-
tary of Defense at the upcoming NATO Defense Ministers meeting. Among the report’s 
enclosures was a memo for the Secretary of Defense that contained perhaps what may 
have been the first threat by the United States to reexamine its options should agreement 
on German participation not happen. Most significantly, paragraph 4.f. stated that if the 
NATO Defense and Military Committees could not come to agreement on the “immedi-
ate initiation of the organization of German military units within the integrated force for 
the defense of Western Europe…the U.S. course of action for the conduct of a war 
against the USSR…should be reexamined.”
31
 
French Counter-proposal: the Pleven Plan 
On 24 October, French Prime Minister Pleven submitted a plan for “the creation 
of a European army linked to the political institutions of a united Europe.”
32
 It is obvious 
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from a memo Bradley wrote to Marshall that he, Bradley, was somewhat confused as to 
what the French intended. Bradley pointed out that regarding the size of units, the French 
definition, depending on who one spoke with, was contradictory.
33
 In one instance they 
spoke of divisions but in another, suggested they would not consent to German divi-
sions.
34
 The proposal also specified that the Supreme Commander would be placed under 
the European Minister of Defense and not NATO and furthermore, the European Minister 
of Defense would receive guidance from a council composed of ministers from the par-
ticipating countries and thus act as an intermediary between the European community and 
NATO. The bottom line, Bradley wrote, was that the position of European Minster of De-
fense cut across almost all NATO lines and would make NATO inoperable.
35
  
Defense Minister Moch formally presented the French plan to the NATO Defense 
Committee the following day, 28 October
36
 The ‘Pleven Plan’ took Acheson and the 
State Department by surprise. They had expected a Schuman Plan-like proposal, similar 
to the one created for the European Coal and Steel community, but for military collabora-
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tion. Instead, what they saw was a plan that would rearm the Germans without rearming 
Germany and turn German soldiers into cannon fodder.
37
 
The French refused to discuss any proposal other than theirs. The gap between the 
French and the U.S. positions was such that the Defense Committee was left with no oth-
er option than to submit the German question to both the Military Committee and the 
Council of Deputies to study the issue and report back. At the Defense Committee meet-
ing on 31 October, Marshall made it clear that no decision could be made on the next two 
agenda items - the creation of an integrated force in Europe and the establishment of a 
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and the reorganization of 
NATO - without first agreeing to the scale and nature of German participation. The threat 
of withdrawing the U.S. contribution caused the ministers to agree to a recess to allow the 
French to reexamine the issue.
38
  
On 8 November, Chancellor Adenauer addressed the Bundestag during a foreign 
policy debate and made the following declaration regarding the French plan: 
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The Federal Republic considers the Pleven Plan a 
valuable contribution to the integration of Europe which is 
one of the pre-eminent aims of the Federal Government. 
The Federal Government considers, however, that the pre-
sent international tension requires an earlier solution than 
would be possible through the implementation of the Plev-
en Plan. It is of the opinion that a general settlement might 
come about through negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
These negotiations can only be successful, however, if the 
Soviet Russian threat is faced by a defensive front of West-
ern powers which is at least as strong as that of the Soviet 
Union. The Federal Government is of the opinion that the 
Federal Republic of Germany must be prepared to make an 
appropriate contribution to the building up of this defensive 
front, should such be requested by the western powers in 
order to secure its existence, the freedom of its population, 
and the further existence of western cultural ideals. Prereq-
uisites for such a contribution are Germany’s full equality 
of rights within this defensive front side by side with the 
other participating powers and further, that this defensive 





In mid-November, the Army G-4 (logistics) reported that a decision had been 
reached that for logistical planning purposes, the MDAP stockpile for Austria could be 
considered a source of equipment for early delivery to Germany. In line with the above, 
Bolte cabled Handy, informing him that the JCS had an allocation of $200 Million from 
the FY ’51 supplemental MDAP appropriation for grant aid for West German rearma-
ment and equipment to be stockpiled in the U.S. and EUCOM until the creation of Ger-
man armed forces was approved. These funds would also be used to train a minimum of 
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four West German divisions but that politics would keep German units no larger than 
Regimental Combat Teams (RCT’s).
40
  
At the same time, the State Department was also making its position clearer. State 
Department Summaries of Telegrams, copies of which were sent to President Truman, 
indicated on 10 November that the State Department had informed its missions in the 
North Atlantic Treaty countries that most members of the NATO Defense Committee had 
indicated that the Pleven Plan was militarily unsound, impossible to realize politically, 
and that it failed to meet the problem of rapidly building up a European defense system. 
Also, that the U.S. believed that to find a compromise solution, three criteria had to be 
met: the plan had to be militarily sound, agreed to by all the NATO members and West 
Germany, and capable of immediate implementation.  
A Supreme Commander is Appointed 
On 20 November, the State Department provided guidance to Spofford at NATO, 
regarding the size of German units to be contributed, the need for the early appointment 
of a Supreme Commander, and the timing of steps needed for the creation of a defense 
force. As to the unit size, the Department of State indicated that Spofford was to make 
clear that the minimal acceptable size for German units was the division; however, during 
a transitional period, smaller units could be considered providing it is clear that they be 
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assembled into divisional units for effective use by the Supreme Commander as soon as 
he determined it to be necessary.
41
 
The first week in December saw a flurry of activity at both the Defense and State 
Departments, much of it regarding U.S.-French disagreement on the size of German units 
and whether the U.S. would approve appointment of a Supreme Commander before the 
size issue was settled. A teleconference on this issue took place on 3 December between 
Spofford, members of the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
Department of the Army and the NATO Standing Group. Spofford was able to report that 
as a result of negotiations and a proposal he had made, and to which the French had 
agreed, there was a reasonable chance for U.S.-French agreement that week.
42
 
That same day, 3 December, the Joint Staff was asked for their views on a State 
Department paper stemming from discussions between the President and Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee of Great Britain on the subject of European defense arrangements includ-
ing German participation. The essence of the paper was that the world situation would 
not allow further delay and that the lack of an agreement on German participation was 
resulting in a deteriorating situation in Germany. 
The point was made that if agreement with France could be reached on the partic-
ipation of German units in a European defense, the U.S. could immediately proceed, 
without waiting for German acceptance, with the appointment of a Supreme Commander 
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and the creation of an integrated force for the defense of Europe. The State Department 
paper also indicated that German participation warranted a change in the relationship be-
tween the Allies and the German Government through the relaxation of occupation con-
trols (the State Department felt the British would concur but not the French). Nonethe-
less, the State Department felt that the U.S. should support the French efforts to consoli-
date the continent as a possible solution to both the European defense and the German 
problem. 
The JCS did not object to the State Department paper but they believed there 
should be no new U.S. military commitments “of any nature” made to [Indochina] or Eu-
rope, other than aid until the Korean emergency was resolved. They were also greatly 
concerned about the politico-military solidarity of the NATO countries but believed that 
if the early appointment of a Supreme Commander would improve the situation material-
ly, they would “consider” such an appointment. Lastly, they emphasized that the need for 
the early utilization of Germany’s war potential and for  increased effective forces in be-




A few days later, President Truman met with Prime Minister Attlee. When the 
discussion turned to Western Europe, Marshall was asked to speak. Marshall stated that 
many in Congress felt the U.S. position on European union and rearmament was imprac-
tical and that they wanted assurances that the plan for the defense of Western Europe had 
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a reasonable chance of success. Without such assurance, he maintained, there would be 
no further appropriations for European rearmament. Without French cooperation and a 
real assurance of German build up, Marshall insisted, “we would get nowhere.” Acheson 
interjected that he thought the appointment of a Supreme Commander would help and 
General Bradley underscored the need to assure Congress that both European rearmament 
and the plan to defend Western Europe would be efficient.
44
   
Before that meeting took place, Acheson called Lovett, telling him that there 
would be a “row with the British on the views that we are discussing with the French to 
encourage them to solve the problem.” Acheson then asked Lovett for clarification of the 
JCS position that they would be “prepared to consider [appointment of a Supreme Com-
mander] when the North Atlantic treaty organization reached agreement on German re-
armament” expected by the end of the week. Acheson then said he would take the JCS 
paper to the meeting with Attlee and tell him that if the French agreed, he was authorized 
to agree to the appointment of a Supreme Commander. 
    The following day, 7 December, Bolte wrote Collins that there had been several 
important developments since his last memo. Bolte wrote that the French had indicated 
that NATO should not proceed with the “actual” rearmament of Germany until an at-
tempt has been made to reach a negotiated settlement with the USSR. Bolte also wrote 
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that press reports indicated the French had agreed to the participation of German units of 
RCT size in an integrated force under a Supreme Commander.
45
 
The very next day, Bolte sent another memo to Collins with a summary of a tele-
conference held with Spofford that day. Spofford reported that the French had accepted, 
and the NATO Deputies had approved, the U.S. version of the NATO report, which read: 
“The size of the German formations to be constituted should not under present conditions 
exceed that of a regimental combat team or brigade groups. However, when these regi-
mental combat team or brigade groups are formed and trained, the question of the manner 
in which they should be used must be determined in the light of conditions at the time, 
due weight being given to the views of the Supreme Commander.”
 46
 
The summary also included concerns of the French representative, Hervé Al-
phand, that German RCT’s not be combined together or placed under control of the Ger-
man Government during the interim period. The French feared that German divisions 
could be formed clandestinely or that the RCT’s would be unrestrained under direct 
German Government control. The NATO Deputies agreed that this issue should be re-
ferred to the Military Committee. 
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The NAC met again in Brussels on 18 and 19 December to approve, among other 
things, German participation in the defense of Western Europe and to request the ap-
pointment of a Supreme Commander. Previously, on 15 December, Lovett had called 
Acheson to advise him of a conversation he had held with Eisenhower the day before. 
Among the issues discussed was Eisenhower’s appointment as Supreme Commander, 
which was a foregone conclusion. Eisenhower suggested that instead of offering the ap-
pointment to any particular individual, the Europeans be asked to invite the U.S. Gov-
ernment to select an individual and then ask those governments if that individual was ac-
ceptable.
47
 The NAC did, in fact, make such a request, and at its sixth session on 18 De-
cember it approved a resolution that Eisenhower be appointed Supreme Commander. It 
then sent a recommendation to President Truman that he appoint Eisenhower to the posi-
tion. The President’s formal reply stated, in part, that he was in agreement with the view 
of the NAC that Eisenhower’s “experience and talents make him uniquely qualified to 
assume the important responsibilities of this position.”
48
  
Always in the background, however, was the Soviet threat, its impact on U.S. 
readiness and on German rearmament. In briefing notes prepared for the President at the 
11 December NSC meeting, it was suggested that the President ask Bradley to discuss 
U.S. military position vis-à-vis the USSR and probable development during the initial 
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stages were a general war to occur in the near future. The notes suggested the U.S. should 
not gamble that the USSR was bluffing and that the U.S. should prepare for total war in 
the near future. It could be avoided, however, if the U.S. acted with unity, determination 
and wisdom. The U.S. should do all it could to avoid war with the USSR without sacrific-
ing self-respect or endangering U.S. survival. The U.S. should prepare for full mobiliza-
tion and meet the 1954 defense targets as rapidly as possible. Lastly, in light of the Soviet 
declaration it would not tolerate German rearmament, U.S. efforts to organize and train 
West German units should be done with the greatest of care.
49
 
In the last week of 1950, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued National 
Intelligence Estimate 17 (NIE-17), entitled “Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitariza-
tion of Western Germany.”
50
 In its short, two-page estimate, the CIA indicated that a re-
armament of Western Germany as then contemplated, i.e., creation of defensive forces, 
would not be considered by the USSR as menacing their security. It continued, however, 
that the USSR was unlikely to believe that once started, it would stop short of complete 
remilitarization. The Soviets recognized, however, that a remilitarization program would 
take time and thus, their immediate objective would be to hinder and delay its progress 
and to exploit the disagreements that exist over it within Western Europe to weaken the 
cohesion of the Alliance, prevent its strengthening, and seek to bring about German uni-
fication on Soviet terms. 
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The USSR had already expressed its concern in notes sent to the Western powers 
calling for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers as well as separate notes to the 
British and the French. The NIE also indicated that the Soviets might increase their forces 
in Eastern Germany and their satellites and suggest to all that German remilitarization 
would result in German aggression. The NIE also suggested that if Soviet diplomacy and 
propaganda failed to halt German rearmament, the USSR might adopt more drastic 
measures that could involve the risk of war, e.g., it would justify an increase in Soviet 
forces in East Germany and the satellites. Lastly, the NIE concluded that the Soviets 
would most likely exhaust all practical means of preventing German rearmament and 
suggested that if the USSR became convinced that complete German rearmament, to-
gether with NATO rearmament and political solidarity between West Germany and the 
western powers could not be stopped,  the USSR would seriously consider going to war. 
Despite having reached agreement on German participation in principle, the Plev-
en Plan, which subsequently became the EDC, and despite French insistence on the con-
struction of a European Army complete with its complicated bureaucracy and its multi-
tude of political and legal restrictions, the actual recruitment and building of cadres for 
the FRG’s contribution was placed in limbo.
51
 Neither blandishment from the U.S. nor 
the Truman Administration’s subsequent acceptance of EDC and the European Army 
concept as the only way to put West Germans in uniform moved the French. In addition, 
aside from high level talks with the Germans, the French insisted that until the EDC Trea-
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ty was ratified, there be no official military to military talks with the Germans. The im-
pact of this on U.S. military planning created a number of program delays and problems 
that will be discussed below in Chapter 6. 
At this juncture, it should also be noted that Eisenhower was initially skeptical of 
the EDC - he did not want, he had said, any “reluctant Hessians” in his army.
52
 In June 
1951, however, after a lunch with Jean Monnet that had been arranged by McCloy, Ei-
senhower “embraced” the concept of a “United States of Europe” and gave his support to 
the EDC. One month later, in July, he sent a personal message to both Marshall and 
Acheson in which he said he was 
convinced the time has come when we must all 
press for the earliest implementation of the European Army 
concept. Bruce, McCloy and I are in full agreement that 
implementation of the European Army concept despite the 
many complicated details which will have to be worked 
out, offers the best and earliest possible chance for a solu-
tion to the problem of (a) obtaining the necessary def [sic] 
contribution from West Ger [sic]….” Having become con-
vinced that the establishment of an [sic] European Army 
will be a major constructive step, I now propose to support 
it in every possible way.
53
 
   
And later that month, on 22 July, Eisenhower met with a visiting subcommittee of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at SHAPE and told them: “When I came over 
here I disliked the whole idea of a European Army and I had enough troubles without it. 
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However….I made up my mind to go into the thing with both feet…and I realize that a 
lot of my professional associates are going to think that I am crazy. But…joining Europe 
together is the key to this whole thing.”
54
 
In giving its support to the EDC, the U.S. placed four conditions on the emerging 
organization. They were: 
1. The EDC must create administrative arrangements that would allow it to 
participate in the defense of Europe. 
2. The European Army would be under SACEUR’s command. 
3. The lengthy negotiations establishing EDC and its superstructure would 
not impede the build-up of German units. 
4. EDC’s administrative machinery was not to interfere with NATO.55 
 
This decision, enunciated in NSC 115, put the German rearmament question 
squarely in the context of a broader European policy. As a result, U.S. basic goals re-
mained the same but on a sounder basis. The question, however, was whether the U.S. 
commitment to EDC had put the U.S. in the “hands of the French?”
56
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Building a New German Military 
Discussions between the three Allied High Commissioners and the West German 
Government on constructing the German contribution began in early January 1951. One 
of the first questions asked by Germany was what they were expected to contribute by the 
end of 1951. The Allied High Commission had agreed on 100,000 men as an interim 
measure but the Army’s G-3 Plans division recommended a stronger program and pro-
posed a figure of 195,000. This number was based upon several things: the German de-
sire for equality; to secure the maximum effective German contribution; that sufficient 
equipment from the Austrian MDAP stockpile was available to equip four divisions; and 
that $200 Million from the supplemental FY 51 MDAP funds had been recommended by 
the JCS for the German rearmament program. The memo prepared to justify these num-
bers also contained Allied safeguards, i.e., all German units to be under SHAPE’s con-
trol; total German land formation would not exceed one-fifth of the total of Allied land 
formations; German formations would not exceed RCT size until authorized by NATO; 
and German units would not be developed at the expense of other forces.
57
 
Over and above the safeguards described above, the Joint Report of the NAC 
Deputies and the Military Committee to the NATO Defense Committee, approved on 18 
December 1950, contained yet over a dozen additional militarily significant limitations 
placed on Germany, to include: 
 Limiting its Air Force to the defense of western Germany and the support 
of its ground units,  
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 Limiting German naval units to mine, patrol, and harbor craft only,  
 Prohibiting Germany from contributing complete armored formations,  
 Prohibiting Germany from supervising its own officer recruitment and 
training,  
 Prohibiting German plans, operations or intelligence staffs to function 
above the level of tactical units, 
 Maintaining prohibitions and limitations on German industry, thus prohib-
iting the production of heavy military equipment, military aircraft, and 
naval vessels other than minor defensive craft, 
 Prohibiting the production of atomic, biological or chemical weapons, and 
the possession of long-range missiles, 
 Limiting research and development to requirements laid down by the Mil-




One month later, on 18 January 1951, McCloy responded to the German size rec-
ommendations asking an additional set of questions, among which were:  
 What was total strength of the German forces to be created by end 1952?  
 Whether the allies could train 15 percent of the German contribution with 
the equipment available within 3 months beginning 15 Sep 51? 
 What proportion of the 15 percent could be trained by British, French or 
U.S. forces? (Germany, however, preferred that the U.S. train its nuclei). 
 Would equipment for 50 percent of the German force contribution be 
available by the end 1951 and the remainder by 1 April 1952?  
 Which U.S. schools were available to train selected Germans?59 
 
The JCS response limited itself to providing only a recommendation on the end 
1952 strength of German forces, justifying its limited response to the fact that the military 
aspects of German participation was up to NATO in accordance with the Medium Term 
                                                     
58
 The limitations were part of NATO Document C6-D/1, December 13, 1950, and were sent in a memo to 
Mr. Bromley Smith at State by Ridgeway B. Knight, and Advisor to Ambassador Bruce on 26 January 
1951. See Memorandum for Mr. Bromley Smith, Negative limitations concerning German participation in 
the NATO defense structure for Western Europe, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Bu-
reau of European Affairs, Records Relating to the European Defense Community 1951-1954, Lot File 
56D38, Box 34, NARA. The figure of 195,000 was broken down as follows: 165,000 Army (12 RCT’s 
with support and service troops), 25,000 Air Force and 5,000 Navy. 
 
59
 Bonn 468, January 18, 1951, RG 218, Geographic File 1948-1950, Box 26, NARA. This cable was also 
part of JCS 2124/33, 23 January 1951, RG 319 - Army Operations, General Decimal File 1950-1951, Box 





Force Goals. As to the questions related to training, the JCS felt that as West Germany 
had not yet agreed to nor accepted the invitation to contribute forces, it was premature to 
discuss those issues.  
Nonetheless, the force strength recommendation made by the JCS for forwarding 
to the U.S. Representative on the NATO Standing Group was as follows: 
TOTAL ARMY   440,000 
 
Ground Combat: 247,000  
 30 RCT’s (187,000) 
 3 AAA Brigades (15,000) 
 Combat Support (40,000-45,000) 
 
Ground Service: 107,500 
 Technical Service Support (100,000) 
 Administrative Service Support (7,500) 
 
Overhead and Mobilization Base: 85,000 
 Administrative Operations (35,000) 
 Trainees, transients, patients (50,000) 
 
TOTAL NAVY  10,000 
 
TOTAL AIR FORCE  45,000 (10 fighter wings/3 squadrons each) 
 Ground personnel (43,000) 
 Pilots (2,000) 
 
The JCS added a caveat to these figures, stating that while they were considered 
suitable for ongoing negotiations, the JCS could give no positive assurance that there 
would be sufficient armament and equipment produced by the NATO countries or Ger-
man industry to justify creation of those forces in 1952. The phased build-up, the caveat 
continued, had to be adjusted to plans allocating equipment to the Allies that would only 
be known over the next several years.
60
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1952 - Bureaucracy and Fear Slow Progress 
Throughout 1952, the State Department, with assistance from the Defense De-
partment, was involved in discussions on various financial and other requirements of the 
EDC, as well as cajoling the various European nations regarding the timing of the ratifi-
cation of the EDC Treaty
61
 On the more military level, planning for the arrival of German 
troops continued and discussions regarding the creation of a Military Assistance Adviso-
ry Group (MAAG) for Germany began.
62
 On 22 February, the NAC reaffirmed the ur-
gency of the defense of Western Europe and the early establishment of the EDF, includ-
ing a German contribution of the size and nature recommended by the NATO Military 
Committee.
63
 In March, the Secretary of Defense assigned an officer from his office to be 
his representative to the Paris-EDC-High Commissioners-SHAPE discussions assessing 
the validity of the costing estimates of the German contingent to EDC. An Air Force of-
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ficer from the USAFE was also assigned to assist him. The U.S. sought to begin furnish-
ing training equipment in phase with the German build-up beginning in CY 1953.
64
 
One issue that continued to plague U.S. attempts to speed up the process of ob-
taining German soldiers was that of funding the creation of a German military. It had al-
ready been determined that no German forces could come into being until the EDC Trea-
ty was ratified. Once that was done, however, and before the U.S. could provide military 
assistance to that country, U.S. law required Germany’s eligibility to receive military as-
sistance be certified. Accordingly, in early July the Secretary of Defense requested that to 
avoid delays in providing assistance to German military units in the European Defense 
Force, the JCS provide a military determination as to German eligibility. 
The JCS was requested to advise whether the FRG “is of direct importance to the 
defense of the North Atlantic Area” and whether its increased ability to defend itself is 
“important to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area, and to 
the security of the United States.” It was also asked to advise whether the grant of mili-
tary assistance to the FRG would strengthen U.S. security.
65
 
Along those same lines, in mid-July, the JCS sent a memorandum to the Secretary 
of Defense recommending that any consideration for the organization of a MAAG-
Germany be held in abeyance until the EDC came into force and Germany’s require-
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ments were determined. The JCS also recommended that until that occurred, USCIN-
CEUR should be charged with planning activities related to the MDAP as it applies to 
German units created for the EDC.
66
 
The following month, the JCS informed the Secretary of Defense that USCIN-
CEUR had been officially assigned responsibility for interim military planning regarding 




Towards the end of September, the continued mistrust of Germany on the part of 
the French was evident during discussions held with Theodor Blank, West Germany’s 
future defense minister and General Hans Speidel regarding end-item delivery schedules. 
One of the problems Blank was confronting was the question of German troop deploy-
ment. He knew, he said, how many barracks he already had and, based on the planned 
German contribution to the EDC, how many he would need to build. What he didn’t 
know was where to build them. The French, he related, felt that it would be dangerous to 
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This mistrust, as well as a concern over rising German nationalism, was not con-
fined to the French. In a two-part letter to Paul Nitze, John Ferguson, Deputy Director of 
the Policy Planning Staff wrote about discussions he had had on Germany with George 
Kennan, former Army Undersecretary and now U.S. Ambassador to NATO, William 
Draper, Walter J. Donnelly, who had replaced McCloy as U.S. High Commissioner, and 
David Bruce in London. According to Ferguson, Donnelly said that France would not be 
able to control Germany in EDC as in NATO. The problem of FRG membership in 
NATO was not yet urgent but it would arise after the EDC Treaty was ratified. He feared 
that the FRG in EDC was simply an attempt to get the Allies to help it regain East Ger-
many. Kennan was even more fearful. He felt that if the FRG was admitted to NATO, a 
civil war would ensue.
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On 18 November, just a few weeks after Eisenhower was elected President of the 
United States, he was invited to a meeting with Truman and Acheson to “establish the 
framework for full understanding of our problems and our purposes in the interim until 
January 20.” Truman saw two problems regarding European defense. The first dealt with 
the need to have a meeting with the NAC to discuss the military programs of the NATO 
members whose proposed force contributions far exceeded their economic capabilities. 
The second problem, according to Truman, was the problem of EDC Treaty ratifi-
cation. The U.S., Truman said, had hoped the Treaty would be ratified by the end of 1952 
or even January or February 1953 at the latest. But after the attack on the treaties by 
France, a recent “unwise” press conference by Schuman, and the defeat in the German 
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Bundestag of a motion to take up the treaties on 26 November, there was a real crisis in 
West European collaboration. France and Germany were “jockeying” to see who should 
act first and neither was willing to do anything until the new Eisenhower administration 
came in.
70
 It was serious in respect to the defense of Western Europe but could also initi-




Just a week before the inauguration, Samuel Reber, Deputy U.S. High Commis-
sioner sent a cable to the Secretary of State describing the impact of delays in the EDC 
Treaty ratification process. Doubts that the treaty would ever be ratified were slowing 
down planning on German forces and military production. The EDC-Interim Commission 
(EDC-IC) had not made progress developing organization and procedures, nor had it 
been possible to develop a German utilization plan, develop policies on production and 
procurement in Germany, or to begin contracting for infrastructure and equipment. The 
one piece of good news was that within the Military Security Board, both the French and 
the British agreed to allow the U.S. member to unilaterally approve German requests for 
increased capacity in shipbuilding, synthetic oil, synthetic rubber, and precision bearings, 
if necessary. Reber concluded that despite continued criticism from the German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the Adenauer government’s western orientation would not 
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The Eisenhower Administration Takes Over 
A week before the inauguration, on 14 January 1953, Vice Admiral A. C. Davis, 
Deputy U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, NATO, sent a memorandum to the 
JCS in which he stated that the NAC had recognized that “[t]he defense of Europe, in-
cluding Western Germany, as far to the east as possible will require a German contribu-
tion in terms of effective military units.” He continued that the “simplest and quickest” 
way to accomplish this would be to end the occupation and bring the FRG directly into 
NATO. Recognizing that this was politically unacceptable to France, the NAC also stated 
in the same document that an EDF, as part of an integrated NATO Defense Force, was 
acceptable as long as it did not delay a German contribution.
 73
  
Admiral Davis wrote further that “it is now, however, two years since this method 
of providing for German participation…was initiated and it is obvious…that there will be 
further and probably prolonged delay in ratification of a European Defense Community 
treaty….” He concluded by recommending that the JCS consider, as a matter of priority, 
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“the increasingly urgent status of the problem with a view to the possible advisability of 
developing and recommending alternative action leading to German participation as soon 
as possible….”  
Almost immediately after his inauguration, Eisenhower, now an avid proponent of 
European integration, sent his new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles and Harold 
Stassen, the Director of the Mutual Security Agency, to Europe to observe and to listen. 
Before he left, however, Dulles spoke on national television about the purpose of his and 
Stassen’s trip. He made a point of telling viewers that the U.S. had made a major $40 bil-
lion investment in Europe and he concluded that “if it appeared that there were no chance 
of getting effective unity, and if in particular France, Germany and England should go 
their separate ways, then certainly it would be necessary to give a little rethinking to 
America’s own foreign policy in relation to Western Europe.”
74
 While there, he met with 
the leader of the German SPD, Erich Ollenhauer, and stated that the U.S. would not ac-
cept a German National Army under any conditions. It was his belief that the establish-
ment of such an army would lead to another Franco-German war, a position that was in-
comprehensible to the SPD leaders. Dulles left the impression that the U.S. had “com-




Several weeks later, the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins and the Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral William Fechteler, responded to the JCS concerning Vice 
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Admiral Davis’s memorandum about a possible alternative to EDC. Collins’s lengthy re-
sponse was thorough and critical. He began by stating that he did not “consider it appro-
priate” for the JCS to offer gratuitous and premature recommendations and comments on 
this complex problem to the Secretary of Defense. While he agreed that no new course of 
action should be recommended, Collins stated that Germany’s membership in NATO was 
the most desirable alternative if the EDC Treaty is not ratified. Collins acknowledged 
that this method was unacceptable to France and posited other possible alternatives. He 
also restated JCS’s position of October 1950, in which the Chiefs had declared that in the 
event a German contribution was not possible, the U.S. should re-examine its contribu-
tion to the defense of Western Europe. He did not believe that this would of necessity 
lead to a “peripheral strategy,” but he indicated that there had been no analysis made of 
possible U.S. courses of action should German rearmament not be allowed and that now 
was the time to undertake such an analysis.
76
 
Fechteler’s response consisted primarily of modifications to what was a follow-on 
report by the JSSC and reply to Davis. He too felt that if the most desirable arrangement 
could not be had, alternatives should be explored to avoid an “all or nothing” situation. 
He also opposed a target date of 1 July 1953 for ratification of the EDC Treaty and be-
ginning of the German build-up as proposed by the JSSC. It was unreasonable, he wrote, 
to expect ratification and build-up by any specific target date. His rationale was that if the 
date was not met, the project would be abandoned and if German membership in NATO 
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was unobtainable, the U.S. should undertake action to rearm Germany by other means.
77
 
Both Collins and Fechteler recommended that the JCS take no action regarding alterna-
tives to EDC until requested by the Secretary of Defense. 
On 3 March 1953, Leon W. Fuller, Deputy Director of the Office of German Po-
litical Affairs and member of the Policy Planning Staff, circulated a paper he had written 
entitled “An Alternate U.S. Course of Action Respecting EDC and a German Settle-
ment.” Among the points raised in the paper, Fuller highlighted the following: 
 Chances for EDC ratification by mid-year (’53) are less than even. 
 French attitudes are still not adjusted to fact that Russia, not Germany, is 
the enemy. 
 France sees EDC as an emergency act to meet exigencies of the Cold War 
and to contain German power but only incidentally to augment the 
strength of European defense. 
 Germany has bought EDC but only due to the absence of admissible alter-
natives; unarmed neutrality preferred by probably 2/3 population. 
 Rearmament grudgingly accepted by Germany but it confirms the division 
of Germany. 
 Both [France and Germany] believe ratification [of EDC] will come only 
due to U.S. pressure. 
 EDC, for the U.S., is a response to the Soviet threat to Europe. 
 The U.S. does not see [within EDC] the revolutionary reform, i.e., the 
merger of national sovereignty that EDC demands. It is something that 
neither the U.S. nor the UK would do. 
 
Fuller argued that EDC was a means to an end, not the end itself. 
 
 The U.S. has yet to explain how EDC would lead to German unity or 
peace. 
 The new [Eisenhower] Administration is even more explicitly committed 
to EDC than its predecessor. 
 Failure of EDC would force alteration of U.S. military strategy in a man-
ner “highly adverse” to U.S. security and political interests in Europe, in-
asmuch as no satisfactory alternative to EDC is available. 
 Ratification of EDC could intensify the cleavage of Germany and launch 
the U.S. irretrievably upon a power struggle with the USSR. 






 France and Germany believe that an effort should first be made to achieve 
a settlement with the USSR or come to a showdown to make clear, once 




Fuller concluded with a 10-step course of action to be taken by the U.S. in which 
he said it was necessary for EDC to be ratified in order to impress upon France and Ger-
many that failure would possibly fatally weaken the West in any political “trial of 
strength” with the USSR. 
On 6 March, the JSSC forwarded JCS 2124/84 (a second revision of JCS 
2124/79) to the JCS. This report contained virtually all the recommendations made by 
Collins and Fechteler. The Appendix to the Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense 
outlined the JCS’s rather pessimistic view of the situation. While repeating that German 
membership in NATO was preferable to EDC, it accepted the fact that France would 
never accept Germany as a full-fledged member in the Alliance. The JCS suggested that 
no other alternatives would be as effective but had to be examined. However, they con-
tinued, the absence of full participation in the common defense effort by France and 
Germany opened up the possibility that the concept of forward defense might have to be 
abandoned, possibly leading to a peripheral defense strategy “with all of its grave military 
disadvantages.” 
Presenting their position, as all JCS papers did, from the “military point of view,” 
the JCS addressed the delays in arming the Germans, stating that there should already 
have been a substantial German contribution. The military appreciation for years 1954-
1955 indicated it would be a dangerous period and considering the time required to cre-
                                                     
78
 RG 59 – General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 64D563,  





ate, organize, equip, and train German forces, a protracted delay in ratification of the 
EDC Treaty could lead to serious military consequences. Furthermore, if EDC was aban-
doned and German NATO membership vetoed, the U.S. needed to take “vigorous action” 
to rearm Germany within the framework of “other suitable political arrangements.” 
The Appendix closed by stating that given the State Department’s awareness of 
the urgency of the situation and it efforts to bring about EDC ratification, the JCS would 
exert no further pressure. The JCS also indicated, however, that if called upon to com-
ment, they would be prepared to express their views on the German rearmament issue to 
include the degree to which they would support limits on additional military aid or other 
military concessions to France to further induce her participation in EDC.
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Toward the middle of March, most likely after the above memorandum had been 
sent to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS sent a brief reply to Admiral Davis. In it, the 
JCS opined that without a substantial German contribution, the defense of Western Eu-
rope would be “shallow and expensive” and probably ineffective. Nonetheless, how 
Germany was to be rearmed was a political matter to be determined by “the political ele-
ments of the government.” Regardless of how this is accomplished, the speedy creation 
of effective German combat units and maximum use of Germany’s productive capacity 
were “definite and urgent military requirements.”
80
 
While the idea of putting pressure on France to ratify EDC by limiting the amount 
of military aid given to her floated around the Defense and State Departments, Eisenhow-
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er threw out another possible inducement at a meeting of the NSC on 25 March. During 
the discussion, Secretary of State Dulles painted a rather bleak picture of what might 
happen in Europe if EDC, which he saw as the last chance for European unity along lines 
desired by the U.S., “went down the drain.” The FRG would unilaterally assume a larger 
measure of sovereignty with U.S. and British support but engendering “irreconcilable 
French hostility.” Dulles, however, indicated that he and other U.S. officials would ex-
plore, together with the French, ways to reduce the strain on France imposed by its in-
volvement in Indo-China. It was beyond France’s capabilities, Dulles explained, to 
shoulder the load imposed by its European commitments and those in Southeast Asia.  
Eisenhower then inquired whether the JCS might find it of value to examine the 
possibility of offering the French a “preeminent command position” in Europe. Given 
that military prestige was very important to the French, he suggested that they might be 
offered either the Central European Command or even General Matthew B. Ridgway’s 
job as SACEUR. Dulles agreed that such an offer would offset France’s fear that the 
EDC meant loss of French identity and leadership on the continent. Dulles then turned to 
General Bradley, asking whether the JCS could proffer an opinion within the next two 
days. Bradley indicated it could but ventured that the question was more political than 
military and that the State Department should consider the political implications as well 
as the degree of opposition the U.S. would encounter from the other European states. The 
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On 7 April 1953, Frank C. Nash, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna-
tional Security Affairs provided Adenauer with a summary of budgetary action the U.S. 
had taken to provide the FRG with certain items of major military equipment. The sum-
mary, subsequently known as the “Nash Commitment,” did not, however, provide an 
itemized list of equipment to be provided nor did it indicate the size of the program. The 
statement read by Nash to Adenauer contained, in part, the following:
82
 
Taking into account the equipment availabilities for 
and requirements of the EDC countries as a whole…the 
United States has made budgetary provisions…to provide 
to the [EDC] the major equipment required…for the first 
six German groupements and twenty-four German air 
squadrons, on a basis comparable to that used in providing 
equipment to the other EDC countries. This equipment will 
include: 
 
a. For Army Contingents: 
 
In general, only those items having a prima-
ry military application, such as tanks, combat vehicles, 
field artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, mortars, machine 
guns, ammunition, and basic signal and engineering 
equipment, including components and spare parts. 
 
b.    For Air Force Contingents; 
 
Fighter-bomber aircraft, tactical reconnais-
sance aircraft, primary and jet training aircraft, ground 
handling equipment, maintenance training units and relat-
ed equipment, electronics maintenance training units and 
related equipment, electronics and communications 
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The statement contained other, general information regarding ongoing negotia-
tions for the return of certain confiscated naval vessels, conditions under which the 
equipment would be delivered, and the need to complete arrangement regarding plans for 
the build-up of German forces in order that delivery plans could be formulated. It also 




A Question of Alternatives to EDC? 
Recall that several months earlier, Leon Fuller had written: “The new [Eisenhow-
er] Administration is even more explicitly committed to EDC than its predecessor.” This 
was made evident in a nationally televised speech Eisenhower gave on 16 April in which 
he said “It [This free world] knows that the defense of Western Europe imperatively de-
mands the unity of purpose and action made possible by [NATO], embracing the Europe-
an Defense community. It knows that Western Germany deserves to be a free and equal 
partner in this community….”
85
 The following day, John Ausland of the Bureau of Ger-
man Affairs wrote his colleague Coburn Kidd that Eisenhower’s speech “added up” to 
the [U.S.] belief that German unification “should be achieved within the framework of a 
broad European community based on the west European community” and only through 
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membership in the EDC.
86
 This idea was further enunciated by Eisenhower in a personal 
letter to Winston Churchill in which the President wrote: “…another subject of vital in-
terest to us both….is the need, in Europe, for uniform progress on the Common Defense 
Plan and for greater political and economic unity.
87
  
There is evidence, however, that growing dissatisfaction with the slow pace of 
EDC discussions led to a discussion of alternatives within the State Department, specifi-
cally between the Bureau of German Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff. The Bureau 
of German Affairs, for example, saw five possible alternatives to EDC while the Policy 
Planning Staff saw only three. Each saw German national forces as one possible alterna-
tive. NATO was the preferred alternative for the Bureau of German Affairs but only a 
“possibly” preferred course in the Policy Planning Staff’s eyes. The Bureau of German 
Affairs, however, saw no real “practical” alternative to EDC while the Policy Planning 
Staff proposed to temporarily give up the effort to get a German defense contribution if 
EDC failed. Instead, it recommended opening a new set of negotiations to obtain “some 
acceptable arrangement” serving the same purpose as EDC.
88
 
In early July, Adenauer wrote Dulles suggesting that a Four Power Conference on 
the German question meet in the fall. A week later, a meeting between Dulles, Acting 
British Foreign Secretary the Marquess of Salisbury, and Georges Bidault, the French 
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Foreign Minister took place in which the three governments concurred with Adenauer 
and proposed an early autumn meeting with the USSR. The possibility of a four-power 
meeting led the NSC Planning Board to develop an updated position paper with respect to 
Germany. This led to a Department of Defense position paper to place against a State 
Department position paper in the NSC.
89
 
On 30 July, the JCS responded to a request from the Secretary of Defense to ex-
amine the draft Department of Defense paper. Having learned, however, that the NSC 
intended to use the State Department’s draft as its working document, the JCS elected to 
discuss only the “fundamental security considerations” involved rather than addressing 
the Department of Defense draft, and it recommended that its comments be used to pre-
sent the Defense Department’s position. That said, the JCS found itself in general accord 
with the draft and the risks it entailed but feared that pursuing its objectives, i.e., negotiat-
ing with the USSR over Germany, could lead to prolonging the EDC negotiations, thus 
delaying the attainment of a German contribution which the JCS still considered an ur-
gent requirement. Prolonged negotiations, according to the JCS, would allow the Soviets 
to progressively increase their nuclear capabilities and thereby possibly use the transition 
period, i.e., during the necessary drawdown and redeployment of Allied occupation forc-
es and redesign of NATO defense plans, to launch a general war. It was, therefore, im-
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perative that the U.S. impress upon its Allies the urgent need to ratify EDC and rapidly 
integrate German forces into the West’s defense efforts.
90
 
NSC 160/1, the U.S. position paper approved by Eisenhower on 13 August, re-
stated the existing U.S. position on Western Germany. This paper, however, also asserted 
that while a unified Germany, free of Soviet occupation forces was essential for an “en-
during settlement, both in Germany and in Europe,” a free and united Germany, oriented 
to the West, would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and a “neutralized” Germany, 
armed or not, would entail sacrifices and risks to the West “incommensurate with any 
possible gains.”  
NSC 160/1 also recognized the Department of Defense’s fears, stating that possi-
ble four-power talks would most likely delay progress toward EDC but that French ratifi-
cation appeared unlikely until such talks were held or blocked by the USSR. It called for 
the U.S. to support “with all available means” the creation of the European Community 
and the ratification of the EDC Treaty as no satisfactory alternative to EDC had been 
found. Nonetheless, the U.S. should review alternative courses of action should delays be 
prolonged to include not only the preferred NATO alternative but also bilateral steps with 
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The delays in ratification also had an effect on West German party politics. In late 
October, the U.S. High Commissioner to the FRG, James Conant wrote Dulles that due to 
nationalistic elements in Adenauer’s coalition, the Chancellor may be “flirting” with the 
idea of a national German army in NATO. This was also in part due to French delay in 
ratifying the EDC Treaty. Conant was deeply concerned about the possible creation of a 
national army and was aware that some in the Pentagon were also in favor of the NATO 
option, as was the former UK High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. Conant sug-
gested that Washington have a serious discussion regarding a German national army and 
possible alternatives. Conant stated that he personally favored the withdrawal of all but a 
token of the occupation forces as part of a strategy of peripheral defense, rather than see a 
German national army evolve.
92
 
Two weeks later, Conant wrote an even more pessimistic letter to Dulles, stating 
that it was clear to him that Adenauer was clearly seeking an alternative to EDC. He ac-
cused “some American Army and Naval officers” of making statements to Theodor 
Blank, and some German officers of advocating a German-American military alliance 
and criticizing the French. Conant recommended that Adenauer be sent a letter from Ei-
senhower stating that the U.S. would not support a German national army and that the 
defense of the Europe depended upon good Franco-German relations.
93
 The following 
week, on 20 November, Dulles wrote Adenauer at the behest of the President indicating 
the President’s concern about reports that Germany was seeking alternatives to  the EDC. 
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Dulles stated unequivocally that the U.S. position with respect to Europe was based “on 
the imperative necessity of a Franco-German unity as the only foundation of any real 
strength in Europe,” and that it was not based upon a choice of either France or Germany 
but on both. The U.S. was convinced that effective Franco-German integration in the mil-
itary and related fields provided the only adequate security arrangements for Europe. 
Dulles closed by saying that there was no alternative to EDC.
94
 
As 1953 came to a close, the frustration experienced by the administration over 
the continued delay in ratifying the EDC Treaty was clearly visible. On 22 December, 
Dulles presented “A Report on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” to the National 
Press Club. He spoke of Eisenhower’s address in London on 3 July 1951 in which Eisen-
hower spoke of the immense gains unity could bring but also that “the project faces the 
deadly danger of procrastination….” That was 2½ years ago, Dulles said, and his obser-
vation has come to pass.
95
 Dulles then mentioned his 14 December address to the NAC, 
in which he repeated, but in more forceful terms what he had told the nation earlier in the 
year, namely that “…if, however, the European Defense Community should not become 
effective, …there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether Continental Europe could 
be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United 
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States policy.” This latter phrase, somewhat rephrased, was repeated later that day in a 
press conference given by Dulles.
96
 
1954 - EDC Defeated 
While in Berlin for the Four-Power Conference in February 1954, Dulles sent a 
cable to the State Department advising that should Pleven and General Ely come to the 
U.S., to discuss Indochina, EDC should also be included. Dulles underscored the support 
the U.S. had given France in the United Nations, and materielly in both Europe and Indo-
china. The U.S. had also made it clear to the world that France shared in the leadership of 
the free world alongside the United States and Great Britain. If France rejects EDC, how-
ever, he cabled that it would be impossible for the U.S. “to maintain[the] fiction [that] 
France is capable of [a] role of leadership in European and world affairs when France, by 




Despite his and the President’s annoyance with the French and their belief that no 
alternative to EDC was immediately available, Dulles was instructed to provide France 
with certain assurances in writing. Thus the United States committed itself to:  
 maintain in Europe, including Germany, its fair share of the forces needed 
for the joint defense of the Atlantic area 
 to consult with NATO and the EDC on questions of mutual security and 
on EDC force levels to be placed at SACEUR’s disposal. 
 encourage closest possible integration between EDC and NATO forces. 
 extend increased security by sharing more information on new weapons 
utilization and techniques to improve collective defense. 
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 regard any action that threatens the integrity or unity of the EDC as a 
threat to the security of the U.S. 
 not leave NATO as long as the solid core of unity which the EDC will pro-




By April, however, despite the U.S. assurances and assurances by the new French 
Prime Minister Joseph Laniel that the debate on the EDC would take place in the Nation-
al Assembly, the actions of the French Socialist Party and the deteriorating situation in 
Indochina had cast an additional pall on French views of EDC. Thus, in the afternoon of 
22 April, Dulles cabled the President that the repudiation of EDC by French Socialist 
leader Guy Mollet the previous night, and the Socialist Party’s desire to add additional 
preconditions to the EDC Treaty was, according to Bidault, a “grave and perhaps mortal 
blow” to hopes for ratification. Additionally, the virtually hopeless situation in Indochina, 
for which U.S. support was requested, was such that if Dien Bien Phu fell, France would 
pull entirely out of Southeast Asia and assume no other commitments. The next evening, 
Dulles spoke with Laniel who also told him that the loss of Dien Bien Phu would have “a 
profound effect on EDC, probably destroying [the] possibility of [a] favorable French 
action.” The situation here, Dulles wrote even later that night, “is tragic.”
99
 Tragic was 
not an understatement. On 7 May, Dien Bien Phu fell and five weeks later so did the La-
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By the latter part of June, a number of issues - continued delays in ratification; 
Mendes-France’s talks of possible changes to the EDC Treaty in order to obtain a majori-
ty in the National assembly in favor of the Treaty; the failure of the Four-Power confer-
ence in Berlin; and the Soviet Union’s granting of sovereignty to East Germany - led the 
Secretary of Defense to ask JCS to make recommendations for alternative measure to ob-
tain a German contribution. JCS again concluded in JCS 2124/119 that “concurrent 
agreements to end the German occupation and to accept West Germany as a full-fledged, 
sovereign partner in NATO would be the most desirable method…provided the participa-




The JCS’s response also indicated that they could make no prediction as to when, 
if ever, France would ratify the EDC Treaty. They concluded further that the FRG would 
not accept anything less than full sovereignty, that EDC without France, while technically 
possible, fell short of what EDC was designed to achieve, as was an arrangement in 
which Germany would only make a non-military contribution. As an alternative to full 
NATO membership, the JCS posited the possibility of an associate member status in 
NATO for the FRG with restrictions on size and force composition not to exceed those it 
would have had in EDC. 
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The final JCS recommendation was that to achieve a German contribution, the 
U.S. and the British should approach the French jointly and tell them that in the event 
France failed to agree to either EDC or German entry into NATO, the two countries 
would bilaterally restore sovereignty to the FRG and assist in its rearmament and eventu-
al integration into NATO.
 
 
Interestingly, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Nathan F. Twining, voiced 
strong disagreement to this approach. “For almost two years,” he wrote, “the Western na-
tions have attempted to obtain French and Italian consent to European Defense Commu-
nity (EDC), so that a German contribution to the defense of Europe can be obtained. All 
of their efforts have been fruitless, and in my view, EDC is consequently a dead issue.” 
Twining continued that Germany presented the greatest potential defense against Soviet 
expansion and that he was so strongly convinced of this “that I believe the United States 
must take the risk of adversely affecting friendship with France and perhaps other nations 
by moving for the immediate rearmament of Germany, Germany’s integration as an equal 
member with all others in NATO, and complete political sovereignty for Germany.” 
German rearmament, Twining continued, should be accomplished, if possible, by 
the U.S. acting jointly with the other NATO nations or, if not possible, jointly with the 
UK and failing that, unilaterally. The U.S. should inform the other nations of its inten-
tions and give the French a limited time to decide what their policy would be. Twining 
closed by recommending that the JCS study be returned for restudy and rewriting.
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On 25 June, Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State, forwarded to Admi-
ral Arthur W. Radford, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a copy of a letter 
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that Conant had sent to Livingstone Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs, a week earlier. The letter reflected Conant’s pessimism over French ratification 
of the EDC Treaty and contained a document that proposed, in the event the French were 
unable to bring the EDC to debate before the National Assembly adjourned for the sum-
mer, that the High Commission’s Charter be “stretched” to allow a majority two-to-one 
vote to suffice to grant West Germany sovereignty and allow the recruitment of Germans 
for military training to proceed. Conant also suggested that this action be publically an-
nounced. He opined that it was possible that neither Adenauer nor the British would be 
satisfied with this proposal as it meant “hanging on to EDC.” Conant felt that if a start 
could be made recruiting and training these troops as auxiliaries to British and U.S. forc-




On 25 June, the JCS submitted its revised response to the Secretary of Defense on 
the EDC Alternatives study. It recommended, in order of priority, full NATO member-
ship for West Germany or the independent rearming of West Germany by the U.S. and 
UK. The JCS further recommended that the U.S. and UK take measures to bring about 
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French ratification of EDC or an agreement to accept Germany in NATO. If this were not 
possible, the U.S. and UK should make it clear to France that they would proceed bilater-
ally to restore German sovereignty, assist Germany in its rearmament efforts, and seek 
Germany’s full integration in NATO. The JCS concluded its response by stating that “[I]f 
none of these courses of action can be implemented, the United States should then reap-
praise its basic policy toward Western Europe and its NATO commitments.”
104
 
Three days later, on 28 June, the U.S. and the UK agreed to a secret Minute on 
Germany and the EDC. It reaffirmed the two countries’ support for EDC and contained, 
in essence, Conant’s earlier recommendations regarding the granting of German sover-
eignty but disregarded his recommendations to arm the FRG. Instead, the Minute stated 
that an agreement would be reached with Adenauer to “defer for the time being the uni-
lateral exercise by Germany of the right to rearmament.”
105
 The German view, according 
to Dulles, was that the FRG was perfectly willing to accept the same limitations on its 
forces as applied to other NATO members but would refuse to be singled out by limita-
tions applicable only to Germany. Adenauer did not favor a separate national army, Dul-
les said, but he would not accept an inferior military position.
106
 
On 13 July, the three service secretaries indicated in a note to all holders of the 
EDC Alternative study that they agreed with the secret Minute. However, as the last par-
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 Meeting of the National Security Council, 1 July 1954, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, 





agraph addressed the possibility of French rejection of EDC, they requested the views of 
the State Department in order to begin “appropriate contingency defense planning.”
107
 
One week later, the State Department issued a lengthy position paper in which they dis-
cussed what the U.S. should do in the event of either continued delay of EDC or outright 
rejection by France. As with previous State Department position papers, this paper began 
by reconfirming the U.S. position that EDC was the best means to obtain a German de-
fense contribution and that the primary goal of the U.S. was to obtain approval of EDC 
by the French National Assembly before the summer recess. 
That said, the paper enunciated the position that in the event of continued delay, a 
slightly modified version of Conant’s proposal be implemented, i.e., that the U.S. and UK 
initiate training of German cadres who would become “potential instructors of future 
German contingents of the European Defense Force” and attach them to U.S. and UK 
forces in Germany, along with appropriate technical MDAP agreements. This would keep 
pressure on the French to ratify EDC and place the Germans on an equal footing with all. 
It would also convince the French that the “agonizing reappraisal” was not a bluff. 
The State Department paper continued that if the French rejected EDC, full Ger-
man membership in NATO would become the best alternative. Failing that, bilateral 
U.S.-UK rearmament of Germany would become the only other alternative. The paper 
also stated that aside from being “quick and simple,” any proposal for bringing Germany 
into NATO had to be acceptable to France and could not discriminate against Germany. 
It recognized that reconciling these conflicting criteria would be a problem. It then set out 
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a six step program to achieve this goal, one of which included consideration of a separate, 
formal U.S.-UK-French-German security treaty.
108
 
On July 27, Congress again reflected its dissatisfaction with the continued delay 
in ratifying the EDC Treaty. This time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a 
“sense of the Senate” resolution informing the President that he should take whatever 
steps he deemed appropriate and constitutional to restore sovereignty to Germany should 
he judge this to be desirable and in the national interest.
109
 
The Curtain Falls 
At the beginning of what proved to be the fateful month of August, the State De-
partment revised its position paper. It was shortened considerably and it now included the 
French in the training of German cadres and in an interim defense agreement, if they 
were willing. Other sections, including the one on a separate, formal U.S.-UK-French-
German security treaty, were deleted and in their place the paper gave a role to the three 
High Commissioners, emphasizing their ability to function by majority vote to insure that 
France could not block through the High Commission any necessary changes to Germa-
ny’s Basic Law to implement its military contribution.
110
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As the month of August progressed, cables crisscrossed the Atlantic, particularly 
between Churchill, Eden, Dulles, and even Adenauer. Several relayed to Dulles conversa-
tions held between Churchill and Mendes-France while the latter was returning from a 
EDC-signatory conference in Brussels.. Mendes-France promised to hold a vote on EDC 
by month’s end but indicated his cabinet refused to allow it to be a vote of confidence. He 
repeated his belief that despite his efforts, he would not be able to garner a majority and 
that EDC would fail in the National Assembly. Ironically, Mendes-France told Churchill 
and Eden that he was ready to consider German entry into NATO and as a first step, to 
restore political sovereignty to Germany. 
Churchill often mentioned the need to take on the NATO solution in his cables to 
Dulles but Dulles disagreed. Dulles responded that even if it were possible, the NATO 
solution would confront the same indecision and procrastination. In fact, as late as 24 
August, while forwarding to Eisenhower an exchange of messages with Churchill, Dulles 
indicated that he hoped it was not too late for EDC and cited from a telephone call he had 
with Ambassador Douglass Dillon in Paris that Dillon, Bruce and John Hughes still felt 
there was a “shred of hope” for EDC. In fact Dillon and Bruce, supported by Assistant 
Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, proposed a last minute Brussels Conference of 
the EDC-signatories, the U.S. and UK, to be held on 30 August, the same day the Nation-
al Assembly was scheduled to vote on EDC. They hoped in this way to make one last at-
tempt to pressure France into voting for ratification. Both Churchill and Eden opposed 





this idea and the matter was dropped.
111
 On 30 August 1954, the French National Assem-
bly employed a parliamentary procedure to table the vote on the EDC. EDC was dead.
112
 
For almost exactly four years, from September 1950 until August 1954, the U.S. 
Government pleaded, cajoled, and even threatened France in various economic and polit-
ical ways in an attempt to force it to ratify EDC.
113
 Having allowed France to take the 
lead in the process to arm the FRG and despite repeated U.S. assurances that American 
troops would remain in Europe, U.S. policymakers were unable to overcome French fear 
of a resurgent Germany.
114
 Neither were they able to contemplate a solution that did not 
include France in some way. That said, the JCS continued to voice its opposition to EDC 
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Chapter 6: The Role of the Three U.S. Military Services 
 
 
During the long, drawn out Pleven Plan/EDC phase, only NATO member-nations 
were eligible for Military Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) assistance. This meant, 
of course, that the FRG was excluded. The Defense Department, however, impatient and 
unwilling to wait on political decisions, began planning a provisional rearmament pro-
gram for the FRG without its actual participation.
1
 Thus, as related in Chapter 5, in mid-
1952 USCINCEUR was made responsible for planning activities related to the MDAP as 
it applies to German units created for the EDC.  
The real effort from all the services began after the EDC Treaty was signed in 
May, 1952. As will be seen however, each of the three U.S. military services became in-
volved at different times and in different ways. The USAF, for example, became more 
deeply involved in the creation and development of its sister service in the new West 
German military and the training of its recruits than any of the other two U.S. services. 
However, information on the actual training plans and policies formulated by each of the 
services remains incomplete and somewhat spotty.
2
 
It was not until immediately after the rejection of the EDC Treaty by the French 
National Assembly that the Department of Defense decided to continue its plans for 
German rearmament with the British, with or without French cooperation. Thus, on 2 
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September 1954, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson directed the JCS to 
prepare a plan for the Secretary of Defense by 15 October with recommendations for lo-
gistical and military assistance to the FRG.
3
 Specifically, the request was for recommen-
dations regarding: 
 Facilities Force composition, to include Tables of Organization and 
Equipment (T/O&E). 
 requirement for both U.S. and German forces. 
 Procedures for logistical support of German forces. 
 Deployment plans for German forces, and 
 A revision of the existing MDAP for Germany. 
USCINCEUR directed the commanders of the three service components in Ger-
many, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE), and Com-
mander, U.S. Naval Forces Germany (COMNAVFORGER), to prepare appropriate rec-
ommendations and to assume that the EDC planning basis of 12 Army divisions, 1,326 
aircraft, and 300 naval vessels would still be applicable. All three service components 
met in Paris on 16 September to assist in drawing up a program for U.S. military assis-
tance based on JCS’s recommendations. There would be no waiting for any specific in-
ternational political guidance. German forces would be limited to the EDC allocation, 
U.S. training would cover the Germans from cadre to combat ready status and be time-
phased to match the build-up of the German armed forces, and most significantly, Ger-
man forces would be developed as a national force - something the Defense Department 
had wanted from the very beginning. It was also decided that the Defense Department 
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and the services should plan to assign sufficient personnel to the Military Assistance and 
Advisory Group-Germany (MAAG-Germany) to preclude any delay in the build-up of 
German forces, and that training and rearmament would take place even before a political 
settlement was agreed if circumstances so warranted.
4
 
There were, however, as Acheson had earlier pointed out,  several obstacles to 
overcome before a German armed force could be created. For example, there was neither 
a German governmental entity nor constitutional authority to raise, command, finance or 
man an armed force in the FRG. Chancellor Adenauer was well aware of this problem 
and until those entities came about, he requested assistance from U.S. authorities to en-
sure that as the governmental and constitutional processes unfolded, the new German 
military would develop in a democratic manner.
5
 
A key obstacle that hindered each of the services in providing training assistance 
was the inability to disclose classified information to the Germans. U.S. regulations on 
disclosure handicapped discussions between U.S. planners of all services and their Ger-
man counterparts throughout the period. Even as late as December 1954, there were only 
43 of the 800 or so employees of Amt Blank¸ also known as Dienststelle Blank, the pre-
cursor of the German Defense Ministry, who were cleared for NATO classified infor-
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 This absurdity was demonstrated again in early 1955 when German planners 
gave USAREUR its draft plan. According to previous agreements, USAREUR was obli-
gated to classify the German plan at the same level the German’s had classified it. In this 
case, the classification was Top Secret. As a result, USAREUR planners were prohibited 
from discussing the German plan with its authors! Each service was, however, able, to 
have certain “workarounds” approved without changing the disclosure regulations, there-
by allowing classified information to be released on a strict “need to know” basis. None-
theless, the development of assistance plans was hampered.
7
 
Each of the three service components in Europe - USAREUR, USAFE, and 
COMNAVFORGER - were subordinate to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and 
eventually were given responsibility for providing training assistance to their new Ger-
man counterpart service. Some, however, had already been involved in planning for the 
FRG’s rearmament as early as 1951. That said, each service played a significantly differ-
ent role in the rearmament process. For example, former German Wehrmacht and Ger-
man Lufwaffe officers viewed U.S. military assistance, training, and organization in com-
pletely different lights.  
On the one hand, German army divisions had been organized differently than U.S. 
divisions and their tactical doctrine was also unlike American practice. Former Wehr-
macht officers considered U.S. weapons, such as tanks and machine guns, inferior to 
those the Germans had developed during the war. In addition, they felt that the German 
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army had been the better army in all respects – the war was lost due to the Allies over-
whelming superiority in manpower and materiel. Had not the U.S. Army used former 
German generals to write about the war and lessons learned so that the Americans could 
learn from German experience? They did not consider themselves a junior partner and, 
therefore, saw little need for training or tutelage. 
On the other hand, former Luftwaffe officers had seen their Air Force decisively 
defeated and they recognized that air combat had changed significantly since the war. 
Despite having flown the first jets in combat, they knew that technology had advanced 
well beyond the point where they had been at the end of the war. Additionally, each of 
the German military experts that participated in the Himmerod Conference knew that a 
new Luftwaffe would be dependent upon a technologically superior mentor - the results of 
the disarmament and dismantling program following the end of the war and the prohibi-
tion on any aviation activity had left German aviation knowledge and technology at the 
level it was in 1945. Only the United Kingdom and the United States qualified as possible 
guides.
8
 Thus, they were eager to copy what the U.S. Air Force (USAF) had to offer in 
the way of organization, equipment, tactics and training. It was, they believed, the only 
way to build a modern and sizeable air force.
9
  
The U.S. Navy 
The role of the U.S. Navy was, perhaps, the easiest and least important. Despite 
the demilitarization of Germany following World War II, the British Royal Navy orga-
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nized on 12 July 1945 a German Minesweeping Service Authority (GM/SA) to clear the 
Baltic and the North Sea of mines. GM/SA utilized approximately 40-percent of the for-
mer Kriegsmarine’s mine-sweeping personnel which amounted to nearly 27,000 person-
nel.
10
 In 1947, the GM/SA was disbanded and reestablished as the Minesweeping Group 
Cuxhaven under the Allied Control Authority, and its personnel given German Civil Ser-
vice status. In November 1950, following the September NATO meeting and Acheson’s 
“Single Package” presentation, a plan by COMNAVFORGER was initiated to disband 
the Cuxhaven group, reclaim its leased minesweepers and establish three Labor Service 
Units: LSU (A) at COMNAVFORGER headquarters in Heidelberg, LSU (B) at the U.S. 
Naval Base Bremerhaven, and LSU (C), which reported to the U.S. Navy’s Rhine River 
Patrol and was divided into three flotillas based at Wiesbaden-Schierstein, Karlsruhe, and 
Mannheim to provide assistance in manning the Navy’s ships and shore facilities at those 
locations. All three LSU’s benefitted from the transfer of personnel from the Cuxhaven 
group and were operational by 1 July 1951.
11
 Although LSU (B) at Bremerhaven contin-
ued its minesweeping duties, advanced training programs for all LSU personnel were es-
tablished by the U.S. Navy following the German government’s ratification of the EDC 
Treaty in 1953. Instruction in naval weaponry, sonar, navigation, electronics and engi-
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neering were provided under the unspoken assumption that these personnel would be 
turned over to the German Government once Germany’s role in EDC was finalized. The-
se efforts had the approval of Amt Blank. The U.S. Navy made classrooms and equipment 
available to the German LSU personnel and encouraged them to avail themselves of the 
many course offered. The Navy even went so far as to place minesweeping boats in dry-
dock to allow their crews and additional LSU personnel to obtain the training that was 




Similar to what the Army had done in employing former German officers to write 
histories of the war, the U.S. Navy assembled a Navy Historical Team (NHT) at Bremer-
haven to “reconstruct the German perspective of the war at sea.” The NHT, however, also 
evolved into a semi-covert “coordinating staff” that examined the organization and needs 
of a future West German navy. In October 1950, at the request of General Adolf 
Heusinger, the senior officer in Amt Blank, several officers on the NHT were reassigned 
to be on his staff and to act as naval specialists to the EDC Conference. Also in October, 
former Admiral Friedrich Ruge joined the Himmerod Conference and x brought with him 
a paper composed by the NHT team, which was incorporated into the final Himmerod 
Memorandum. Following some minor modifications by Admiral Gerhard Wagner, the 
head of the NHT, the naval proposal, now renamed the Wagner Paper, was adopted as the 
basis for negotiations at the EDC Conference by Amt Blank.
13
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The first negotiations regarding the creation of a West German navy actually took 
place between then General Eisenhower and Adenauer in January 1951 at the Bonn Con-
ference. In September 1951, the JCS set, for planning purposes, the strength of the future 
German navy at 183 active vessels, just three less than had been agreed at the EDC Con-
ference. While negotiations over the EDC treaty ratification continued in 1953, the U.S. 
drafted two initiatives to assist the future German navy: the first was to earmark MDAP 
funds for the new navy and the second was the return of over 300 vessels confiscated 
from Nazi Germany and allocated to the United States by the Tripartite Naval Commis-
sion. Many of these returned boats later entered service with the Bundesmarine, as the 
new navy was named in 1956. Also, in April 1953, eighteen minesweepers were included 
for delivery as part of the Nash Agreement.
14
  
Interestingly, the French, Belgians, Dutch and Italians saw no need to have an 
EDC naval component. The Germans, however, insisted on one and Wagner brought the 
German position to Captain George Anderson, U.S. Navy, who acted as arbitrator. An-
derson supported the German position but recommended a smaller force. Ironically, once 
this issue was solved and numbers and armaments decided upon, the French naval repre-
sentative on the EDC-Interim Commission (EDC-IC) became a strong supporter of the 
Germans and worked diligently to support them.
15
 
                                                                                                                                                 
minelayers, one net layer, nine escort vessels, 30 airplanes and 30mhelicopters, three air bases, three weap-
ons depots, two coastal artillery sections, one signals section and a headquarters. It also increased personnel 
requirements from approximately 15,000 to over 20,000. 
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The U.S. Army 
In late March, early April 1951, HQ EUCOM was requested to support a request 
by Amt Blank, for assistance in ensuring that the new German armed forces would be es-
tablished in a democratic manner. HQ EUCOM tasked the Personnel & Administration 
Division to develop appropriately written material to fulfill that request. HQ EUCOM 
specified that the material should not be in the form of recommendations but as exposi-
tions of the subject being treated, i.e., how it came about, reasons why it has been ap-
plied, and the advantages and disadvantages, if any, to be obtained. All staff divisions 
were expected to participate.
16
 
There does not appear to have been any further contact between the Germans and 
EUCOM until 1953. As stated earlier, the JCS had recommended in July 1952 that final 
organization for administering a military assistance program for the FRG be deferred un-
til the EDC Treaty came into force. In the interim, However, the JCS also recommended 
that to prevent any overt planning activities from jeopardizing the EDC program, all ac-
tivities be coordinated with the EDC-IC.
17
 A will be seen below, this created major ob-
stacles for both the Army and the Air Force. 
In early 1953, former Wehrmacht Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, Chief of the Plan-
ning Section in Amt Blank, attempted to establish closer contact with USAREUR. These 
attempts were denied by HQ EUCOM as being in violation of JCS policy, i.e., all queries 
of a military nature had to be placed through the EDC-IC. Thus, on 4 May 1953, CIN-
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CEUR requested 63 additional personnel and authority to establish a Detachment ‘A’ 
(Det. A) to facilitate coordination with the EDC-IC. He was told, however, that until the 
FY ’54 MDAP was approved by Congress, which was expected in July, no personnel al-
locations could be made.
18
 
In June 1953, a joint State-Defense-Foreign Operations Administration message 
addressed the need to re-evaluate military assistance planning. At this point in time, how-
ever, USAREUR’s role was limited and the command had little knowledge of German 
plans. Forced to being an “info” copy recipient of correspondence between EUCOM and 
the Office of the High Commissioner, Germany, USAREUR’s planning activities were 
confined to recommending the use of training areas and providing lists of possible ca-
sernes/barracks and depot facilities for release to the Germans. Again, because of con-
cerns about French sensitivities, USAREUR was unable throughout 1953 until the col-
lapse of EDC in August 1954 to develop definitive and all-encompassing plans for assis-
tance to the proposed German EDF contingent.
19
 
Several months later, on 20 August, a second CINCEUR request for specialized 
school-trained personnel was also denied because the EDC Treaty had still not been rati-
fied. However, CINCEUR was authorized to finally establish Det.A, but only by using 
personnel from his own resources.
20
 Once formed, Det. A was made responsible for liai-
son between EDC-IC and HQ EUCOM. The EDC-IC was made up of military, econom-
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ic, political and legal committees. The military committee, chaired by French General 
R.M.E. Delaminate, despite its many accomplishments, was nonetheless hindered 
throughout its existence in its efforts to create a German contingent by so-called “politi-
cal events.” In fact, USAREUR considered the EDC-IC to have been a failure, i.e., una-
ble to function due to the delays imposed on planning activities by the several French 
committee members and chairmen that brought planning assistance by U.S. military enti-
ties “virtually to a standstill.”
21
  
In addition, however, Det. A was further limited in that the assistance it was au-
thorized to provide to the EDC-IC and its working groups pertained only to U.S. forces’ 
organization and procedures. Although some of that information was provided to German 
members of the Commission, Det. A was reluctant to form a closer relationship with the 
Germans for fear of repercussions from the French. As mentioned above, USAREUR saw 
the EDC-IC as an obstacle and not as a help in providing assistance to the Germans. Eve-
ry attempt by USAREUR to assist in planning for German contingents had to be cleared 
by the Commission and Det. A was in no position to pressure it into allowing more spe-
cific planning out of fear it would jeopardize EDC’s future in the French National As-
sembly. Thus, the EDC made little progress in obtaining a viable West German contribu-
tion to the defense of Western Europe
22
 One year later, in the fall of 1953, Det. A was 
replaced by an Advanced Planning Group in EUCOM’s Military Assistance Division.
23
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Throughout the EDC phase, USAREUR expected to be required to initiate a train-
ing program for the future  West German army but it was not until 15 July 1954 that its 
capabilities to support such training was delineated. Thus, immediately after the collapse 
of the EDC in August, USAREUR G-3/Operations Division instructed all staff divisions 
to begin the development of appropriate plans but to ensure that the amount of assistance 
offered would not affect USAREUR’s combat readiness. Similar to concerns voiced by 
USAFE, USAREUR was concerned that its role in training the German army would ex-
pand its mission beyond its capabilities. 
As a result, a series of conferences were held in Paris on 18-19 November 1954 
between USAREUR and EUCOM. At the third such conference, a compromise was 
reached based upon Congressional action that specified EUCOM as having full authority 
and responsibility for providing assistance to the German army. The final letter of in-
struction, issued on 1 December 1954, delegated to USAREUR responsibility for provid-




The Army’s Advanced Planning Group 
A few months earlier, in September 1954, the JCS designated the Advanced Plan-
ning Group (APG) to act as the single point of contact between EUCOM and the German 
planners. In this respect and until the FRG regained full sovereignty, APG would repre-
                                                                                                                                                 
clear to Hervé Alphand , France’s Permanent Representative to the NAC, that this attitude has made a very 
“unfortunate impression here.” 
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sent the military part of the U.S. Country Team in West Germany. U.S. policy, as it con-
cerned only its military relationship, was to consider the FRG as a sovereign nation. The 
APG would, therefore, function as a proto-MAAG until an actual MAAG-Germany was 
established. It would continue discussions with German military planners and the EU-
COM component command planners, and would arrange direct contact between them. 
EUCOM planned to man APG with 69 personnel - one-half the strength of the future 
MAAG - by 31 March 1955. If additional personnel were needed during the actual train-
ing phase, they would be acquired from the Army and the Air Force. 
   The APG’s manifold responsibilities included advising the U.S. Ambassador to 
the FRG as needed, coordinating the MDAP for West Germany, and assisting the West 
German government in preparing requests for aid and training. In this respect, it would 
screen all assistance requests before forwarding them to USCINCEUR. Responsibility 
also extended to preparing deficiency lists and recommending end-item requirements, 
delivery requirements, and to prioritize the distribution of supplies among the various 
German units. Last but not least, the APG was given responsibility for obtaining space in 
U.S. service schools for German military personnel and for exercising control over U.S. 
training and technical personnel assigned to German units. Thus, a sound working rela-
tionship between the APG and USAREUR became a high priority.
25
 
On 2 September 1954, after the collapse of the EDC, USAREUR G-3 distributed 
to various USAREUR staff divisions and subordinate commands a directive entitled 
Planning in USAREUR for Assisting in the Formation of the German Army. The di-
rective’s basic assumption was that the EDC manpower levels for the West German con-
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tingent would remain, that Amt Blank would become the West German Defense Ministry, 
and that restrictions on contacts with Amt Blank would be relaxed. It was also assumed 
that when requested, USAREUR would provide all practical training assistance to Ger-
man planners, to include mobile training teams and making space available as needed in 
USAREUR training schools. 
USAREUR’s staff divisions responded by submitting their preliminary plans to 
G-3, which were then incorporated into a staff study. This study, which included a time-
phased planning program, was first coordinated with the APG and then sent to the 
USAREUR Chief of Staff for approval and for forwarding to HQ EUCOM by 1 February 
1955. Due to changes in the German plan following the demise of EDC, e.g., German 
forces would now be created as a national force. The new plan called for the creation of 
an army of 6 infantry and 6 armored divisions as well as 5 armored, 2 mountain, and 2 
airborne brigades. Because the plan’s due date of 1 February could not be met, several 
time-consuming conferences between USAREUR and Amt Blank planning staffs were 
needed to make adjustments but the lack of lists of MDAP items that would be available 
precluded determining logistics and maintenance requirements. As a result, USAREUR 
requested an extension until 1 April, which was approved.
26
 
To further complicate matters, however, the new German plan required the U.S. 
to provide a total of 284 officers and 1,507 enlisted men to fill the training team comple-
ments. This exceeded the EDC training personnel requirement by 16 officers and 1,039 
enlisted men. Additionally, the Germans wanted to retain the U.S. trainers for a period of 
six months while U.S. plans foresaw only three months. After the dust settled, the num-
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bers were whittled down considerably and the final total of army trainers that the U.S. 
agreed to provide was 222 officers and 680 enlisted men, to be supplied by USAREUR, 
the APG and the Department of the Army. One hundred German interpreters were added 
to that number, however.
27
 
Army Training Areas and Logistics Planning 
The question of providing training areas for the six army RCT’s the FRG would 
be providing under the EDC concept proved problematic. USAREUR claimed that the 
three large training areas then in use - Grafenwehr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken - were 
barely sufficient for use by U.S. and French forces. German utilization could only be on a 
“space available” basis. German attempts to acquire additional land in CENTAG’s area 




In October 1954, the JSPC looked at the issue of training areas and decided that 
the areas used by U.S. forces in Germany would have to be shared equally. USAREUR 
was initially opposed but relented somewhat after accepting the fact that combat-ready 
German divisions would be a major asset to the West’s defenses. As long as the training 
of U.S. forces would not be affected, they accepted the reality of the situation. Enter the 
Department of the Army who, based on previously reached agreements, e.g., “Forces 
Convention and Relations,” and the “Convention on Rights and Obligations,” stated that 
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the Germans were required to find their own training areas. With that, USAREUR revert-
ed to its original position and the problem was elevated to SHAPE.
29
 
Following a conference involving SHAPE, LANDCENT, NORTHAG, and 
CENTAG a decision was reached that once the FRG became a member of NATO, she 
would be able to utilize all of NATO’s training areas within and outside West Germany, 
and that additional training areas should be provided by whichever country was best able 
to do so.
30
 Thus USAREUR developed plans in February 1955 so that German forces 
could use either German or USAREUR resources for the first ten months of the planned 
36-month build-up phase and that USAREUR facilities would be on a “space available 
basis” for the next two months. As for the remaining two years, German planners were 
unable to provide USAREUR its requirement as they did not know which areas would be 
made available or released to them. This problem, as well as several others, bounced back 
and forth between USAREUR and SHAPE but no permanent solution was found prior to 
Germany’s entry into NATO in May, 1955.
31
 
The most intractable planning problem that faced USAREUR was that of logistics 
support for the new German army. The logistics problem was, in fact, two problems. The 
first involved providing support to the U.S. training teams deployed to 14 German train-
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ing sites and the second involved receiving, storing, maintaining, and distributing MDAP 
items destined for the German army. 
In February 1954, the Department of the Army directed USAREUR to provide 
storage facilities for equipment that would be given to the Germans. USAREUR, howev-
er, lacked sufficient storage capability west of the Rhine, where it would be less vulnera-
ble to attack. USAREUR was then authorized to store the MDAP materiels east of the 
Rhine and two areas were selected, one near Bremerhaven in northern Germany and one 
near Darmstadt in the south. No action was taken, however, as the NASH Plan had not 
begun and the entire future of the EDC was still in question. When EDC collapsed, 
USAREUR was forced to change its plans. It decided that it wanted the Darmstadt facili-
ty for its own use - NATO plans had changed to now hold east of the Rhine rather than 
fall back to a defensive position on the west bank - and it discarded the Bremerhaven area 
depot as too far away and too vulnerable. Furthermore, the Germans had selected, and 
EUCOM had approved, an unused Eberstadt area for their southern depot. 
As a partial solution, German civilian storage facilities were contracted for use 
but only after additional MDAP funds were made available. In addition, EUCOM ar-
ranged for materiel stored in the U.S. to remain there until called for by USAREUR. It 
was also stipulated that the FRG was not to receive anything until a renegotiated NASH 
agreement, i.e., a new MDAP agreement had been negotiated. Despite the above, as late 
as March 1955, nine weeks before Germany was admitted to NATO, the full extent of the 
types and amounts of U.S. equipment that was to be furnished to the FRG was still un-




Problems were also encountered in the hiring of German personnel who were to 
be trained as assistant instructors and materiel maintenance personnel. On the one hand, 
hiring was difficult because of housing shortages at the mostly rural training sites. On the 
other hand, German nationals who were to be hired and were supposed to be integrated 
into the German army after the EDC Treaty was ratified could not be told for what they 
were being hired due to security regulations. In addition, Amt Blank could not guarantee 
their integration into the army.
32
 
In mid-March 1955, USAREUR G-3 submitted a revised draft assistance plan. It 
was forwarded to HQ EUCOM who forwarded it further to the Department of the Army 
without comments or recommendations that differed from those made by USAREUR. 
The “USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan,” was subsequently approved by the 
Department of the Army in August 1955. However, those portions of the draft plan that 
required German action or agreement in order to be implemented had not been coordinat-
ed with the German planners. When the plan was forwarded to the Army, it contained a 
statement that the plan was only a basis for initiating training assistance and that once 
coordinated with the Germans, ultimate implementation would be affected. 
Therefore, on 29 April, a meeting between USAREUR representatives and the 
APG was held to determine which portions of the plan could be released to the Germans. 
Finally, on 9 May, the day Germany was admitted to NATO, modified copies of the as-
sistance plan were released to Amt Blank. The Germans were told, however, that the plan 
was only a draft and did not imply a commitment by the United States.
33
 The plan, as ap-
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proved, envisaged 18 training teams and two equipment maintenance teams for a total of 
910 officers and enlisted personnel. The majority of the personnel were to be in place ap-
proximately 1 June 1956 and would be required for 5-8 months. The training program 
was to be phased out by February 1957 assuming actual activation of the German army 
took place on 1 January 1956. It was also requested that the maximum numbers of as-
signed personnel receive German language instruction or refresher training as needed.
34
 
It should probably be pointed out here that not all of the delays or obstacles faced 
by the U.S. military planning elements were due to EDC restrictions or U.S. regulations. 
Amt Blank was also responsible. According to James Corum, Theodor Blank, who had 
been appointed by Adenauer to head the office and who became Germany’s first Defense 
Minister, was a trade unionist with little knowledge of military matters and not a very 
good manager. Amt Blank was also severely undermanned, given to factional debates be-
tween “traditionalists” and “anti-traditionalists.” As a result, many of the mundane plan-
ning issues so important to the creation of a new armed force were either given a low pri-
ority or ignored. Corum states that although the manning of Amt Blank increased from 
100 military personnel in 1952 to 300 in 1954, they were simply overwhelmed. There 
were, Corum writes, 28 sections in the Luftwaffe staff of which six, to include organiza-
tion, personnel, and communications sections, had no section leader. Corum states further 
that on the eve of rearmament in January 1955, the Luftwaffe admitted it had neither the 
time nor personnel to prepare its own plans for logistics, basing and support structure.
35
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The U.S. Air Force 
 
In February 1951, a few months after the arrival of General Lauris Norstad as 
CINCUSAFE, the USAF War Plans Division formulated the service’s first thoughts on 
German air rearmament. A staff study, sent to USAFE, contained five points: 
1. The new German Air Force (GAF) should have a minimum of 750 front-
line fighters capable of both air defense and ground support missions. 
2. The German Air Force should be equivalent to 10 U.S. fighter wings, or-
ganized in self-contained bases with German technical and administrative 
support. 
3. German Air Force personnel should be trained outside of Germany. 
4. The German Air Force should be supplied with major equipment under the 
same policies as other continental countries, with MDAP aid forthcoming 
as necessary, and 
5. 1 January 1954 should be the completion date, with force formation be-
ginning in November-December 1952. 
 
A revised study was sent to USAFE the following month which assumed that 10 
fighter wings would require 65,000-70,000 men and 1,200 pilots (using a ratio of 1.5 pi-
lots per aircraft). The study also concluded that a sufficient pool of experienced personnel 
existed in West Germany that would require only minimal training; there would be no 
problem in providing bases for the 10 wings; and of the three aircraft deemed suitable for 
the German Air Force - the French “Vampire 53,” the British “Venom,” and the U.S. F-
84E “Thunderjet” - the Venom was considered the best but the ability of the British to 
produce sufficient numbers of surplus aircraft was unknown. 
USAFE responded in May with a staff study in which it opposed the limit of 750 
aircraft. USAFE felt that this number should not be a ceiling that Germany could not ex-
ceed if it were able to obtain equipment from sources other than the U.S.
 36
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Actual USAF participation in planning for German rearmament, however, began 
on 6 April 1951 when an invitation was received by USAFE asking that a representative 
be sent to the eighth meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and German representa-
tives in Bonn. This Allied Rearmament Conference (the Bonn Conference) provided 
Germany a forum from which to offer their first official proposal for a new air force. The 
Germans, proposed an air force of approximately 1,900 aircraft with emphasis placed on 
the tactical support of ground operations. USAFE disapproved of this concept and rec-
ommended the establishment of an independent air force.
37
 General Heusinger, the Ger-
man representative stated that the new Luftwaffe would require approximately 88,000 
personnel of which 3,000 would be flight personnel. At another meeting, several weeks 
later on 20 April, Heusinger suggested that about 9,000 former Luftwaffe veterans were 
living in West Germany and that as many of them who would volunteer and qualify 
should be retrained. Since USAFE was not authorized to consult with the Luftwaffe plan-
ners in Bonn, nothing further was done.
38
 
The next significant event took place in November 1951 when former German 
Colonel Eschenauer, Chief of the Air Planning Group in Amt Blank, invited USAFE to 
discuss the reconstruction of airfields, deployment of German air units, and training for 
future air force personnel. Until then, USAFE had not been aware that such an office ex-
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isted within Amt Blank. USAFE accepted the invitation and saw the opportunity to in-
volve full staff participation. Brigadier General Robert F. Tate, Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Operations told Major General Truman H. Landon, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, 
USAFE that the time had come to increase USAFE’s efforts to liaise with this agency in 
Bonn. Tate initially envisioned a program similar to that run by the Army’s Historical 
Division with ex-Wehrmacht officers, but that was not accepted. However, on 8 January 
1952, Landon informed Eschenauer at a meeting in Wiesbaden that political complica-
tions prevented him from sending an Air Force liaison officer to Bonn. Nonetheless, 
Landon authorized the establishment of informal staff-wide contacts between USAFE 
personnel and the German Air Planning Group as an interim measure in order to develop 
a coherent plan. However, as no official contact was authorized and no formal plan for 
the rearmament of Germany had been agreed, both sides were urged to be discrete to 
avoid upsetting the French.
39
  
Thus, between January 1952 and the end of March, eight meetings were held and 
because organization and manpower issues were of primary concern to the Germans, the 
Manpower Organization Division of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Opera-
tions assumed responsibility for the liaison effort. The discussions covered a wide range 
of topics, to include headquarters organization, intelligence procedures, and ground and 
air warning operations, and included the involvement of the appropriate USAFE staff 
agencies. USAFE also provided unclassified guidance materials to the Germans to study 
and to use as planning aids. By April 1952, however, the lack of authority to disclose 
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classified information to the German planners had become a serious limitation, affecting 
especially communications and air defense planning.
40
 
On 20 May, 1952, Norstad informed Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. 
Vandenberg of the informal meetings and what had been accomplished to date and he 
requested that direct contact between USAFE and the Luftwaffe planners be authorized.
41
 
Norstadt made the argument that formalizing these discussions and designating USAFE 
as the interim Air Force agency to administer unilateral MDAP responsibilities would 
allow USAFE to exert influence over the new Luftwaffe from the very beginning. He also 
stressed that much time would be saved by giving the German planners the benefit of 
USAF experience and that the needed aid would be for rebuilding an air force, unlike the 
aid being given to other Allied nations. Despite the rationale provided by Norstadt, HQ 




The following month, on June 21, 1952, USAFE made another request in con-
junction with CINCEUR’s request to establish a MAAG-Germany Advanced Planning 
Group to establish contact with German representatives on the EDC-IC. Landon wrote 
Norstadt that: 
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This entire problem of assisting the Germans in 
their planning is made more acute by the fact that the Air 
Planning Group constitutes only a very small group in the 
Defense Ministry [sic], a body which is primarily com-
posed of former German army officers of relatively greater 
rank than the air people. In addition, the only formal con-
tact the Germans have had with U.S. Military Forces has 
been through the High Commissioner’s office to his advi-
sors, who are officers from EUCOM. We have feared, and 
in some of our early reports concerning the plans being 
formulated by the Germans have indicated, a possibility of 





On 7 July, 1952, Norstadt wrote General Thomas White, Air Force Deputy Chief 
of Staff, urging support of the USAREUR request and stressed again the need for a strong 
USAF liaison with the Germans. He wrote that “one of our greatest concerns in this mat-
ter has been in seeing that the German Air Force, when it is formed, is patterned along 
the lines that will permit its effective use as part of the defense forces of the Western 
Powers rather than see it parceled out by direct assignment to ground units for limited 
objectives. We have been disturbed that this might happen unless qualified advisors were 
on hand to work directly with the Germans in their early planning.”
44
 
Recall that at Himmerod, the Germans decided to build a new Luftwaffe and to do 
so by copying the logistical and organizational structure of the USAF. They also decided 
to subordinate Luftwaffe units to the Army command but failed to consider an air defense 
role for the Luftwaffe. To USAF planners, this was not only naïve but a “doctrine of a de-
feated enemy.” During World War II, the U.S. Army Air Force units in North Africa had 
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been subordinated to Army commanders and the system had been a failure. Subordina-
tion, as such, was anathema to USAF tactical thinkers and doctrine. It limited the flexibil-
ity of airpower and its ability to operate across a combat theater, using its speed and 
range to mass at decisive points when needed. The USAF wanted a Luftwaffe equal to the 




In mid-July, a week after Norstadt wrote White, Eschenauer was transferred and 
replaced by Colonel Richard Heuser. Before he departed, Eschenauer requested that Heu-
ser be allowed to visit USAFE and that the informal meetings, forced to cease in early 
June when the French learned of them, be resumed. Confronted with the problem of re-
establishing the informal contacts, Headquarters, USAF, decided that although permis-
sion to establish formal relationships had been denied, informal meetings had not been 
prohibited. It appears that the delays in the EDC ratification process gave USAF reason 
to allow the meetings to continue but they advised that they should not receive any undue 
publicity. Thus, on 8 August, 1952, Heuser was invited to visit USAFE and the suspen-
sion of the informal meetings ended.
46
 
Former Luftwaffe officers were not only allowed to visit USAFE but to visit U.S. 
tactical units in West Germany as well. They were provided with briefings and presenta-
tions on organization, technology, operations and even given orientation flights in the T-
33 jet trainer. Following his orientation flight, former Luftwaffe ace Colonel Johannes 
Steinhoff, one of the few former Luftwaffe pilots with jet fighter experience, came away 
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believing that refresher training would be successful only for the most experienced Ger-
man pilots and that knowledge of English was absolutely essential.
47
 It appears that dur-
ing this same period, USAF officials had also begun making inquiries regarding the num-
ber of pilots the new Luftwaffe would need. They were also interested in learning how 
many former Luftwaffe pilots would require refresher training but more importantly, how 
many could meet USAF physical and English language requirements.
48
 
Also in August, USAF influence scored a major victory. Amt Blank announced 
that the concept of subordinating Luftwaffe units to the Army was being dropped. The 
future Luftwaffe, it had decided, would be a fully independent service and would be fully 
integrated with Allied air operations. Nonetheless, the planning effort continued to be 
hampered by both political and bureaucratic restrictions imposed by the EDC, NATO, 
and even the U.S. Defense Department. In particular, just as USAREUR was being ham-
pered, security regulations precluded the sharing of information necessary to various as-
pects of air force planning. It was not until December 1953 that the Air Staff, at the urg-
ing of USAFE, granted an exemption and allowed USAFE planners to share classified 
defense information with accredited German personnel.
49
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USAFE, Detachment ‘A’ and the Advanced Planning Group 
Despite the existence of Det. A in Paris as the single, mandatory, channel of con-
tact between USAREUR, the EDC-IC and the German planners, USAFE was only al-
lowed to officially participate in planning for German rearmament when directed by 
USCINCEUR or higher authority. Det. A, however, was not manned sufficiently to per-
form its tasks nor, as mentioned above, able to effect close liaison with the German plan-
ners.
50
 USAFE, therefore, again sought a clearly defined responsibility for Luftwaffe 
planning. Similar to USAREUR’s requests to be given significantly more responsibility 
for the German Army portion of the MAAG when it came into existence, General Wil-
liam H. Tunner, then CINCUSAFE, pointed out that while EUCOM retained overall 
planning responsibility, it continually turned to USAFE to perform the majority of the 
planning activity without giving the command any “discretionary and creative” planning 
responsibility. Thus at the 3 December 1953 EUCOM CINC’s Conference, the USAFE 
presentation stated that “[I]t is clear that USAFE, among U.S. elements, has not only a 
legitimate interest, but indeed a paramount interest in German Air Force planning and 
development and logically should have commensurate responsibility. There is no ques-





USAFE’s entreaties and efforts to obtain more specific responsibilities had as lit-
tle success as USAREUR’s. Just a few weeks earlier, however, EUCOM established a tri-
service Advanced Planning Group to form the nucleus of a MAAG-Germany within EU-
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COM, which included five Air Force officers. As related above, the new organization 
moved to Bonn in August 1954 where it served as the single point of contact between HQ 
EUCOM and Amt Blank and its 800 plus German planners on all military assistance and 
training matters. The above notwithstanding, USAFE continued to seek authority for 
German Air Force planning. USAFE’s views were presented to EUCOM on 16 Septem-
ber 1954 and again on 11 October 1954. Finally, on 3 December 1954, USCINCEUR de-
fined the specific responsibilities of all three service commands as they applied to Ger-
man rearmament planning. Those given to USAFE were considerable but significantly 
less than the command desired.
52
 
The Sands Plan 
In June, 1953, Lt. Colonel Warren Sands arrived in West Germany with a team 
from Air Training Command. Sands initiated a joint EUCOM, USAFE, German Planning 
Group effort to prepare a comprehensive training plan, the object of which was to coordi-
nate personnel training with aircraft delivery and unit activation schedules. The plan was 
based on the EDC goal for Germany of 1,326 aircraft. The aircraft delivery schedule, as 
per the MDAP, was 978 combat aircraft and 270 training aircraft within three years of 
EDC ratification. Based on that, the Sands Plan, otherwise known as the German Flying 
and Technical Training Program, was completed in early July 1953.
53
 
The Sands plan provided for refresher training for approximately 600 pilots, basic 
flight training for 1,000 aviation cadets, and for non-flying technical courses. While most 
of the flying training would be conducted in West Germany, some would take place in 
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the United States. HQ USAF approved the Sands Plan and gave USAFE operational con-
trol of the training until the MAAG-Germany was established. It also assigned to USAFE 
responsibility for all aspects of the training program outlined in the Sands report. In Sep-
tember 1953, a decision was made at USAF headquarters to establish the 7330th Training 
Group, - the first of three - which was activated at Fürstenfeldbrück Air Base in southern 
Germany on 1 November 1953. Two other training bases under consideration, Erding and 
Landsberg, would not be available until 1955 and a fourth, Kaufbeuren, which was being 
used by the U.S. Army, would not be transferred until September 1954.
54
 Forty-six T-6 
propeller and 47 T-33 jet trainers were scheduled to arrive shortly after 1 January 1954.
55
 
Not long after the 7330th Training Group was activated, its Plans Division under-
took a study of the Sands Plan and found that it needed significant revisions and that 
there were areas that had not been covered and, therefore, needed development. These 
deficiencies were brought to the attention of USCINCEUR on 19 January 1954 and 
USAFE’s recommendation that it unilaterally refine the plan and select the sites for train-
ing the Germans was approved on 2 February.
56
 Two days later, on 4 February 1954, the 
7330th Training Group and an officer from EUCOM’s Advanced Planning Group began 
work on the Plan for the Implementation of the Federal Republic German Air Force 
(GAFP 55-1), the first draft of which was completed three weeks later.  
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This large-scale training program would be located at the four bases named 
above, with Erding serving as the USAFE logistics support base. A full USAF Training 
Wing would be created with approximately 1,000 U.S. personnel and 1,000 American 
and German civilians at each base. The end goal was to train a German cadre in 18 
months, after which they would take over the training and during that process the bases 
would be turned over to full German control.
57
  
Although the program had been approved on the U.S. side, it was realized that the 
assumptions made regarding the Luftwaffe structure had not been verified by German au-
thorities and would, therefore, require modification. Coordinating with the Germans re-
quired authorization to release to them MDAP programming equipment delivery data and 
a host of other required actions, to include the release of site surveys, information on the 
redeployment of USAFE units from NATO bases destined for allocation to the Germans, 
the development of a German Air Force logistical support plan, and a determination of 
USAF capability to support German training needs in the U.S.
58
 
On 31 March, HQ USAF informed USAFE that it could not support the large 
number of training spaces that had been requested in the U.S. It then directed USAFE to 
expand its capability to the maximum in Germany and to assume all, or at least the great-
er portion of the refresher training that had originally been scheduled for completion in 
the U.S. Based on this and a number of other issues needed to expand USAFE’s training 
capability, USAFE was directed to prepare a modified training plan - GAFP 55-2, re-
named The German Air Element of the EDC Force. 
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 The revised training plan contained two new sections. The first contained a con-
cept of operations and integration of the German Air Force into the EDC force structure. 
The second provided for an English language training course. The revised plan also spec-
ified that the build-up period would last four years and it even included manning details 
such as pilot to aircraft ratios and training wing locations.
59
 It was also designed to pro-
duce within the first four years 1,800 pilots (80 percent of the total) and 17,000 techni-
cians (maintenance, intelligence, communications, etc., personnel).
60
  
In June, USAF had revised the aircraft delivery schedule but due to a lack of dis-
closure authority, most of USAFE’s plans and programs were done without knowledge of 
German capabilities to support them. On 1 August 1954, the revised GAFP 55-2 was 
completed and subsequently approved pending revisions that also required input from the 
German Air Planning Group. As a result, there were many discrepancies between the 
USAFE plan and what the German planners had developed based on EDC guidance. To 
facilitate contact with German planners, HQ EUCOM moved the APG to Bonn on 11 
August 1954. On 3 December 1954, GAFP 55-2 was again revised to include a training 
program that included both flying and technical training that had been approved by the 
Germans.
61
 The newly revised plan provided for a refresher course of 16 months for vet-
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eran pilots who could speak some English, while those whose English proficiency was 
low were required to study English for an additional three months. Aviation cadets were 
sent to the U.S. for 22 months of training. Following refresher and basic training in the T-
6 and T-33 respectively, the new Luftwaffe pilots would enter the tactical aircraft course. 
Both officers and enlisted personnel would attend technical training courses and NCO’s 
would be selected from the enlisted trainees based on their academic performance, expe-
rience, and leadership abilities.
62
 GAFP 55-2 was distributed on 25 August 1954 and en-
dorsed by USCINCEUR, USAF, JCS, and the Secretary of Defense as the initial U.S. 
plan to support the German Air Force rearmament program. Five days later, on 30 August 
France rejected the EDC Treaty and the differences between it and GAFP 55-2 became 
moot. GAFP 55-2 served as the basic planning document until a new plan, GAFP 56-1, 
was completed several years later.
63
  
Air Force Facilities 
At the same time that USAFE was dealing with Luftwaffe training issues, the 
command was also attempting to acquire additional facilities and bases for them. During 
the 1951 German Rearmament Conference, Heusinger set out a tentative proposal for 25 
air bases. The German Air Planning Group had also raised this question with 
CINCUSAFE in the summer of 1952 and again in the early months of 1953. Nothing 
could be accomplished at the time however, as no authorization had been received from 
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the EDC agency responsible for determining where future Luftwaffe units would be de-
ployed.  
Finally, in January 1953, SHAPE authorized both AAFCE and ALFCE 
(LANDCENT) to begin discussions with the EDC-IC on facilities for both the German 
Army and the Luftwaffe. AAFCE and the EDC-IC failed to come to an agreement, caus-
ing planning for Luftwaffe facilities to fall behind. The result was that several former 
Luftwaffe bases were earmarked for use by German land forces. USAFE’s requests for 
additional meetings to discuss the issue were denied and in May, 1953, COMAAFCE ad-
vised that further meetings had been postponed. One month later, however, on 26 June, 
COMAAFCE asked USAFE for a list of air bases that could be released to the Germans 
and in late July, the EDC-IC reopened discussions on the allocation of non-operational 
facilities. 
USAFE and USAREUR representative met on 6 August 1953 to discuss availabil-
ity and procedures and decided that Army-type installations no longer needed by 
USAREUR would be offered to USAFE, the German Army, and the Luftwaffe in that or-
der. Air force-type facilities not needed by USAFE would be offered to USAREUR, the 
Luftwaffe, and the German Army in that order. USAFE declared that surplus space would 
be available at Neubiberg and Landsberg in September 1954, at Fürstenfeldbrück after 
December 1955, and Erding after March 1956. All four bases, however, would be re-
served for joint USAFE- Luftwaffe use. Aside from the above, no further decisions were 
made. 
The problem of installations was further exacerbated when USAFE’s dispersal 




September 1954, USAFE notified USCINCEUR that unless the FRG provided alternate 
facilities at no expense to the U.S., or unless agreement could be reached on joint occu-
pancy, USAFE would be forced to keep for itself all the bases foreseen in the German Air 




Air Force Post-EDC Issues 
As 1955 dawned, the biggest problem confronting USAFE planners in building 
the new Luftwaffe was finding qualified personnel. While the new German Army would 
benefit from thousands of former professional soldiers who had been cleared and careful-
ly screened as politically reliable, a number of them already trained and under arms in the 
Bundesgrenzschutz (the Border Police), and fully trained former German Navy officers 
and Non-commissioned officers had manned  several minesweeper flotillas maintained 
by the Allies, the Luftwaffe had no one who had been trained in high-performance jet air-
craft, current radar systems or electronics.
65
 Of the six thousand Luftwaffe pilots who had 
survived the war, only 160 were available and considered qualified to fly jets when the 
Luftwaffe began recruiting in 1955-56.
66
 Nonetheless, undeterred by the number of unre-
solved issues, such as the lack of facilities, sufficient training aids, and the long-awaited 
but still insufficient delineation of its responsibilities, USAFE had a training network in 
place by the time the FRG was admitted to NATO and given full sovereignty on 5 May 
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1955. It was fully prepared to play a substantial role in building the new Luftwaffe and to 
accept the first Luftwaffe volunteers at the beginning of 1956.
67
 
All in all, and despite being beset by internally and externally imposed obstacles, 
lack of resources, and often real responsibility, each of the three U.S. services took on 
and successfully completed the task of laying the groundwork and preparing to train the 
nucleus of the new German Armed Force, the Bundeswehr. And although the actual train-
ing took place after the time frame of this dissertation, the navy being an exception, and 
although the operational readiness of the Bundeswehr took longer to achieve than initially 
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At the beginning of this dissertation I indicated that I would show, by us-
ing previously unseen, neglected, or underused archival material, that there was 
much more to the process of rearming Germany than is evident in the existing 
literature. I also stated that as a result of my archival research, this dissertation 
would call for a revision of several conventional views of the German rearma-
ment issue, particularly the  relationship between the Department of Defense and the 
Department of State, the involvement of the JCS in this matter, the relationship between 
the U.S. and its European allies, and the “suddenness” of Acheson’s “conversion.” From 
my research, I have concluded that: first, once the decision was made to reverse 
standing U.S. policy and arm the FRG, and it was communicated to the Allies, the United 
States government lost effective control of the rearmament initiative -- it was ceded to 
France. Second, despite the efforts by two U.S. administrations, neither their pleas nor 
threats could save the European Defense Community (EDC) - the entity under which the 
FRG was to be rearmed - from defeat. Third, that the U.S. had so commitment itself to 
German rearmament within EDC that the Eisenhower Administration refused to consider 
any U.S. alternative. When the solution to the German rearmament question was imple-
mented, the U.S. found itself pledging an open-ended troop commitment on the European 
continent despite long-held U.S. plans to remove its  forces from Europe, i.e., to build 
down as the Germans built up. This pledge, which remains in force today, served to as-
suage continued European fears of a possibly resurgent Germany (as well as a potentially 




Before continuing, I should like to remind readers that this dissertation 
has brought to light, for the first time, an in-depth narration of Operation 
ECLIPSE. This plan, two years in the making, to disarm, demobilize and demil i-
tarize Germany following its defeat in World War II now adds to the existing lit-
erature and highlights a segment of World War II and post-hostilities history 
previously known only to a very few.
1
 The narration of Operation ECLIPSE in 
Chapter 2 thereby brings to the surface the fact that: 
 The degree of interservice and interagency rivalry and squabbling, 
specifically in Washington D.C. over post-hostility policy and respon-
sibility had the effect of leaving General Eisenhower and his staff at 
SHAPE with little or no guidance as to how to proceed after the sur-
render; 
 The driving force behind Operation ECLIPSE was a combat-proven 
British Colonel by the name of Tom Neville Grazebrook. 
 The European Advisory Commission, whose function it was to lay 
out, inter alia, the terms of German surrender, failed in that and in 
many of its key tasks and that the actual surrender document was put 
together at the last minute by Eisenhower’s staff . 
 The U.S. military contemplated exiling for life the officers of the 
German General Staff and their families. 
 U.S. and British authorities, thinking there would be massive disor-
der in Germany following the defeat, believed that a massive show of 
ground forces and air power would be required for several years after 
Germany’s surrender to insure compliance with the surrender terms 
and prevent a repeat of the violations of the Versailles Treaty.  
 
Beyond the surrender of Germany and once the Cold War began, however, 
the use of archival documents enabled this dissertation to highlight the fact that 
the initial U.S. strategic war plans were developed without political guidance. 
And even afterward, when that guidance was given, this dissertation underscores 
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the early recognition by senior Defense Department officials that the  U.S.’s ini-
tial nuclear superiority notwithstanding, there was no way Western Europe could 
have been defended without the addition of German troops, which meant that the 
continent would have to be lost and subjected to Soviet occupation for two or 
more years before the Allies could even hope to win it back again.
2
 
This dissertation also shows that while the State Departmen t’s official 
policy was to keep Germany disarmed and demilitarized for decades , and that 
Germany needed first to be brought into the Western camp economically and po-
litically. This policy, however, did not reflect a consensus. While there were 
many in the Department of State who felt that arming the FRG would provoke 
the Soviets into attacking before rearmament was complete and German forces 
could be fielded, others however, including Acheson, believed that if anything 
would provoke the Soviets, it would be the continued weakness of the Allied mil-
itary position. Acheson had long been an advocate of the necessity of dealing 
with the USSR from “positions of strength.”
3
 Furthermore, he obviously had 
thought privately about German rearmament long before the outbreak of the Ko-
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rean War, which strongly suggests, as I argue, that his “conversion” was not as 
quick or surprising as many have come to believe.
4
 
Another set of issues addressed in this dissertation was the extensive in-
volvement of the three U.S. services in planning for the training of the new Ger-
man armed force. Although this matter has only recently surfaced in the scholar-
ly literature, the role and interrelationship of the three services in preparing and 
planning the rearmament of the FRG has not previously been looked at in a com-
prehensive fashion, nor does it appear that the authors have had the use of previ-
ously classified histories, such as those that I was able to obtain and used.
5
 
This dissertation makes it clear that despite the repeated urging by the JCS 
and the Secretary of Defense to arm West Germany by bringing it rapidly into 
NATO, Acheson decided that the process had to be led by the French. As a r e-
sult, and despite having a U.S. plan for an integrated European Defense Force, 
Acheson allowed the French to assume the leadership but he did not expect them 
to present a plan that was unworkable from the start. It also makes clear that the 




Additionally, while the argument has been made that the U.S. remained 
the leader of the Alliance, this dissertation argues that when it came to the actual 
                                                     
4
 Acheson was well aware of the many military studies and papers that had been written advocating the 
rearmament of the FRG and he, himself stated that the State Department had “not yet gotten that far.” He 




See Chapter 6. 
   
6




process of arming the FRG, the U.S. Government became an onlooker, relegated 
to the sidelines.
7 
Nothing that either the Truman or the Eisenhower Administra-
tions did, whether it was accepting and blindly supporting the EDC, providing 
repeated assurances of maintaining an adequate troop presence in Europe as long 
as needed, or even threatening France with a cutoff of aid funds, enabled them to 
induce France to ratify the EDC Treaty - a plan of French making - and accept 
German rearmament. 
Lastly, research for this dissertation shows that even after the defeat of the 
EDC, the U.S. commitment to it was such that U.S. policymakers were left with-
out an alternative; “[they] did not have any constructive proposals to advance.”  
In 1953 for example, the JCS had been directed to “suspend” consideration of 
alternatives, and as the defeat of the EDC became obvious, the State Department 
refused to face the possibility that the EDC would not be approved. It refused to 
discuss alternatives for fear the French would find out, thus dooming the EDC’s 
chances for ratification.
8 
Both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dul-
les continued to seek a way to bring a German contingent into an integrated Eu-
ropean Defense Force as a means of controlling the Germans while adding their 
combat power to the defense of Western Europe.
9
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The NSC, however, continued to debate internally what it and the Secre-
tary of State should do, i.e., whether or not another form of EDC would work or 
whether it should seek to arm Germany unilaterally or together with the UK. On 
16 September, the NSC Planning Board drafted a paper, NSC 5433, Immediate 
U.S. Policy toward Europe. This paper, was an attempt to formulate an approach 
that would assist the U.S. in reaching its objective of arming the FRG. It began 
by stating that in view of France’s rejection of EDC, the U.S. should pursue “its 
present objectives in Europe by means other than EDC.” It also laid out a pro-
gram of action that included restoring sovereignty to the FRG, admitting the 
FRG to full membership in NATO, and obtaining acceptable safeguards on Ge r-
man rearmament among others, to include being prepared, with appropriate legis-
lative authority and if necessary as a quid pro quo, to commit the U.S. to main-
tain troops in Europe. 
Secretary Dulles told the NSC that he was convinced the Europeans were 
more concerned with a replacement for EDC as it was their problem and no t a 
U.S. problem. He continued by saying that if the Europeans agree on a substitute 
for EDC, they would want to know if the U.S. would cooperate with them as was 
done with EDC. Dulles also told the NSC that if France “torpedoes” the NATO 
solution, there was no good alternative and that the U.S. must not assume it 
could unilaterally rearm Germany if the French refused to agree.10 
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The Department of Defense -- obviously tired of repeated delays, debates 
and what appeared as procrastination on the part of the State Department -- 
sought what it always had sought -- the immediate, controlled rearmament of a 
national German army that would be integrated directly into NATO with or with-
out French participation. It acknowledged that “[F]ailure to obtain French coop-
eration for a German contribution … will require a basic change in NATO com-
mitments and structure…” but that this should not deter the United States from 
working out the best possible arrangements with Western Germany in our own 
interests as well as the interests of a free Europe.
11
 Secretary of Defense Charles 
Wilson was quite explicit telling the NSC that if the U.S. had to “buy the French 
into supporting the program of action, the deal wouldn’t be worth anything.” 12 
Ironically, according to both Hitchcock and Trachtenberg, it was Mendes-
France who came up with the essential elements of a plan to solve the German 
question.
13
 Dubbed “little NATO,” he passed this idea to the British and it was 
put into motion by Prime Minister Anthony Eden using the Brussels Treaty Or-
ganization. Nonetheless, Dulles remained “skeptical,” continuing to stand by 
EDC. He did not approve of Eden’s solution because it did not have enough “su-
                                                                                                                                                 
achieving a German defense contribution. Neither was he in favor of offering a commitment. Steininger, 
Op. cit., pp. 82, 92, 93, 97, 106. Emphasis added. 
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 The British also preferred the NATO option. In a telegram to President Eisenhower, Churchill called the 
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it.” Message from the Prime Minister to the President, 18 September 1954, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-
Herter Series, Box 4, DDEL. 
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pranational characteristics. The U.S. again stood aside, “defeated and demoral-
ized,” realizing that the Europeans did not want an American plan, only Ameri-
can encouragement and assurances.
14
 Lastly, when the British made its historic 
commitment of four divisions and a tactical air force to the defense of contine n-
tal Europe, the U.S. was left with no choice but to give its own assurances to 
maintain troops in Europe as long as needed in order to recapture the leadership 
on the “German Question” that it had given up five years earlier.15 
The London and Paris negotiations Eden engineered with the EDC signa-
tories led to the expansion of the Brussels Treaty (Western Union) Organization 
and the creation of the Western European Union with West Germany as a mem-
ber in December 1954, and eventually to the final admission of West Germany to 
NATO in May, 1955. These actions brought closure to America’s most important 
European policy issue of the period. In the end, there was nothing the U.S. could 
do, as Dulles had indicated earlier, but to cooperate. On 1 February 1955, Eisen-
hower again provided the assurances the Europeans had been looking for, com-
mitting U.S. forces to an open-ended stay on the European continent, thus prov-
ing the hypothesis set forth at the beginning of this dissertation. Three months 
later, on 9 May 1955, ten years after World War II in Europe ended, Germany 
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was formally admitted to NATO. The way was now clear for the arming of the 




Appendix A - The European Advisory Commission (EAC) 
The European Advisory Commission (EAC) was a creature of the Tripartite Moscow 
Conference of Foreign Ministers of October 1943. Britain’s Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, 
who proposed the Commission, desired it to have a broad scope that would include a wide range 
of European problems caused by the war but excluded military operations. The Commission was 
to be consultative only and not have any executive authority, thus it could only accept issues rec-
ommended by the governments of its members and its decisions required unanimity. One of its 
first tasks was to make detailed recommendations regarding the terms of surrender and, by impli-
cation, the disarmament and demilitarization of the European states at war with the three Allies. 
The EAC held its first formal meeting in London on January 14, 1944 with John G. Winant, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain representing the United States, Sir William Strang of the For-
eign Office representing Great Britain, and the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain,   Feodor T. 
Gousev representing the USSR.
1
 In early November 1944, the Provisional French Government 




 In all, the EAC held 20 formal meetings and issued twelve signed agreements, of which 
five pertained to Germany. Of those five, only three provided broad guidance regarding the de-
militarization of Germany. They were: 
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1) The Unconditional Surrender of Germany. There were two versions of this document; 
the first, which took six months to negotiate, was approved on 25 July 1944, and amended on 1 
May 1945 to allow for France’s accession to the EAC and to allow the French representative to 
sign it while the second, which contained a paragraph that discussed the dismemberment of Ger-
many, was never shown to the French.
3
 On 4 May 1945, just days before Germany’s surrender, 
SHAEF Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith informed Ambassador Winant that SHAEF 
had no authoritative copy of the surrender instrument nor had the Allied governments delegated 
to SHAEF the authority to sign that document. Thus none of the two drafts that had been sent to 
SHAEF were used. Instead, SHAEF drew up and used a briefer surrender document but, at the 
urging of Ambassador Winant, revised it to include a paragraph (paragraph 4) that did not pre-
clude the use of a surrender document drawn up by the EAC at a later date.
4
 The only mention of 
disarmament contained in the EAC document was in Article 2 (a), which stated that “All armed 
forces of Germany or under German control…equipped with weapons, will be completely dis-
armed….” The SHAEF document makes no mention of disarmament at all.
5
  
2) Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Au-
thority with Respect to Germany. This document was approved on 21 May 1945 and signed by 
the four powers in Berlin on 5 June 1945. Virtually all of the 15 articles in this declaration di-
rected the German Armed Forces to undertake certain actions following the cessation of hostili-
ties regarding their weapons and equipment, etc., but only Article 2(a) specifically stated that “All 
armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including 
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land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all other forces of auxilia-
ry organizations equipped with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, handing over their weap-




3) Certain Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Germany. This document, agreed 
on July 25, 1945, contained thirteen sections with various additional restrictions that inter alia 
related to finances, shipping, property, and the abolition of German militaristic organizations. 
Specifically, Section I, paragraph 1 stated that: “all German land, naval and air forces, including 
the S.S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo and all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the 
General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations 
and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations 
which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abol-
ished….”  Paragraph 2 continued by prohibiting “All forms of military training, military propa-
ganda and military activities of whatever nature…as well as the formation of any organization 
initiated to further any aspect of military training and the formation of war veterans’ organiza-
tions or other groups which might develop military characteristics or which are designed to carry 
on the German military tradition….”
7
  
In the same vein, Section V, paragraph 13, prohibited the “manufacture, production and 
construction, and the acquisition from outside Germany, of war materiels….” It also required that 
all “research, experiment, development and design directly or indirectly related to war or the pro-
duction of war materiel….” be placed at the disposal of the Allied Representatives. 
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A fourth document, Control Machinery in Germany, signed on 14 November 1944, pro-
vided for the initially tripartite and later quadripartite control of Germany through the Allied Con-
trol Authority (ACA). While not mentioning disarmament per se, it delineated the composition of 
the ACA, mandating an Allied Control Council and a Coordinating Committee. It also provided 
for the Coordinating Committee’s subsidiary agencies whose function it was inter alia the control 
and disarmament of Germany.
8
 
The EAC came to the end of its existence with the publication of the Communiqué, Re-
port on the Tripartite Conference on Berlin on 2 August 1945. The Communiqué, which also an-
nounced the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, noted “with satisfaction that the 
Commission had ably discharged its principle tasks” but felt that further work for the control of 
Germany fell within the competence of the Allied Control Council. It therefore recommended that 
the EAC be dissolved.
9
 The EAC accepted the recommendation as a mandate and agreed to it. Its 
final report was dated 10 September 1945 although discussion on it continued into November.
10
 
In his report on the activities of the EAC, Ambassador Winant pointed out that the sup-
port given the Commission by the U.S. had been uneven, given the difficulties within the gov-
ernment in formulating a unified German policy.
11 
Commending the work of the U.S. Joint Advi-
sors to the U.S. Representative, he reported that the U.S. Joint Advisors had prepared 36 draft 
Directives designed to provide General Eisenhower with agreed policy guidance. Of this total, 24 
draft Directives (seven of which dealt disarmament issues) and five draft Agreements were ap-
proved by “appropriate authorities” in Washington for circulation and negotiation in the EAC. 
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Although these Directives had been circulated within the EAC, none had reached the point of be-
ing negotiated. Winant, however, stated that they had informed and influenced the policies of the 
other Allied governments and that these draft Directives had provided the U.S. Group Control 
Council (U.S. Group CC)  its first systematic guidance for preparatory planning. They also were 
incorporated to a large extent in the General Directive for Germany.
 12
                                                     
12
 FRUS, Vol. I, 1945, Diplomatic Paper: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945, The 
Work of the European Advisory Commission, A Summary Report, 12 July 1945, pp. 292-294. For a list of 
the U.S. draft Directives, see FRUS, Vol. 3, 1945, Diplomatic Papers, European Advisory Commission, 
Austria, Germany, pp. 537-539 that says only 23 Directives were circulated. Winant stated that the lack of 
agreement on these directives was due to the failure of the Soviet government to provide instructions to its 







Appendix B – List of Operation ECLIPSE Memoranda1 
 
 
Memo No.  Title and Nature of Document 
 
 
1.   Instrument of surrender, surrender order and sanctions 
 
4.   Outline Air Plan 
 
5.   Supplies, services and facilities in GERMANY 
 
6.   Signal communications and RADAR 
 
7.   Intelligence requirements and plan 
 
8.   Care and evacuations of PW 
 
9.   Primary Disarmament of German Land Forces 
 
10.   Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces 
 
11.   Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces 
 
12.   CA consideration in Liberated Territories 
 
13.   CA consideration in GERMANY 
 
14.   Control of displaced persons 
 
15.   Psychological Warfare Requirements and plan 
 
16.   PR considerations and plan 
 
17.   Disbandment of German Armed Forces 
 
18.   War criminals and security suspects 
 
19.   Powers and rights over German persons 
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Appendix C:  Orders, Directives and Laws dealing with the Disarma-
ment and Demilitarization of Germany 
 
 
Military Government Law No. 12: Abolition of Employment Preferences in Favor 
of Former Members of the German Armed Forces and Others 
 
Military Government Law No. 12, enacted on 1 Aug 1948, repealed any provision 
of GE law that required employment preference be given to former members of the Ger-
man armed forces or other Versorgungswärter (officials with claims on the government?) 
for government posts or other public positions, or conferred upon them preferential 
treatment in appointment to, remuneration for, or promotion in any government post. 
 
 Military Government Law No. 54: Use of Wehrmacht Property 
 
 Military Government Law No. 54, enacted on 27 Aug 1945, returned all 
military property could be used for agriculture and/or the settlement of Germans and oth-
ers to the Land (State) in which it was situated. 
 
 Military Government Law No. 56: Prohibition of Excessive Concentration 
of German Economic Power 
 
 Military Government Law No. 56, also known as the Decartelization Law, 
was enacted on 12 Feb 1947 expressly to ”(i) prevent Germany from endangering the 
safety of her neighbors and again constituting a threat to international peace, (ii) to de-
stroy Germany’s potential to wage war….” 
 
 Military Government Law No. 154: Elimination and Prohibition of Mili-
tary Training 
 
 Military Government Law No. 154, which became effective on 14 Jul 
1945, specified various punishments, to include the death penalty, for violation of this 
law. 
 
 Military Government Ordinance No. 1 made the unlawful possession or 
control of firearms, ammunition, explosives, or “war materiel” a capital offense punisha-
ble by death. 
 
 Military Government Ordinance No. 4 prohibited the wearing of German 
military uniforms. 
 
 Allied Control Council Law No. 8: Elimination and Prohibition of Mili-
tary Training 
 
Allied Control Council (ACC) Law No. 8, had a somewhat controversial begin-




and in JCS 1103 as well. On 4 November 1944, a recommendation was made to amend 
paragraph 9 of JCS 1103 to include prohibition of all forms of parades, e.g., military, po-
litical, civilian or sports. It also recommended the prohibition of military music and other 
German and Nazi anthems as well as the display of German national and Nazi flags and 
paraphernalia. On 19 February, 1945, officers of the Demobilization Branch, Army 
(Ground) Division conferred and established that such a law was necessary and recom-
mended it be published by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). 
The draft was subsequently approved by U.S. Group Control Council (U.S. Group CC), 
who also recommended SHAEF approve and promulgate it. 
 
SHAEF’s G-5 Division (Legal Branch), however, saw several redundancies in the 
draft, claiming that much of what was in the draft was either covered already by existing 
laws and ordinances or would soon be. As a result, G-5 felt the law was not needed at that 
time but should be considered again after SHAEF was no longer responsible for Germa-
ny. These arguments were rebutted by U.S. Group CC who argued that the provisions of 
the draft law were covered by existing ordinances only in an “extremely technical sense.” 
U.S. Group CC argued further that this law on the Elimination and Prohibition of Mili-
tary Training was a “fundamental and basic element of Allied long-range policy” and its 
contents needed to be presented to the German people in a clear and understandable man-
ner. This argument won the day and the ACC promulgated the law on 30 November 1945 
with but few changes to the original version. 
 
Allied Control Council Law 23: Prohibition of Military Construction in Germany 
 
This law, which was enacted on 17 April 1946, prohibited, among other things: 
 The preparation, possession, or even making use of models or plans of any 
military installation. 
 The design, planning, fabrication, erection or construction of any military 
installation, or any civil installation that could possibly be used for war purposes, whether 
for land, sea or air. 
Penalties for violating this law, depending on the seriousness of the violation, en-
compassed a wide range of prison terms up to and including the death penalty. 
 
Allied Control Council Law 25: Control of Scientific Research 
 
Enacted on 7 May 1946, this law prohibited all research on a number of subjects, 
outlined in four schedules, that had military application. This law was supplemented by 
an OMGUS Regulation that refined the requirements of the Law and included forms that 
required approval for the conducted of scientific research. 
 
Allied Control Council Law 34: Dissolution of the Wehrmacht 
 
 Although the Wehrmacht was dissolved by Allied proclamation No. 2 and 
Disbandment Directives -9, this Law, enacted on 26 August 1946, was seen as necessary 




other name and to declare such any such reconstitution illegal. According to Article V of 
this Law, violators could also be subject to the death penalty.  
 
Allied Control Council Law 43: Prohibition of the Manufacture, Import, Export, 
Transport or Storage of War Materiels. 
 
This Law was enacted on 20 December 1946 to prevent the rearming of Germany. 
It’s very specific provisions were determined to include even the production of such ma-
teriels for the occupation forces, as it would then create a conflict with ACC Law 25, i.e., 
it would allow the Germans to retain a degree of “technical know-how” regarding the 
manufacture of weapons of war. 
 
Allied Control Council Law 46: Abolition of the State of Prussia. 
 
As it had been determined that the Prussian State had been the bearer of milita-
rism and reaction in Germany from the earliest days, this Law was enacted on 25 Febru-
ary 1947 to “assure the further reconstruction of the political life of Germany on a demo-
cratic basis….” 
 
Allied Control Council Directive 16: Arming of German Police. 
 
This Directive, published on 6 November 1945, authorized the rearming of the 
German police for purposes of maintaining law and order. It prohibited the use of auto-
matic weapons, however, and weapons or ammunition of German manufacture, at least 
until there were sufficient non-German weapons available. The Directive further limited 
the issuance of weapons to pistols and handguns except that rural and frontier police were 
allowed to be armed with carbines. No weapon was to be issued to any unit that had not 
completed denazification and had not removed any person deemed hostile to the military 
government. Ammunition was strictly limited to 10 rounds per municipal police and 20 
rounds to rural and frontier police. Police units were to be held to strict accountability for 
all weapons issued and for all ammunition issued and expended. 
 
Allied Control Council Directive 18: For Disbandment and Dissolution of the 
German Armed Forces. 
 
This Directive was issued on 6 December 1945 to specify procedures by which 
former members of the Wehrmacht, POW’s and non-German members would be demobi-
lized, discharged, and sent to their previous homes or repatriated as the case might be. 
 
Allied Control Council Directive 22: Clearance of Minefields and Destruction of 
Fortifications, Underground Installations and Military Installations in Germany. 
 
This directive, published on 6 December 1945, began by stating that its purpose 
was to forever prevent Germany from using these facilities. All those listed in the appen-
dix, except those needed by the occupation forces or civil population, were to be de-




months; Priority II, within a further four years, so that all these facilities would be de-
stroyed within five and one-half years from the date the directive was published. Military 
Zone commanders were given discretion to add to the list and to destroy any military 
structure not listed in the appendix. 
 
Allied Control Council Directive 23: Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in 
Germany. 
 
 Issued on 17 December 1945, this directive prohibited all sport activities, organi-
zations, clubs, etc., that were involved in aviation, parachuting, gliding, fencing, military 
drill or display, and shooting with firearms. 
 
 Allied Control Council Directive 28: Reports on Disposal of German War 
Materiel. 
 
 Issued 26 April 1946 provided for the expeditious destruction and disposal 
of captured or surrendered German war materiel located in Germany. It was amended by 
Control Council Directive 46 which set a target date of 1 May 1948. 
 
Allied Control Council Directive 30: Legislation Dealing with the Liquidation of 
German Military and Nazi Memorials and Museums. 
  
Enacted on 13 May 1946 amended on 12 June 1946 prohibited the “planning, de-
signing, erection, installation, posting or other display” of a wide range of objects , to in-
clude street signs, statues, tablets, etc., that would keep German military tradition alive, 
serve to revive it, or serve to “glorify incidents of war.” The same directive prohibited the 
re-opening of military museums and exhibitions. Only monuments erected to the memory 
of deceased members of military organizations     - except paramilitary organizations, the 
S.S. and the Waffen S.S. - were allowed as were tombstones that existed or were to be 
erected in the future as long as they carried no indication of militarism or Nazism. 
 
Allied Control Council Directive 32: Disciplinary Measures Against Managing 
and Administrative Staffs of Educational Institutions, Teaching Staffs, and Students 
Guilty of Militaristic, Nazi or Anti-Democratic Propaganda. 
 
Enacted on 26 June 1946, this directive, as its titled implied, provided for the 
dismissal/expelling of such individuals and left them liable to criminal prosecution. 
 
 
Allied Control Council Directive 39: Liquidation of German War and Industrial 
Potential. 
 
 Issued on 2 October 1946, this directive was written to take into consideration 
those remaining elements of German war-making potential that had not been covered by 




were to either destroy completely, declare available for reparations, or leave intact for 
peace-time economic use (in accordance with certain stipulations). 
 
 Title 2: Eradication of Nazism and Militarism. 
 
 Dealt with the responsibility of the Military Government to accomplish the 
task of destroying German militarism and removing all Nazi and militarist influences 
from the public, cultural, and economic life of the German people. This was one of the 
principle objectives of the war as well as having been mandated by the Potsdam Agree-
ment.  
 
 In the main, the Title pertained to the de-Nazification procedures, which 
was made the responsibility of the Germans. Demilitarization had, by 1946, been com-
pleted in terms of personnel and was still underway in terms of physical plant, such as 




Appendix D:  U.S. Approved Draft Directives of the U.S. Joint Advisors to 





1.  Disposition of German and German Controlled Naval Craft, Equipment and Facilities 
 EAC(44)34, 24 Nov 44. 
 
2.  Disposition of German and German Controlled Aircraft, Aeronautical Equipment and Facili-
ties 
 EAC(44)37, 24 Nov 44. 
 
3.  Disposition and Control of the German Police     
EAC(44)38, 25 Nov 44 
 
4.  Control and Disposal of Nationals, Armed Forces and Property of Enemy Countries other than 
Germany     
EAC(44)39, 25 Nov 44 
 
5.  Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training in Germany     
EAC(44)43,  8 Dec 44 
 
6.  Disposal of German Armed Forces     
EAC(45)1,  1 Jan 45 
 
7.  Disarmament of the German Armed Forces and Disposal of Enemy Equipment     
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Appendix E: The Himmerod Conference and the Bonn Report 
 
Unbeknownst to the U.S., the September 1950 meeting of the NATO Foreign 
Ministers in New York led Chancellor Adenauer to call a conference of German military 
experts to meet from 6-9 October 1950 at Cloister Himmerod, near Wittlich, in the Eiffel 
Mountains to discuss and lay out the manner and form in which a German contribution to 
the defense of Western Europe should take. Fifteen former Wehrmacht officers took part: 
nine from the Army (Heer) and three each from the Air Force (Luftwaffe) and Navy (Ma-
rine). Despite some significant differences, it is interesting that this conference, which 
dealt with a wide range of military issues, to include recruitment, education and training, 
and most important, the nature of the military tradition that could be imparted to soldiers 
serving in a democratic society, as well as strategy, arrived independently at the size of a 
German contribution that roughly paralleled that discussed above by the JCS.
1
 
The conference concluded that the Federal Republic’s contribution by end 1952 
should consist of an army of 12 armored divisions, to include tanks, artillery and anti-
aircraft artillery, in six Corps, for a total of 250,000 men. While manpower numbers were 
not given, the conference saw a minimum need for a Luftwaffe of six tactical air wings 
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totaling 831 aircraft: 180 reconnaissance planes, 279 fighter-bombers and 372 fighters. 
Similarly, no manpower figures were given for the naval contingent but the conference 
underscored the Soviet strength in the Baltic and thus indicated a need for landing craft, 
small submarines, torpedo boats and minelayers, naval aircraft (both reconnaissance and 
fighters), submarine hunters and minesweepers. 
In June, Army G-3 Plans Division circulated a paper containing a summary of the 
High Commissioners-FRG talks (the Bonn Report) that began in January.
2
 The summary 
indicated that the FRG accepted a number of the safeguards proposed by NATO, among 
the more important were German acceptance that its participation would be under NATO, 
that German air units would be under SACEUR (Himmerod recommendations were that 
they be under German Army command), that recruitment of Germans would initially be 
by volunteers followed by conscription, that a German arms industry would be estab-
lished only as requested by France, that a German defense administration would be civil-
ian and under the control of the Bundestag, and that the end strength of German land 
formations would not exceed 20% of the total available to SACEUR. 
The Germans rejected the RCT size limit and insisted that the basic unit for Ger-
man ground forces be a 10,000 man division, preferably armored. Accordingly, they also 
rejected the prohibition on heavy armored formations. They also insisted that there 
should be a central German Defense Ministry. Consistent with Germany’s demand for 
equality, they rejected Allied control of the future German defense administration as well 
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as supervision of officer recruiting, and the restriction on not having intelligence, plans 
and operations functions above the tactical level. Lastly, they rejected the limit on the di-
vision being the largest national ground force contribution. 
Not too long afterward, Handy forwarded to the JCS comments of its European 
representative on the Bonn Report in which he praised the German approach as being re-
alistic and sound. He opined that more desirable results would be obtained if each nation, 
including Germany, would be allowed to contribute forces at corps or even army level. 
The message approved the establishment of a single German defense ministry and cau-
tioned that the “progressive creation of German military forces must be keyed to the abil-




On 6 August, the JCS submitted its assessment of the Bonn Report and with few 
exceptions, considered the German proposals acceptable. The JCS agreed that German 
ground formations should be of at least division size but they disagreed with the German 
desire to have all armored divisions as not coinciding with NATO requirement and logis-
tically difficult. Regarding the German desire to have Corps commands, the JCS waffled 
somewhat and addressed the possibility of an “international” corps as meeting Germany’s 
requirements. In the end, the JCS indicated that any corps organization should be flexible 
and allow SACEUR to deploy all NATO forces as he deemed necessary. 
Regarding the Luftwaffe, the JCS accepted the view that materiel procurement 
provided the greatest obstacle to its organization. They recommended that for planning 
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purposes, the Luftwaffe seek to contribute a total of only 750 aircraft, organized into ten 
fighter wings of three squadrons each, by end 1954. JCS estimated that an eventual min-
imum Luftwaffe contribution would be in the neighborhood of 1,600 to 1,800 aircraft. 
Lastly, JCS concurred with the Army Staff and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, 
Europe (CINCUSAREUR), that the primary mission should be tactical air support for the 




On 1 September, G-3 Plans recommended adoption of the Bonn Report but did 
not agree with U.S. Air Force and Navy recommendations to create a Deputy Inspector 
General for each of the three German services. G-3’s rationale was that “present planning 
is largely for the establishment of Army forces.”
5
  
On 10 September, the JCS drafted a memo to the Secretary of Defense stating that 
they had reviewed the Bonn Report and the interim Report of the Conference for the Or-
ganization of a European Defense Community and noted that while the concept of a Eu-
ropean Defense Force had been accepted by NSC 115, the Interim Report did not provide 
for the raising of German forces at the earliest possible date as required by NSC 115. The 
JCS then stated that a specific plan to insure an immediate German contribution was es-
sential and that such a plan should be developed under SACEUR’s direction.
6
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Along with those thoughts, the JCS submitted an updated “Force Basis” to be 
used for planning purposes for the German contribution. This “Basis” specified ten Army 
divisions, of which four would be armored and six infantry along with Corps and Army 
type service support units. It allocated 10 fighter-bomber wings (to include tactical re-
connaissance aircraft) to the Luftwaffe, and for the Marine it allocated 11,500 personnel 









                                                                                                                                                 
(Tripartite) Talks, that the Pentagon considered inadequate, were sent to the Secretary of Defense. Memo-
randum for the Secretary of Defense, Washington Foreign Ministers Meeting (Tripartite Talks) Draft Posi-
tion Paper (WFM T-4/2a), dated 8 September 1951, entitled “European Defense Forces and the Question 
of German Contribution to Defense,” 12 September 1951, Ibid. 
 
7
 Appendix “B” to Enclosure “A,” JCS2124/59, 1September 1951, Ibid. The E-Boat’s actual designation is 
S-Boot for Schnell or fast boat. The WW II Allies used the designation “E” to signify the vessel as an “en-
emy” fast attack boat. On 18 October 1951, the Military Committee of the Conference for the Organization 
of a European Defense Community agreed on the basic unit size for the various “Groupements” of the Eu-
ropean Defense Force and settled on peacetime/ wartime strengths as follows: Infantry - 14,500/17,000; 
Armored - 12,500/14,500; Mechanized - 12,700/14,700. This agreement resolved the long-standing differ-
ences between the French and the Germans as the French had initially insisted that any German formation 
larger that an RCT of 4,000-6,000 personnel was politically impossible. To alleviate French sensibilities, 
however, the term division was avoided. Attachment to Paris 2269, October 18, 6 p.m., RG 59, General 
Records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Lot 56D38, Records Relating to the Eu-





Appendix F: Acheson’s “Single Package” 
 
How Acheson’s “Single Package” came to be is still a matter of debate. Most scholars 
take their cue from Acheson’s Present at the Creation in which he relates that State and Defense 
debated the issue for two weeks before a compromise, which he then carried to the Tripartite 
Meeting in New York on 12 September, was reached. The “package,” which had been approved 
by President Truman just a few days earlier and which the French labeled the ‘Bombshell at the 
Waldorf,’ was intended to be offered to the Allies on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis. It contained 
several key elements: an offer to increase U.S. forces in Europe by approximately 6 divisions, 8 
tactical air groups and appropriate naval forces, and participation, along with the United Kingdom 
and all the other NATO armies in a combined European defense force, with an international staff 
and a ‘supreme commander.’ This offer, however, was contingent on the Allies boosting the ca-
pabilities (and size) of their forces and accepting the inclusion of German contingents that would 
be added at division level but without a German General Staff.
1
  
Acheson later called the ‘single package’ a mistake and claimed that he was forced into 
accepting it from the military, a claim that is supported by many. However, all the available evi-
dence and documentation indicates that by the time the so-called compromise with the military 
was reached, Acheson had already decided on the necessity for Germany to be armed: “If there 
was to be any defense at all,” he had said, “it had to be based on a forward strategy” and Germa-
ny’s role had to be primary.  
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Acheson also stated that “the Pentagon needed no persuasion,” a fact we know from 
Chapter 4.
2
 Of particular interest in this respect, however, is David S. McLellan’s comment that 
Acheson may have wanted to avoid a conflict with Bradley and that the JCS insisted that the 
“recommendations must be submitted and accepted as a whole.”
 
While one cannot prove a nega-
tive, this claim and other similar statements by McClellan are not supported by the available doc-
umentation. On August 30, 1950, Acheson, Byroade, Paul Nitze and George Perkins met with 
General Bradley to discuss the JCS response to Truman’s eight questions. According to the only 
memorandum of that meeting, prepared by Byroade, the two men agreed on the Army’s answers 
to the President’s questions. The memorandum contained no mention of any major disagreement.
3
  
Furthermore, both Trachtenberg and McMahon agree that Acheson was neither a person 
to be easily cowed nor one who would subscribe to a position he did not approve.
4
 Thus, as Chap-
ter 4 relates and underscores the Joint Staff ‘s position of wanting Germany armed through 
NATO, one would have to conclude that if Acheson had been forced to accept the military posi-
tion, it would have been an national Germany army in NATO.  
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According to a Memorandum of Conversation regarding German rearmament in which 
Bevin, Acheson, Roddy Barclay and Lucius Battle took part, Acheson is cited as saying that if he 
had to present the matter [at the forthcoming meeting of the Defense Ministers], he would “do so 
as one complete conception pointing out the importance of all parts.”
5
 Thus, I am convinced, as is 
Trachtenberg and Gehrz, and I believe the evidence supports the conclusion that if the package as 
presented to Bevin and Schuman was a mistake, it was not that it mandated the arming of the 
Federal Republic but that it was presented as a virtual all or nothing demand.
6
  
Lastly, the alleged “bombshell” was, in fact, no bombshell at all. Recall from Chapter 5 
the 2 September cable Acheson sent both Ambassadors Bruce in Paris and Douglas in London 
instructing them to “urgently call” on the French and British Foreign Ministers, Schuman and 
Bevin, to inform them of U.S. thinking regarding the creation of a unified Defense Force in Eu-
rope, the appointment of a Supreme Commander and the integration of German units in such a 
force without creating a German National Army. Acheson specifically asked that Schuman and 
Bevin be told that “US participation in the defense of Eur [sic] and in the direction of such a uni-
fied Force would involve greater commitments than we have heretofore been willing to consider. 
Whether or not we actually make such commitments will depend on whether or not the Europe-
ans are themselves willing to make greater efforts resulting in adequate steps to increase their 
forces in being.”
7
 Thus the stage was set for a significant unintentional consequence of the U.S.’s 
German policy, the refusal of France to accept the “arm Germany” portion of the U.S. offer and 
the five-year battle to put Germans back in uniform.
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Appendix G: The Great Debate 
 
The “Single Package” and the decision to send additional troops to Europe to 
support the request that the FRG be armed created a second unanticipated consequence - 
this time, however, the challenge was to the President’s powers and authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief, and it came primarily from the Senate. While there was unanimity with-
in the Senate on the need for the U.S. to check Soviet expansion in Europe, this unanimi-
ty did not extend to how that was to be accomplished.
1
  
Already incensed over the “loss” of China to the communists, the setback in Ko-
rea resulting from Chinese entry into the war in November 1950, and the administration’s 
push for a European strategy that included sending additional U.S. troops to mainland 
Europe, the Senate turned even more against the President and his Secretary of State. 
What became known as “The Great Debate of 1951” actually began in late 1950, but took 
shape when the 82
nd
 Congress convened in January 1951. 
Led by Senators Robert A. Taft (R), Ohio, and Kenneth S. Wherry (R), Nebraska, 
the key argument revolved around the President’s authority to send troops to Europe 
without Congressional approval. To this end, and bolstered by earlier statements by 
Acheson that neither the NATO Treaty nor the Military Assistance Program (MAP) 
would commit troops to Europe, Senate Resolution 8, introduced on 16 January, gave the 
sense of the Senate that no ground troops could be sent to Europe pending formulation of 
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a Congressional policy. President Truman’s response was that as Commander-in-Chief, 
he had the authority to send troops anywhere, and that while he was not required to con-
sult with Congress, he was polite and usually always consulted with them, “I don’t ask 
permission, I just consult them.” 
On 1 February, Eisenhower, by then confirmed as Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe (SACEUR), spoke to a joint session of Congress of the need for unity (regarding 
the U.S. and Europe) and stated that “someone in achieving that unity has to take the 
leadership, and I mean one nation, not some one individual.” He continued that this was 
the role of the U.S. and  that he believed that “the transfer of certain of our units should 




Two weeks later, on 15 February, Marshall addressed a joint session of the Senate 
Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs Committees and, referring to Eisenhower’s earlier tes-
timony, told the assembled Senators that after obtaining express permission from the 
President, he could inform them that the JCS had recommended to him, and he had rec-
ommended to the President - who had approved - that the U.S. maintain in Europe ap-
proximately six divisions of ground forces. As there already were in Europe approximate-
ly two divisions on occupation duty, only four more divisions would be sent.  
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Marshall reminded the committees that what was being done was, in fact, carrying 
out Congress’ earlier instructions regarding the preparation of integrated plans for the de-
fense of the North Atlantic area. Those plans were well advanced, he said, and for Gen-
eral Eisenhower to accomplish his mission it was imperative that he not be denied the 
freedom of action necessary to a military commander.
3  
The “Great Debate,” however, continued on into April with amendments to S.R. 8 
offered, new proposals made, and even a proposal submitted by the administration 
through Senators Tom Connally (D), Texas and Richard Russell (D), Georgia, was intro-
duced. In the end, however, not wanting to force a Constitutional showdown, the Senate 
passed a simpler concurrent resolution, S.R. 99 on 4 April, which not only approved the 
designation of Eisenhower as SACEUR but also approved the President’s actions and the 
dispatch of four divisions but qualified it all with the sense of the Senate that the Presi-
dent should consult with Congress and submit semi-annual reports on the implementation 
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